Re: [TLS] Security concerns around co-locating TLS and non-secure on same port (WGLC: draft-ietf-tsvwg-iana-ports-08)

Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com> Tue, 09 November 2010 00:57 UTC

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Date: Mon, 08 Nov 2010 16:58:08 -0800
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Security concerns around co-locating TLS and non-secure on same port (WGLC: draft-ietf-tsvwg-iana-ports-08)
To: Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com>
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On 11/8/10 at 9:27 AM, marsh@extendedsubset.com (Marsh Ray) wrote:

>Should we only be concerned with passive eavesdropping? If so, 
>then consider how much higher adoption could have been if the 
>specs had endorsed anon-anon DH connections such that there was 
>no need for admins to set up certificates for their mail 
>servers before deploying encryption.

Don't underestimate the value of protection from passive 
eavesdropping. It buys you quite a bit in the mobile WiFi world, 
where trusting the network providers is not an unreasonable 
level of trust compared with trusting anyone who can hear your 
radio connection.

As an exercise for the student: Do you trust your network 
provider more than you trust our current version of PKI?

My answer might depend on how the three letter agencies active 
where my packets may flow fit into my threat model.

Cheers - Bill

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