Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> Tue, 17 November 2020 19:02 UTC
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References: <160433257633.23038.15047041472414640530@ietfa.amsl.com> <AB11DC08-C6ED-4045-A8F5-872AD263035D@mit.edu> <FR2P281MB01063C2EA739E892B549611D8D110@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <CAM8feuQcCdQFGUKy-ou7H3Ta38yyN1LR+0XJd9WophRMRdPDEA@mail.gmail.com> <FR2P281MB0106C83420ED3F8DF2723BFD8DE30@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <5b8ac79b-0c0e-18e9-9f80-b5d79e9ae59b@free.fr> <CAM8feuQ346w9EL=-qpJRmMOO_YUp_14gShxcro+pVxnfXTvkzw@mail.gmail.com> <5E214281-2974-4632-AB74-4E068B7EE66B@mit.edu> <CAK2Cwb5ACMxjiph796Lq1U3FZ6Tm_2TCmsKTJZn8Fgc0rzEgZQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD9ie-vDS9-Cc=cVRc_SDg7z6KxMqySdcfv3ZPSjAzHorZP7UQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAK2Cwb66asqy1MCtW7KNHyW5=H23fWATBds2aKC3Xi88V34=Rw@mail.gmail.com> <CAD9ie-sGRFQMj81g4oWAS=CgHOe5ReDrAXeVzqvW9UL0W0P-Qw@mail.gmail.com> <CAK2Cwb4EvfF6umL9kU+02kjTWGbV8Xe8ekOoA4X6yKnhhZNjpg@mail.gmail.com>
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 11:02:10 -0800
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To: Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>, GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
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It would seem that the mobile OSes would need to support a new scheme "openid:" ... and provide a mechanism in both the mobile browser and mobile apps to detect if an "openid:" handler has been installed. ᐧ On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 10:32 AM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> wrote: > yes - this is the sticking point for siop - not sure how it will get > resolved. > Peace ..tom > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 10:29 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Got it. >> >> So web apps invoke a openid: deep link and hope there is an app to handle >> the openid: scheme? ... and that it is the user's wallet rather than some >> malware that has registered openid: on the mobile device? >> >> A native app can attempt to open a deep link associated with an app, and >> will fail if the app is not there. If the app is there, it will be opened, >> so this can't be used to silently test if an app is present, but it does >> allow a native app to provide an alternative experience if an app is not >> present. I don't think this works with custom schemes ... and I don't know >> how it could work from a web app on the phone with the current Safari APIs. >> >> Apple warns against using custom schemes [1] ... but perhaps they can be >> convinced to make openid: a managed scheme similar to mailto:, tel:, >> sms:, facetime: ? >> >> [1] >> https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/allowing_apps_and_websites_to_link_to_your_content/defining_a_custom_url_scheme_for_your_app >> >> >> ᐧ >> >> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 10:06 AM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> You are - that is not standard which is opeind:// >>> This is the one step that still needs to be optimized for SIOP to have >>> good UX. >>> Peace ..tom >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:59 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Tom >>>> >>>> I watched your video (I watched at 2X speed) >>>> >>>> Looks like the employment website app that is using localhost:8765 to >>>> communicate with the wallet. Am I correct? >>>> >>>> /Dick >>>> ᐧ >>>> >>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:46 AM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Well, here's a demo. Note that in this case the AS is not online all >>>>> of the time, so it is really implicit flow and the OIDC id-token comes from >>>>> the siop device directly. >>>>> (whether this is front-channel or back channel is no longer an >>>>> interesting question.) >>>>> Now if an always-on AS is required, that is possible, but probably >>>>> beyond the scope of this effort and would require something like an >>>>> agent-in-the-sky (with diamonds). >>>>> here is the link to the 9 min video https://youtu.be/Tq4hw7X5SW0 >>>>> <https://urldefense.us/v2/url?u=https-3A__youtu.be_Tq4hw7X5SW0&d=DwMFaQ&c=2plI3hXH8ww3j2g8pV19QHIf4SmK_I-Eol_p9P0CttE&r=D5lnfoa2MVZWELqVbbz71ooelbP7rVGCjGDSBNvUpYQ&m=ixsudGSr_dhG-SLiatb4Sz9FWslmywnYyZAOLgZxhl8&s=jdLLy0G1JTQCAOBZ6PeUgI0kiCtVJXrru0VToYWlNZ8&e=> >>>>> Peace ..tom >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:20 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Ultimately, in most situations like these in the real world, the >>>>>> hurdle isn’t technical compatibility so much as it is trust compatibility. >>>>>> The RP (client) needs to have some incentive to trust the assertions and >>>>>> identity information that’s coming from the AS. The same is true for an RS >>>>>> trusting tokens from the AS. The hard question is less “how” to do that >>>>>> (which SSI answers), but more “why” to do that (which SSI doesn’t answer >>>>>> very well, because it’s a hard question). >>>>>> >>>>>> Still: it’s definitely a question about how to support this “AS on >>>>>> device” element. We’ve got the start of it more than OAuth2/OIDC have by >>>>>> allowing the bootstrap of the process from a starting call: the interaction >>>>>> and continuation URIs handed back by the AS don’t need to be the same URIs >>>>>> that the client starts with, so just like SIOP the process can start in >>>>>> HTTP and potentially move to other communication channels. A major >>>>>> difference is that we aren’t dependent on the assumption that the user will >>>>>> always be in a browser at some stage, and so the whole raft of >>>>>> front-channel messages that SIOP relies on doesn’t fly. That said, we’ve >>>>>> got an opportunity to more explicitly open up alternative communication >>>>>> channels here, and that’s something I’d like to see engineered, even if >>>>>> it’s an extension. I’d love to see a concrete proposal as to how that would >>>>>> work over specific protocols, starting with what we’ve got today. >>>>>> >>>>>> — Justin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 17, 2020, at 12:03 PM, Fabien Imbault < >>>>>> fabien.imbault@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Denis, hi Francis, >>>>>> >>>>>> At some point integration with SSI (on the authentication side) will >>>>>> probably occur, including amongst other possibilities SIOP (since they work >>>>>> with OpenID a part of the work will probably be made easier). >>>>>> >>>>>> That being said, Denis is right. It's not an AS. Technically it's >>>>>> entirely possible to rely on a decentralized wallet (for instance on your >>>>>> phone) and a centralized AS. I know of a few studies on how to decentralize >>>>>> the AS itself (for instance >>>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardjono-oauth-decentralized-02). >>>>>> Maybe it exists, but I'm still looking for real scenarios (or even >>>>>> architectures) where an AS is deployed directly on a phone, and under the >>>>>> sole authority of the RO, while being compatible with the rest of the >>>>>> world. >>>>>> >>>>>> Cheers, >>>>>> Fabien >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 5:45 PM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hello Francis, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> See two comments in line. