[tsvwg] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: [gwhiteCL/NQBdraft] Should traffic protection be mandatory to implement? (Issue #48)

["Livingood, Jason" <[e-mail]>]

>> I also don’t think it is necessary or helpful to try to solve for malicious actors here. Any malicious actor can fill up queues and crowd out other traffic simply by sending high rate UDP.
>> Shallow buffers are not uniquely vulnerable here.

> That's the wrong class of malicious actor.  Theft of service is a different attack (with different malicious actor behavior) from denial of service.  The draft's incentives framework is making strong claims that theft of service attempts are sufficiently counterproductive for the thief so as to make other countermeasures (e.g., traffic protection) unnecessary.  The fact that all the buffers, e.g., both best effort and NQB, can be overwhelmed by a sufficiently large denial of service attack has almost no relevance to that theft of service concern.

[JL] So “theft of service” in this use case would be some software on the home network trying to achieve high throughput on an upstream (outbound) basis to the internet? There are already ways that users can sort of do similar things – such as using their own home router and using QoS prioritization to advantage certain LAN clients (e.g., game console) and to give certain devices or users more bandwidth than others. This is the user making decisions for how to use their connection.

[JL] So ISTM there are parallels in this use case to what many customers do today. They are provided a certain bandwidth (and may have volumetric usage policies) – shouldn’t it be up the the user to decide how to use that? Wouldn’t the user just  be ‘stealing’ from themselves?