Re: [trill] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-trill-irb-13: (with COMMENT)

[Donald Eastlake <[e-mail]>]

Hi Stephen,

Thanks for the comments. See below.

On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 8:04 AM, Stephen Farrell
<[e-mail]> wrote:
> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-trill-irb-13: No Objection
>
> ...
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> - section 5: The tenant ID is sometimes described as "globally
> unique" and sometimes (in 5.2) as "throughout the campus." The
> latter seems likely correct to me. (As an aside, is this document
> the first to introduce that concept to TRILL?)

Yes, it should be unique within the TRILL campus.

> - section 8: If IS-IS security is not actually used, (is that the
> current deployment reality btw?) and if I can guess a tenant ID then
> what new mischief can happen? If there is some, then perhaps you
> ought recommend that tenant ID's be randomly selected within the
> campus? (I see you use "1" in the example, which is pretty easy to
> guess:-) I think one could argue that that (and maybe more) ought be
> covered in section 8, if the current deployment reality is that no
> crypto is actually used to protect most IS-IS traffic. Is it?

My impression is that IS-IS security is not used in a majority of
cases. The importance of this depends on a lot of factors such as how
tightly managed the routing area is, the security of the links between
routers, etc.

Without link (RBridge-to-adjacent-RBridge) security or edge-to-edge
(ingress-RBridge-to-egress-RBridge), obfuscating Tenant IDs provides
only limited protection against off path attackers but I agree it
would be reasonable to mention it.

Thanks,
Donald
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 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   [phone] (cell)
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