Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-detnet-architecture-08
Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net> Thu, 08 November 2018 07:52 UTC
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To: "Black, David" <David.Black@dell.com>, "Scharf, Michael" <Michael.Scharf@hs-esslingen.de>, 'János Farkas' <janos.farkas@ericsson.com>
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From: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
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Subject: Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-detnet-architecture-08
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Hi, See below for in-line responses On 11/5/2018 12:21 AM, Black, David wrote: > ... >>> * It is surprising that there is hardly any discussion on network robustness >>> and safety; this probably also relates to security. For instance, >>> misconfiguration or errors of functions performing packet replication could >>> severely and permanently congest a network and cause harm. > [... snip ...] >> NEW: >> Robust real-time systems require to reduce the number of possible >> failures. Filters and policers should be used in a DetNet network to >> detect if DetNet packets are received on the wrong interface, or at >> the wrong time, or in too great volume. Furthermore, filters and >> policers can take action to discard offending packets or flows, or >> trigger shutting down the offending DetNet flow, or shutting down >> the offending interface. >> >> [ms] That does not address my concern. As I wrote already, I believe this >> document has to discuss the applicability of circuit breakers according to RFC >> 8084. > I concur with Michael's implied concern that the "should" in the NEW text > is woefully inadequate. The provisions to prevent escaped non-elastic traffic > from causing damage elsewhere need to be mandatory particularly if DetNet > and non-DetNet networks are interconnected. The above > text on filters doesn't appear to cover escape from the DetNet network, > and needs to do so. Deployment of filters at DetNet nodes that drop all > DetNet traffic that tries to escape, and that drop all misdirected DetNet > traffic should address most of this problem. > > Once that is done, I think a discussion of circuit breakers is needed, in the > form of Detnet service mechanisms that can shut down (cease transmission > of) a flow that is being sent entirely into the bit-bucket by a downstream filter, > due to misconfiguration, failure, etc. I think we have a bit of a disconnect of what DetNet service delivers. DetNet does not itself impact any Transport protocol (e.g., UDP, TCP) so itself does not *produce* elastic or non-elastic traffic. DetNet operates at Layer 3 and basically provides detnet flows with a service equivalent to IntServ's Guaranteed Quality of Service. As such, DetNet flows basically operate as if the network is uncongested. WRT escaped traffic, as I mentioned in today's session, I really think this is no difference between escaped DetNet traffic and traffic delivered over an uncongested network to a peer (congested or uncongested) network. Based on all this, I'm not sure how or why a discussion of circuit breakers is needed. Lou > > Thanks, --David > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Tsv-art [mailto:tsv-art-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Scharf, Michael >> Sent: Monday, October 22, 2018 5:44 PM >> To: 'János Farkas' >> Cc: tsv-art@ietf.org; DetNet WG; draft-ietf-detnet-architecture.all@ietf.org >> Subject: Re: [Tsv-art] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-detnet-architecture-08 >> >> >> [EXTERNAL EMAIL] >> Please report any suspicious attachments, links, or requests for sensitive >> information. >> >> >> Hi Janos, >> >> Thanks for the reply. My comments are inline [ms]. >> >> I have omitted all proposed changes that work for me. >> >> Michael >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: János Farkas <janos.farkas@ericsson.com> >> Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2018 10:56 AM >> To: Scharf, Michael <Michael.Scharf@hs-esslingen.de> >> Cc: tsv-art@ietf.org; draft-ietf-detnet-architecture.all@ietf.org; DetNet WG >> <detnet@ietf.org> >> Subject: Re: Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-detnet-architecture-08 >> >> Hi Michael, >> >> Thank you very much for the thorough review and good comments! >> >> Please find below in-line responses and how we plan to update the draft to >> resolve your comments. >> >> Best regards, >> Janos >> >> >> On 9/29/2018 12:24 AM, Michael Scharf wrote: >>> Reviewer: Michael Scharf >>> Review result: Ready with Issues >>> >>> The document "Deterministic Networking Architecture" >>> (draft-ietf-detnet-architecture-08) defines an overall framework for >>> Deterministic Networking. >>> >>> As TSV-ART reviewer, I believe that this document has issues as >>> detailed below. >>> >>> Michael >>> >>> Major issues: >> [...] >> >>> DetNet >>> basically requires support in (almost) all network devices >>> transporting DetNet traffic. That assumption should be explicitly >>> spelt out early in the document, e.g., in the introduction. >> Actually, some form of DetNet support is required from each node that >> transports