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Re: [tsvwg] [saag] Comments on draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-08.txt

Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> Sat, 09 November 2019 17:41 UTC

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Sat, 09 Nov 2019 12:40:59 -0500
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [tsvwg] [saag] Comments on draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-08.txt
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People have asked me for an infographic to illustrate my point. Well I only
have text here.

Encryption is like a too-short blanket when you are trying to sleep in bed.
If you pull it up over your shoulders, you get cold toes. If you cover your
feet, the rest of you gets cold. There is nowhere that you can put that
blanket that is going to keep all of you warm and they only come in one
size. So what you need is more blankets.

If we only have one layer of encryption for headers and payload, it is all
or nothing. If the payload is encrypted inside the encrypted transport, we
can strip off the transport encryption with much less risk.


And that is part of what we will be discussing in the MATHMESH BOF in the
first session of the first day in Singapore.

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