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Re: [tsvwg] [saag] Fwd: Last Call: <draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-19.txt> (Considerations around Transport Header Confidentiality, Network Operations, and the Evolution of Internet Transport Protocols) to Informational RFC

Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar> Fri, 12 February 2021 02:08 UTC

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To: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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From: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
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Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 23:07:14 -0300
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Subject: Re: [tsvwg] [saag] Fwd: Last Call: <draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-19.txt> (Considerations around Transport Header Confidentiality, Network Operations, and the Evolution of Internet Transport Protocols) to Informational RFC
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On 11/2/21 20:19, Tom Herbert wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 3:32 PM Michael Richardson
> <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:
[....]
> 
> It's also hard not to notice how similar these discussions are with
> those that occurred when TLS was being brought up. Some network
> providers argued vehemently that if they aren't able to inspect HTTP
> payload they can't provide the services and security their customers
> need. They lost those arguments, as I suspect similar arguments that
> transport layer shouldn't be encrypted will also fail.

FWIW, I'm certainly *not* arguing that the transport layer should not be 
encrypted. I'm simply pointing out that operators do more things with 
packets that blindly forward packets on a per-packet and per-dst-address 
basis. And that that, there are consequences of them not being able to 
access IP+transport metadata.

When it comes to QUIC, it could well be the case that then only thing 
they care in this respect is IP header + UDP header... and e.g. rate 
limit as they do for some other UDP traffic.

Thanks,
-- 
Fernando Gont
e-mail: fernando@gont.com.ar || fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1

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