DetNet traffic. For instance, DetNet flows have to be recognized in >> order not to spoil their QoS at the minimum. >> >> [ms] I look for an clear explanation in the architecture document of what "some >> form of DetNet support" exactly means. For instance, is standard MPLS TE >> without any DetNet support good enough for an LSR on the IP/MPLS path used >> by DetNet traffic, or not? As an example, when I read the following paragraph in >> draft-ietf-detnet-dp-sol-mpls-01 ... >> >> Transit nodes are normal MPLS Label Switching Routers (LSRs). They >> are generally unaware of the special requirements of DetNet flows, >> although they need to provide traffic engineering services and proper >> QoS to the LSPs associated with DetNet flows to enhance the prospect >> of the LSPs meeting the DetNet service requirements. Some >> implementations of transit nodes may be DetNet aware, but such nodes >> just support the DetNet transport layer. >> >> ... I could maybe assume that actually there can be "transit nodes" that do not >> require *any* sort of DetNet support or DetNet awareness. Is that correct? I >> think the architecture document has to be clear on such fundamental questions. >> >> The Introduction could be extended to clarify, e.g., the third paragraph: >> >> OLD: >> A goal of DetNet is a converged network in all respects. That is, the presence of >> DetNet flows does not preclude non-DetNet flows, and the benefits offered >> DetNet flows should not, except in extreme cases, prevent existing QoS >> mechanisms from operating in a normal fashion, subject to the bandwidth >> required for the DetNet flows. A single source-destination pair can trade both >> DetNet and non-DetNet flows. End systems and applications need not >> instantiate special interfaces for DetNet flows. Networks are not restricted to >> certain topologies; connectivity is not restricted. Any application that generates >> a data flow that can be usefully characterized as having a maximum bandwidth >> should be able to take advantage of DetNet, as long as the necessary resources >> can be reserved. Reservations can be made by the application itself, via network >> management, by an application’s controller, or by other means, e.g., a dynamic >> control plane (e.g., [RFC2205]). >> >> NEW: >> A goal of DetNet is a converged network in all respects. That is, the presence of >> DetNet flows does not preclude non-DetNet flows, and the benefits offered >> DetNet flows should not, except in extreme cases, prevent existing QoS >> mechanisms from operating in a normal fashion, subject to the bandwidth >> required for the DetNet flows. A single source-destination pair can trade both >> DetNet and non-DetNet flows. End systems and applications need not >> instantiate special interfaces for DetNet flows. Networks are not restricted to >> certain topologies; connectivity is not restricted. Any application that generates >> a data flow that can be usefully characterized as having a maximum bandwidth >> should be able to take advantage of DetNet, as long as the necessary resources >> can be reserved. Reservations can be made by the application itself, via network >> management, by an application’s controller, or by other means, e.g., a dynamic >> control plane (e.g., [RFC2205]). Network nodes supporting DetNet flows have to >> implement some of the DetNet capabilities (not necessarily all) in order to treat >> DetNet flows such that their QoS requirements are met. >> >> [ms] To me, the last sentence is not clear. Does "some of the DetNet capabilities >> (not necessarily all)" include e.g. vanilla traffic engineering? For instance, if a >> network node can ensure that the QoS requirements are met by leveraging >> existing standardized TE without any additional DetNet awareness, is this >> enough for deploying DetNet? Or does this node have to implement additional >> DetNet-specific functionality? Specifically, please explain if an existing DetNet- >> unaware router on the path taken by DetNet traffic can be used to forward >> DetNet traffic, or if it is mandatory that any router forwarding DetNet traffic >> indeed implements new capabilities specific to DetNet. In the latter case, I think >> the document would need to discuss incremental deployment strategies as well. >> >>> * It is surprising that there is hardly any discussion on network robustness >>> and safety; this probably also relates to security. For instance, >>> misconfiguration or errors of functions performing packet replication could >>> severely and permantly congest a network and cause harm. How does the DetNet >>> architecture ensure that a network stays fully operational e.g. if the topology >>> changes or there are equipment failures? Probably this can be solved by >>> implementations (e.g., dynamic control plane), but why are corresponding >>> requirements not spelt out? Section 3.3.2 speculates that filters and policers >>> can help, and that may be true, but that probably still assumes consistently >>> and correctly configured (and well-behaving) devices. And Section 3.3.2 is >>> vague and mentions a "infinite variety of possible failures" without stating >>> any requirements or recommendations. There may be further solutions, such as >>> circuit breakers and the like. Why