Re: [trill] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-trill-transport-over-mpls-07: (with DISCUSS)

Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> Wed, 14 March 2018 18:29 UTC

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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 14:28:50 -0400
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To: Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-trill-transport-over-mpls@ietf.org, trill-chairs@ietf.org, Susan Hares <shares@ndzh.com>, trill IETF mailing list <trill@ietf.org>, "Andrew G. Malis" <agmalis@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [trill] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-trill-transport-over-mpls-07: (with DISCUSS)
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Hi Donald,

Thanks for the proposed text.  Please see inline.

On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Kathleen,
>
> Would the following replacement Security Considerations section for
> draft-ietf-trill-transport-over-mpls be adequate?
>
>
>    This document specifies methods using existing standards and
>    facilities in ways that do not create new security problems.
>
>    For general VPLS security considerations, including discussion of
>    isolating customers from each other, see [RFC4761] and [RFC4762].
>
>    For transport of TRILL by Pseudowires security consideration, see
>    [RFC7173]. In particular, since pseudowires are support by MPLS or IP
>    which are in turn supported by a link layer, that document recommends
>    using IP security or the lower link layer security.
>
>    For added security against the compromise of data end-to-end
>    encryption and authentication should be considered; that is,
>    encryption and authentication from source end station to destination
>    end station.

Would this be accomplished through IPsec?
If encryption and authentication are not employed, what are the risks
to tenant isolation since this draft joins TRILL campuses?  I think
there should be text that explains this risk in addition to the text
already proposed.

Thanks,
Kathleen

>
>    For general TRILL security considerations, see [RFC6325].
>
>
> Thanks,
> Donald
> ===============================
>  Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-333-2270 (cell)
>  155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA
>  d3e3e3@gmail.com
>
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 5:35 PM, Andrew G. Malis <agmalis@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Kathleen,
>>
>> I don’t want to speak for the authors. However, I did contribute to this
>> draft (although not this specific section). So that said, here’s my two
>> cents ….
>>
>> I agree that first sentence could have been worded better, but the bottom
>> line is that depending on the model used, the security considerations for
>> RFC 7173, 4761, or 4762 applies, including the discussions in those RFCs on
>> issues such as isolation and end-to-end security. Those RFCs are referenced
>> in the security section. So the substance is already there, perhaps the
>> draft just needs better pointers to it.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Andy
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 5:01 PM, Kathleen Moriarty
>> <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
>>> draft-ietf-trill-transport-over-mpls-07: Discuss
>>>
>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>>
>>>
>>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>>
>>>
>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trill-transport-over-mpls/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> DISCUSS:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> I was very surprised to see the following in the security considerations
>>> section and would like to work with you on improvements.
>>>    As an informational document specifying methods that use only
>>>    existing standards and facilities, this document has no effect on
>>>    security.
>>>
>>> Having watched many TRILL documents go by in the last 4 years, we didn't
>>> push
>>> too hard on security in some cases as a result of the restriction to a
>>> campus
>>> network.  This particular document extends into multi-tenancy where there
>>> are
>>> certainly security considerations introduced to be able to provide
>>> isolation
>>> properties.  MPLS offers no security and it is being used to join TRILL
>>> campuses as described int his draft.  This is done without any
>>> requirement of
>>> an overlay protocol to provide security - why is that the case?
>>> Minimally, the
>>> considerations need to be explained.  Ideally, a solution should be
>>> offered to
>>> protect tenants when TRILL campuses are joined.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> trill mailing list
>>> trill@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trill
>>
>>
>



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen