Re: [Tsv-art] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-06

Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> Sun, 25 November 2018 13:00 UTC

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To: Joe Touch <touch@strayalpha.com>
Cc: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>, ietf@ietf.org, draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering.all@ietf.org, opsec@ietf.org, tsv-art@ietf.org
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From: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
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Subject: Re: [Tsv-art] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-06
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Joe Touch wrote on 25/11/2018 06:24:
> The reality is that standards are not followed, agreed. That does not
> imply that we need to relax those standards - instead, it can be
> reason to fix broken devices.
> 
> Working at the level of the most broken device is no way to run a
> production Internet.
> 
> And claiming that doing so is appropriate for security reasons is
> just as broken, as it always has been.
Joe,

another point of view would be that operator feedback should be welcomed 
because sometimes protocols are found to be difficult to implement 
fully, or when implemented fully cause unforeseen consequences.  EHs are 
a good example of this.  When originally conceived - for the best of 
intentions - the spec was sufficiently loose that they were not just 
unimplementable from a practical point of view, but the spec was open to 
protocol level security problems.  RFC7112 describes some issues 
relating to EHs, but there are plenty of other examples.

How, where and when to filter EH packets creates a bind, no doubt about 
it. Some EHs are intrinsically troublesome (e.g. anything with hbh 
processing requirements); others can be processed without issues.  The 
IETF can choose to ignore this problem or get involved and have some 
influence about what might constitute best practice.  If this happens, 
vendors might even fix some of their silicon.  Declaring that the 
problem exists only on one side won't make the Internet better.

Nick