Re: [tsvwg] Suggestions on draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-09

Eric Rescorla <> Thu, 07 November 2019 17:23 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <>
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2019 09:23:04 -0800
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To: Tommy Pauly <>
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Subject: Re: [tsvwg] Suggestions on draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-09
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On Thu, Nov 7, 2019 at 9:09 AM Tommy Pauly <tpauly=> wrote:

> As has been pointed out already, much of the operational considerations
> are already described by RFC 8404. Some of the discussion of these
> operational considerations in the TSV document could be reduced to point to
> that RFC, rather than needing to reiterate.
> It may be good to, as a community, re-look at the conclusions section as
> the place to rework the tone. The choice it presents at the end is, as far
> as I can tell, the main concern that is being highlighted: that there
> should be some choice between encrypting transport headers and not
> encrypting them, depending on what you want the network to be able to do.
> Practically, I don't see that being the choice before protocol designers.
> What we see in the case of the Spin Bit in QUIC is that we are adding new
> mechanisms that are explicit signals, which are arguably outside of the
> domain of the original notion of transport headers, since the endpoints
> themselves consume an encrypted form of the information that acts as their
> true authority at the transport layer. The document brings up IOAM
> signaling and other mechanisms for measurement, which are also explicit
> signaling outside of the transport. This seems to be the more obvious
> conclusion. Of course, clients may not opt into these measurement
> mechanisms, but that is the choice and evolution that needs to play out.
> Perhaps the conclusion could lay out something similar to this logic:
> - Transport headers are being encrypted, because it has become necessary
> to preserve privacy and allow for the evolution of transport protocols
> - Signals that middleboxes passively read will not be available anymore,
> which makes certain functionality harder
> - If clients want to get the functionality that middleboxes provide while
> using encrypted transports, they will need to come up with explicit
> signaling mechanisms

Isn't this point already well reflected in RFC 8558?


> -----
> Also, two typos in the document:
> Section 1:
> .... nis a technical ...
> Should be:
> .... is a technical ...
> Section 2.3:
> .... regulators to explore teh ...
> Should be:
> .... regulators to explore the ...