[tsvwg] New Version of draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt (12)

Gorry Fairhurst <gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Thu, 27 February 2020 09:08 UTC

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Subject: [tsvwg] New Version of draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt (12)
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The editors have just uploaded a new revision of 
draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt following review comments. We are not 
aware of further review comments and now think that this new version is 
now ready to proceed.

Best wishes,

Gorry and Colin

---
A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-12.txt
has been successfully submitted by Godred Fairhurst and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name: draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt
Revision: 12
Title: Considerations around Transport Header Confidentiality, Network 
Operations, and the Evolution of Internet Transport Protocols
Document date: 2020-02-26
Group: tsvwg
Pages: 48
URL: 
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-12.txt
Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt/
Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-12
Htmlized: 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt
Diff: 
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-12

Abstract:
To protect user data and privacy, Internet transport protocols have
supported payload encryption and authentication for some time. Such
encryption and authentication is now also starting to be applied to
the transport protocol headers. This helps avoid transport protocol
ossification by middleboxes, while also protecting metadata about the
communication. Current operational practice in some networks inspect
transport header information within the network, but this is no
longer possible when those transport headers are encrypted. This
document discusses the possible impact when network traffic uses a
protocol with an encrypted transport header. It suggests issues to
consider when designing new transport protocols, to account for
network operations, prevent network ossification, enable transport
evolution, and respect user privacy.