Re: [tsvwg] Comment on draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt

Joseph Touch <touch@strayalpha.com> Sat, 29 February 2020 04:15 UTC

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From: Joseph Touch <touch@strayalpha.com>
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Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 20:15:06 -0800
Cc: "C. M. Heard" <heard@pobox.com>, tsvwg <tsvwg@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [tsvwg] Comment on draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt
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> On Feb 28, 2020, at 7:27 PM, Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Feb 28, 2020 at 6:06 PM C. M. Heard <heard@pobox.com <mailto:heard@pobox.com>> wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 28, 2020 at 4:18 PM Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com <mailto:tom@herbertland.com>> wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 28, 2020, 4:10 PM Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:ek.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
> It also seems possible that some UDP options (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options>) might come along that could help things like QUIC effectively have a path-modifiable portion that (a) isn't a HbH extension header and (b) isn't covered by something cryptographic that would break if it were modified in-flight.
> 
> "things like QUIC" would mean protocols encapsulated in UDP. The point of HBH is that it works transparently for _all_ transport protocols whether they are encrypted. Besides, UDP options hasn't yet been proven deployable, so good chance it would just be trading one set of problems for another...
> 
> Also, UDP options as specified in the current WG draft are not intended to be modifiable in flight:
> 
>    >> Options MUST NOT be modified in transit. This includes those
>    already defined as well as new options. New options MUST NOT require
>    or intend optionally for modification of any UDP options, including
>    their new areas, in transit.
> 
> I find that a little sad, actually.  I would expect UDP MSS clamping to be a thing (in the absence of an AH it should be fine).

As discussed on the UDP options draft, the option is more relevant to signal end host reassembly limits, which are not affected by the effects of on-path tunnels.

(That’s actually how MSS is defined for TCP as well, FWIW; the fact that it’s used for something else seems to be an error that hasn’t been consistently noted).

Joe