are such topics not discussed? >> Security issues and considerations are addressed by the DetNet Security >> draft: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-detnet-security. >> Reference to the DetNet Security draft will be added. >> >> There will be a document dedicated to Operations, Administration and >> Maintenance (OAM), which will address operational, misconfiguration, and >> failure detection issues. >> >> The topology changes have to be solved by the control plane, either >> centralized or distributed. >> >> The filters and policers described in Section 3.3.2 also provide >> robustness by eliminating/mitigating traffic coming from malfunctioning >> devices. >> >> RFC2475 is recommended for traffic policing functions to increase >> robustness. >> >> The text in Section 3.3.2 could be made clearer, e.g., by updating the >> first paragraph to: >> >> OLD: >> One key to building robust real-time systems is to reduce the >> infinite variety of possible failures to a number that can be >> analyzed with reasonable confidence. DetNet aids in the process by >> allowing for filters and policers to detect DetNet packets received >> on the wrong interface, or at the wrong time, or in too great a >> volume, and to then take actions such as discarding the offending >> packet, shutting down the offending DetNet flow, or shutting down the >> offending interface. >> >> NEW: >> Robust real-time systems require to reduce the number of possible >> failures. Filters and policers should be used in a DetNet network to >> detect if DetNet packets are received on the wrong interface, or at >> the wrong time, or in too great volume. Furthermore, filters and >> policers can take action to discard offending packets or flows, or >> trigger shutting down the offending DetNet flow, or shutting down >> the offending interface. >> >> [ms] That does not address my concern. As I wrote already, I believe this >> document has to discuss the applicability of circuit breakers according to RFC >> 8084. >> >>> * Somewhat related, the document only looks at impact of failures to the QoS of >>> DetNet traffic. What is missing is a discussion how to protect non-DetNet parts >>> of a network from any harm caused by DetNet mechanisms. Solutions to this >>> probably exist. But why is the impact on non-DetNet traffic (e.g., in case of >>> topology changes or failures of DetNet functions) not discussed at all in the document? >> Actually the regulation of DetNet traffic by polices and filters >> protects both other DetNet traffic and non-DetNet traffic. >> >> Section 3.3.1 could be extended to make it clear, e.g., by extending the >> last paragraph: >> >> OLD: >> Ideally, the net effect of the presence of DetNet flows in a network >> on the non-DetNet packets is primarily a reduction in the available >> bandwidth. >> >> NEW: >> Traffic policing functions (e.g. [RFC2475]) are used to avoid the >> starvation of non-DetNet traffic. Thus, the net effect of the presence >> of DetNet flows in a network on non-DetNet flows is primarily a >> reduction in the available bandwidth. >> >> [ms] I believe a stronger wording is needed, e.g. along the lines of "a DetNet >> deployment must avoid starvation of non-DetNet traffic ...". >> >> [...] >> >>> * Section 4.4 refers to RFC 7426, which is an informational RFC on IRTF stream, >>> and the document uses the concepts introduced there (e.g., "planes"). This is >>> very confusing. First, an IETF Proposed Standard should probably refer to >>> documents having IETF consensus. An example would be RFC 7491, albeit there is >>> other related work as well, e.g., in the TEAS WG. Second, Section 4.4 is by and >>> large decoupled from the rest of the document and not specific to DetNet. >>> Neither do other sections of the document refer to the concepts introduced in >>> Section 4.4, nor does Section 4.4 use the DetNet terminology or discuss >>> applicability to DetNet. Section 4.4 even mentions explicitly at the end that >>> it discusses aspects that are orthogonal to the DetNet architecture. It is not >>> at all clear why Section 4.4 is in this document. Section 4.4 could be removed >>> from the document without impacting the rest of the document. >> The document should point out to traffic engineering and centralized >> control plane aspects, so it is better to keep Section 4.4. >> >> RFC 7426 provides the full picture of SDN architecture, which needs to >> be referred from the DetNet architecture. No other RFC provides such >> detailed picture. Therefore, we need to keep the reference to RFC 7426, >> which is an informative reference. >> >> [ms] I'll leave that up to the IESG to decide whether an IETF proposed standard >> should build an architecture based on research work instead of, say, documents >> with IETF consensus. As a side note, I believe the understanding in industry what >> "SDN architecture" really means and how it is implemented may have evolved >> since publication of IRTF RFC 7426, which was published in Jan. 2015. For >> instance, IRTF RFC 7426 does not discuss the implications of segment routing, >> BGP-LS, and other recent IETF techniques. And, based on what I read in the >> DetNet architecture, I believe DetNet could actually be implemented without >> any "SDN architecture", e.g. by