Re: [tsvwg] Adoption call fordraft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-zero-checksum - to conclude 25th April 2023

Michael Tuexen <> Tue, 11 April 2023 09:59 UTC

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From: Michael Tuexen <>
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Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2023 11:59:02 +0200
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To: Michael Welzl <>
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Subject: Re: [tsvwg] Adoption call fordraft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-zero-checksum - to conclude 25th April 2023
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> On 11. Apr 2023, at 11:28, Michael Welzl <> wrote:
> Hi,
> I have now read this document and support progressing it: it looks genuinely useful to me.
> I was just wondering if the receiver-side behavior should include a statement about the possibility of simply ignoring the checksum?  The way section 4.3 is written, it doesn’t exclude this, but I guess that the SCTP base RFCs prescribe that the checksum *must* be calculated and checked. So, why not relax this? With or without negotiation of "Zero Checksum Acceptable”, a receiver could probably always locally decide: “I see that this is going over DTLS, so I will ignore the SCTP checksum."
> A nit - though, not being a native speaker, I don’t even know if this really is a mistake:  "This is in particular important for computational limited end points using SCTP encapsulated in DTLS.”
> I believe that “computationally” should be used here instead of “computational".
Fixed. Thanks for notifying.

Best regards
> Cheers,
> Michael
>> On Apr 11, 2023, at 10:31 AM, Gorry Fairhurst <> wrote:
>> This email now marks the start of a WG adoption call for: Zero Checksum for the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (draft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-zero-checksum-02). This draft was discussed at the recent TSVWG meeting.
>> Abstract:
>>   The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) uses a 32-bit
>>   checksum in the common header of each packet to provide some level of
>>   data integrity.  When the lower layer used by SCTP provides already
>>   the same or a higher level of data integrity, computing this checksum
>>   does not provide any additional protection, but does require
>>   computing resources.  This document provides a simple extension to
>>   SCTP allowing to save these computing resources by using the constant
>>   0 as the checksum in a backwards compatible way.
>> Please read this draft, and send any comments/concerns to either the TSVWG or to the chairs <>.  Notes of support to progress this work, and volunteers to review the drafts will also be very welcome at this stage.
>> All participants, should disclose any relevant intellectual property rights (IPR) under [RFC8179].
>> Best wishes,
>> Gorry and Marten
>> (tsvwg co-chairs)