[tsvwg] Éric Vyncke's No Objection on draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-20: (with COMMENT)

Éric Vyncke via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Thu, 08 April 2021 11:25 UTC

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Subject: [tsvwg] Éric Vyncke's No Objection on draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-20: (with COMMENT)
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Éric Vyncke has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-20: No Objection

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thank you for the work put into this document. The document is excellent on the
readability, not a surprise from academic authors ;-)

Special thanks for the doc shepherd's write-up as it writes about the WG
consensus/discussion, which appears to be be painful (as expected on this
topic). Congratulations David !

Please find below some non-blocking COMMENT points (but replies would be
appreciated), and some nits.

I hope that this helps to improve the document,

Regards,

-éric

== COMMENTS ==

First a generic comment (close to be a DISCUSS): what about the impact on ECMP
(or even LAG) ? Many ECMP hashes are based on a 5-tuple and encrypting the
transport header will force the use of a 3-tuple. There should be a section on
the important of getting some field with entropy per 'flow'.

-- Section 2 --
Unsure whether "Common issues concerning IP address sharing are described in
[RFC6269]." should be part of this document but this is just my opinion. Feel
free to ignore.

-- Section 2.2.1 --
This is an impressive text by its clarity while being short and dense.

I just wonder about the absence of in-band/in-situ measurements, only
active/passive probing is mentioned (see other IETF works such as
draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data or draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-alt-mark -- the former only
briefly cited in section 3.3 and in more details n section 6 but should section
2.2.1 already touch the topic ?)

-- Section 2.2.2 --
About "IP address", this is probably where IP address sharing should be
mentioned (rather than in section 2) ?

Should the part about IPv6 extension headers also mention the draft that I
referred to in section 2.2.1 ?

-- Section 2.3.4 --
The DoS attack aspect is possibly too brief... (notably because it is only
against the infrastructure and not a volumetric DoS attack against a end-user
node). How to "scrub" suspicious traffic if the traffic in "uncharacterized" ?

-- Section 2.4 --
Please add LPWAN WG RFC 8724 in the compression section.

For many constrained network, compression is really important as well as
QoS/precedence of some traffic. Should there be a dedicated section about such
constrained network ? (for header compression and precedence/QoS setting)

-- Section 3 --

Generic comment: refreshing section about R&D ;-)

-- Section 6.1 --
Please consider defining a "Maintenance Domain"

== NITS ==

-- Section 6 --
OAM has already been expanded