distributed traffic engineering. As a result, I don't >> even understand the need to discuss "SDN". >> >> [ms] For the record: As TSV-ART reviewer, I question whether IRTF RFC 7426 is >> indeed an appropriate reference, I have doubts that IRTF RFC 7426 is really up- >> to-date, and I am concerned about the content quality of section 4.4, e.g., >> regarding the lack of alignment with the rest of the document. The IESG will >> certainly have a better understanding that than me how to deal with such topics. >> >> The related work in TEAS is already referred to. >> >> [...] >> >>> Minor issues: >>> >>> * Terminology "DetNet transport layer" >>> >>> The term "transport layer" has a well-defined meaning in the IETF, e.g. >>> originating from RFC 1122. While "transport" and e.g. "transport network" is >>> used in the IETF for different technologies in different areas, I think the >>> term "transport layer" is typically understood to refer to transport >>> protocols such as TCP and UDP. As such, I personally find the term "DetNet >>> transport layer" misleading and confusing. The confusion is easy to see e.g. >>> in Figure 4, where UDP (which is a transport protocol as per RFC 1122) sits >>> on top of "transport". >>> >>> Based on the document it also may be solution/implementation specific >> whether >>> the "DetNet transport layer" is actually a separate protocol layer compared >>> to the "DetNet service layer". Thus it is not clear to me why the word >>> "layer" has to be used, specifically in combination "transport layer". >>> >>> To me as, the word "transport layer" (and "transport protocol") should be >>> used for protocols defined in TSV area, consistent with RFC 1122. But this is >>> probably a question to be sorted out by the IESG. >> "transport" is used here as in "packet transport networks" not as OSI L4 >> transport. >> >> [ms] At the risk of stating the obvious: The relevant section of RFC 1122 defining >> "transport layer" is entitled by "The Internet Architecture". And, according e.g. >> to RFC 5921, "packet transport network" is a term defined by ITU-T. In an IETF >> document, I believe IETF terminology should be used. >> >> I suggest to use the terms "DetNet transport sub-layer" and "DetNet >> service sub-layer" throughout the document, which would hopefully avoid >> confusion. >> >> [ms] "DetNet transport sub-layer" somewhat solves my concern of avoiding the >> expression "transport layer". To really avoid confusion, I believe it would be >> better to avoid the ambiguous term "transport" altogether. But I will be fine if >> all DetNet documents consistently avoid the term "transport layer". >> >> Michael >> _______________________________________________ >> Tsv-art mailing list >> Tsv-art@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tsv-art > _______________________________________________ > detnet mailing list > detnet@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/detnet
- [Tsv-art] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-d… Michael Scharf
- Re: [Tsv-art] Tsvart last call review of draft-ie… János Farkas
- Re: [Tsv-art] Tsvart last call review of draft-ie… Scharf, Michael
- Re: [Tsv-art] Tsvart last call review of draft-ie… Black, David
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Lou Berger
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Scharf, Michael
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Black, David
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Black, David
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Lou Berger
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Scharf, Michael
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Lou Berger
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Toerless Eckert
- [Tsv-art] Fwd: Re: Tsvart last call review of dra… János Farkas
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Fwd: Re: Tsvart last call … Lou Berger
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Scharf, Michael
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Toerless Eckert
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Scharf, Michael
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Toerless Eckert
- Re: [Tsv-art] Tsvart last call review of draft-ie… Lou Berger
- Re: [Tsv-art] Tsvart last call review of draft-ie… Scharf, Michael
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Lou Berger
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Scharf, Michael
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Black, David
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Pascal Thubert (pthubert)
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Lou Berger
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Scharf, Michael
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Norman Finn
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… Scharf, Michael
- [Tsv-art] Congestion Protection name change (was:… János Farkas
- Re: [Tsv-art] Congestion Protection name change (… Pascal Thubert (pthubert)
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Congestion Protection name… Andrew G. Malis
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Congestion Protection name… qiangli (D)
- Re: [Tsv-art] [Detnet] Tsvart last call review of… János Farkas