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> B) Current Document >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Roles description shall not hold any assumption on the physical >>>>>>> structure of the party fulfilling the roles. >>>>>>> [FI] not sure what you mean >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [FP] for example, we assume the AS is a server! In most SSI based >>>>>>> use cases, the AS will be running on the user device. See SIOP ( >>>>>>> https://identity.foundation/did-siop/). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I browsed through the two drafts, i.e. : >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0 Core architecture, data >>>>>>> model, and representations W3C Working Draft 08 November 2020 >>>>>>> - Self-Issued OpenID Connect Provider DID Profile v0.1. DIF >>>>>>> Working Group Draft >>>>>>> >>>>>>> At no place within these two documents, it is possible to imagine >>>>>>> that "the AS will be running on the user device". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> From section 3 of the DIF Working Group Draft: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Unlike the OIDC Authorization Code Flow as per [OIDC.Core], >>>>>>> the SIOP will not return an access token to the RP". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An Identity Wallet is not an AS. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Roles: >>>>>>> -> grant endpoint of the AS: Why is this a post request? This >>>>>>> eliminates the chance of having user device hosted AS (no server). >>>>>>> [FI] what would you propose instead? >>>>>>> Would also be interested to understand better the deployment model >>>>>>> when there is no server. That's something that was discussed several times >>>>>>> but I'm still missing the underlying architecture and use case. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [FP] See above (SIOP). There will be a lot of identity wallets >>>>>>> operated on end user device. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> See the above comment. Please, do not confuse an Identity Wallet >>>>>>> with an Authentication Server (AS). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Denis >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -> Resource Owner (RO) : Authorizes the request? Does it authorize >>>>>>> the request or the access to a resource? >>>>>>> [FI] yes, we should make the wording clearer >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Missing Section Interactions: >>>>>>> --> This section shall introduce the notion of interaction before we >>>>>>> start listing interaction types. >>>>>>> [FI] yes >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Interaction Types: >>>>>>> --> I prefer a classification with Redirect, Decoupled and Embedded >>>>>>> is. In the draft, we have one redirect and 2 decouple interactions and >>>>>>> nothing else. >>>>>>> [FI] this should be handled as a specific discussion item. As a >>>>>>> reminder, how would you define embedded? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In practice there's at least these modes: >>>>>>> - redirect and redirect back >>>>>>> - redirect to different browser or device >>>>>>> - user code >>>>>>> - CIBA >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [FP] This classification is limited. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Redirect: same device, same or different user agents (browser, >>>>>>> mobile app, desktop app, ...) >>>>>>> - Decoupled: different devices >>>>>>> - Embedded : RC carries RO authorization to AS >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Resource Access Request vs. Resource Request >>>>>>> --> Both are mixed up. No clarification of the context of each >>>>>>> section. >>>>>>> [FI] could you clarify what you'd expect. Btw on this topic, >>>>>>> there's a more general discussion on whether we should make a distinction >>>>>>> or not. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [FP]: Here: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Resource Access Request: Requesting Access to a resource. >>>>>>> Response is an access token (or any type of grant) >>>>>>> - Resource Request: Request the resource. Response is the >>>>>>> resource (or a corresponding execution) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Token Content Negotiation >>>>>>> --> Not expressed as such. This is central to GNAP and not >>>>>>> represented enough in the document. >>>>>>> [FI] right. This should be a specific discussion item. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Requesting "User" Information >>>>>>> we identify two types of users: RQ and RO. It will be better not to >>>>>>> refer to a user in this draft, but either to a RQ or an RO. >>>>>>> [FI] yes that would avoid potential misunderstandings. Although in >>>>>>> the end, people will translate RQ into user or end-user most of the time. >>>>>>> Cf in definition, currently we have Requesting Party (RQ, aka >>>>>>> "user") >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Interaction Again >>>>>>> -> For each interaction type, we will have to describe the protocol >>>>>>> flow and the nature and behavior of involved Roles (Parties), Elements, >>>>>>> Requests. >>>>>>> [FI] yes >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [FP] Will these and into tickets? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best regards. >>>>>>> /Francis >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> TXAuth mailing list >>>>>>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> TXAuth mailing list >>>>>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> TXAuth mailing list >>>>>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> TXAuth mailing list >>>>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>>>> >>>>
- [GNAP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-… internet-drafts
- Re: [GNAP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-gnap-core-proto… Justin Richer
- [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00 Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault