Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architecture?
Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> Tue, 23 March 2021 15:15 UTC
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From: Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2021 08:15:17 -0700
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To: Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Mark Miller <erights@gmail.com>, GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architecture?
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Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Alan, > > Yes, but in that flow, the token relationship between AS-RS and AS-RO is > only secure if the tokens issued by AS-RS are cryptographically attenuable > in the first place. > Attenuated delegation is a requirement, but that doesn't have to be done cryptographically. Token exchange works just fine. SPKI and zcap-ld are examples of the crypto approach, and we used token exchange in the system for HP. -------------- Alan Karp On Tue, Mar 23, 2021 at 4:12 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Alan, > > Yes, but in that flow, the token relationship between AS-RS and AS-RO is > only secure if the tokens issued by AS-RS are cryptographically attenuable > in the first place. > > Fabien > > On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 9:26 PM Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >> >>> >>> But with all that in mind, I think the key here is going to be looking >>> at what the inputs to the AS are, and how those can be defined in an >>> interoperable way for AS’s that can accept them. I think there’s a lot of >>> room for innovation and flexibility here that doesn’t break the trust model >>> or core use cases. If I have an AS-RS set that won’t accept my favorite >>> flavor of policy engine inputs, then I can decide not to use that one. But >>> this is a very different question than saying the RS itself needs to accept >>> my own AS — and we can’t keep conflating these two models. >>> >>> I agree. The point of having an AS-RO is to allow RO to specify a >> policy for which of RO's access tokens should be delegated under what >> conditions. AS-RS should not need to understand those policies. The flow >> would be >> >> - RO contacts AS-RS and gets one or more access tokens. >> - RO delegates one or more of those tokens, potentially sub-scoped, >> to AS-RO. >> - A different user contacts AS-RO to get a potentially sub-scoped >> access token from AS-RO. >> - That user presents the access token delegated by AS-RO when >> invoking the resource. >> >> AS-RS only needs to verify that the delegation chain is legitimate, e.g., >> no increase in scope, and that it grants permission for the request being >> made. AS-RS does not need to understand the policy behind granting the >> delegation by AS-RO. >> >> -------------- >> Alan Karp >> >> >> On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 11:40 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >> >>> Adrian, >>> >>> I think this shows the problem with the terminology as it’s been applied >>> in this conversation, which I’ve tried to shine light on before. What you >>> and others are calling the “RS” is really the “AS and RS working together” >>> — everything to the right of the line. When Denis had brought up >>> “eliminating the AS” in another thread, what he’d really done is labeled >>> everything to the right of the line as the “RS”. Of course, the irony here >>> is that everything to the right of the line used all be called the “AS” or >>> simply “server” in the OAuth 1 days. As you say below, I don’t want the >>> client to have visibility on what happens on that side. >>> >>> Note well: The Google+ logo labeled “IdP” in the diagram is not the AS, >>> as far as GNAP is concerned. It does not issue an access token that the RS >>> will accept. The elements to the left of the line could be a lot of things, >>> but they are NOT the AS — by definition. The client lives over on the left, >>> but so do any external inputs to the AS. These could be policy inputs on >>> behalf of the RO, they could be presentation artifacts, they could be >>> federated logins, they could be the output of policy decisions. How the AS >>> comes to trust those things is up to the AS’s implementation. It’s >>> something we can talk about, but ultimately GNAP won’t be in any position >>> to dictate because in practice some AS’s are simply going to internalize >>> all policies and we will never successfully force those open. >>> >>> But with all that in mind, I think the key here is going to be looking >>> at what the inputs to the AS are, and how those can be defined in an >>> interoperable way for AS’s that can accept them. I think there’s a lot of >>> room for innovation and flexibility here that doesn’t break the trust model >>> or core use cases. If I have an AS-RS set that won’t accept my favorite >>> flavor of policy engine inputs, then I can decide not to use that one. But >>> this is a very different question than saying the RS itself needs to accept >>> my own AS — and we can’t keep conflating these two models. >>> >>> So to me, GNAP can support a Zero Trust Architecture by LEVERAGING the >>> AS, not by subsuming or eliminating it. It is in fact the AS, not the >>> client and not the RS, that will request and consume the results of a >>> privacy-preserving zero-trust policy query thing. Anything that happens >>> downstream from that is of little concern to the zero-trust components >>> because, as you point out, it’s on the “other side” of the line. >>> >>> I think we got this basic component model pretty right in OAuth: the AS >>> and RS and client working together. Where OAuth misses the mark is the >>> assumption that the user has to log in to the AS through a webpage and >>> interact directly, thereby proving they’re the RO. It’s this latter space >>> where I think we can both push innovation and also address the important >>> and compelling use cases like the ones you’re bringing. >>> >>> — Justin >>> >>> On Mar 22, 2021, at 2:14 PM, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I'm sorry, Justin. As a Resource Owner, I look at the RS trust boundary >>> (the dotted line in the diagram) as being the RS. I don't expect any >>> visibility into what's going on on the right. >>> >>> My problem with the framing you propose is that requests are going to >>> the RS (or the AS-RS) and I don't want to share my policies with the AS-RS. >>> I want to keep the RS and AS-RS as ignorant as possible. >>> >>> Adrian >>> >>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 1:48 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >>> >>>> Adrian, >>>> >>>> What you’re discussing below, in terms of logging in to a site, is not >>>> approaching the RS. You are in fact approaching the client, and identifying >>>> both the AS and RS to the client. The client is a client *of your >>>> identity* in this model, and the RS is part of the identity provider. >>>> It’s really important that we don’t conflate the RS and client in this way >>>> as it leads to a lot of confusion downstream and a lot of broken trust >>>> boundaries. >>>> >>>> With that model in mind, approaching the “RS" and providing it your >>>> identity is really just a case of the “federated login to AS” pattern that >>>> we discussed on the WG call. The user here approaches an RS, which has its >>>> own AS. To share things from this RS, the RO has to authenticate to the >>>> RS’s AS. This particular AS allows the RO to do so using an external >>>> identity — in which case, the AS is now a “client” of a separate, >>>> disconnected (but layered) delegation. The ultimate client that eventually >>>> calls the RS down the way may or may not know about these layers. >>>> >>>> <PastedGraphic-1.png> >>>> This same AS, which is closely tied to the RS and trusted by the RS, >>>> might also take in FIDO credentials, or DIDs, or any number of other proof >>>> mechanisms. The output of this is an access token the RS trusts, but the >>>> input is up to the AS. The RS is not what you’re logging in to. >>>> >>>> — Justin >>>> >>>> On Mar 22, 2021, at 1:28 PM, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I too am in favor of avoiding consolidation and correlation. Right now, >>>> when I approach a service provider (RS) for the first time, I'm offered the >>>> opportunity to identify my persona as: email, sign-in with Google, >>>> Facebook, or Apple. I know there are people who try to create one-off email >>>> addresses but that is mostly a waste of time. >>>> >>>> So, along come FIDO2 and DID wallets to the rescue. Now, in theory, I >>>> have a way to start out my RS relationship pseudonymously. >>>> >>>> When I want my resource to be discovered or shared I will post that RS >>>> URL including my pseudonym. If I then want to introduce a mediator in front >>>> of my AS or messaging service endpoint, I have that option. If I want to >>>> keep requests away from the mediator, I would publish an encryption key >>>> along with my pseudonym. >>>> >>>> - Adrian >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 9:55 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Mar 21, 2021, at 1:18 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote: >>>>> > >>>>> > On Sat, Mar 20, 2021 at 01:07:42AM -0400, Adrian Gropper wrote: >>>>> >> @Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> shared a talk about the Principle >>>>> Of Least >>>>> >> Authority (POLA) in a recent comment >>>>> >> >>>>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/145#issuecomment-803099693 >>>>> >> I recommend it. >>>>> >> >>>>> >> We might expect a protocol with authorization in the title to use >>>>> authority >>>>> >> as a core principle. I advocate for a GNAP design that maximizes >>>>> the power >>>>> >> of the RO, to be seen as a human rights issue when the RO is a >>>>> human. This >>>>> >> causes me to ask how to combine better security with better human >>>>> rights in >>>>> >> GNAP. >>>>> >> >>>>> >> Who should have the least authority in the GNAP design? >>>>> >> >>>>> >> The AS derives authority as a delegate of the RO. If we ask the RO >>>>> to >>>>> >> partition limited authority across dozens of different ASs by >>>>> domain and >>>>> >> function, then we are not using technology to empower the >>>>> individual. >>>>> >> Probably the opposite, as we introduce consent fatigue and burden >>>>> normal >>>>> >> people to partition their lives into non-overlapping domains. >>>>> >> >>>>> >> My experience says we should aim for one AS per persona because >>>>> that maps >>>>> >> into the way we manage our public and private identities. POLA >>>>> would then >>>>> >> teach care in keeping ASs and RSs related to work / public separate >>>>> from >>>>> >> ASs and RSs related to private life so that a policy vulnerability >>>>> in our >>>>> >> delegation to an AS would have the least likelihood of harm. >>>>> > >>>>> > Thinking about how least authority/least privilege would apply to >>>>> GNAP >>>>> > seems like a useful exercise. I do want to point out some potential >>>>> > pitfalls with one-AS-per-persona that we can also be aware of. If >>>>> > one-AS-per-persona becomes one-persona-per-AS as well, then the AS's >>>>> > identity in effect also serves as a persona identity and there are >>>>> privacy >>>>> > considerations to that. If, on the other hand, the >>>>> > multiple-personas-per-AS (presumably corresponding to multiple >>>>> humans) >>>>> > route is taken, we should consider whether that would lead to various >>>>> > (e.g., market) forces driving consolidation to just a handful of >>>>> > super-popular AS services. That topic is a current matter of >>>>> concern to >>>>> > some IETF participants. >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> Hi Ben, big +1 to this. This is something that we discussed ages ago >>>>> in the UMA working group, and it’s one of the biggest problems with the >>>>> personal AS (and personal data store) model. This kind of thing makes >>>>> RS-first trust models really difficult in practice. >>>>> >>>>> As a strawman, let’s say that I’ve got software that wants to access >>>>> my medical information. It calls an RS and requests access, but it hasn’t >>>>> been granted anything yet. Now I as the RO have set up the RS so that it >>>>> talks to my personal AS, that only I use. In addition to the RS having to >>>>> be able to figure out which medical records are being requested from the >>>>> context of the unauthenticated request (which means it needs identifiers in >>>>> the URL or something similar for the RS to be able to tell, assuming that >>>>> it protects data for more than one person). So this client software doesn’t >>>>> know who I am and doesn’t know my medical record information, makes a >>>>> completely unauthorized request to the RS, and the RS says “Go to Justin’s >>>>> personal AS to get a token”. The client can now make a direct correlation >>>>> between the data that’s being protected at the RS and the person running >>>>> the AS that protects it. Importantly, this client makes this call with no >>>>> prior relationship to the RS and no really auditable way to track it down >>>>> after the fact. This is a design feature in the good case, and terrifying >>>>> in the bad case. >>>>> >>>>> If the RS instead says “welcome to Medicine Doctor RS, please talk to >>>>> the Medicine Doctor AS to get access”, we haven’t exposed anything at all. >>>>> And from the perspective of both the patient and the RS, this is more >>>>> privacy-preserving, and it’s really the least surprising option. Once the >>>>> client gets to the AS, it can start a negotiation of figuring out who the >>>>> RO is for the information being accessed. >>>>> >>>>> On top of this, the usability expectations of people managing their >>>>> own AS, or set of AS’s for multiple personas to keep things separate, is a >>>>> huge burden. Even in the tech community, I know people who can’t reliably >>>>> manage more than one email address for different purposes. I wouldn’t >>>>> expect my partner to do that — they have trouble enough balancing all the >>>>> logins and sessions required for different kids remote schooling, I >>>>> couldn’t imagine them having to understand all the requirements for >>>>> managing multiple authorization servers and associated policies. I also >>>>> don’t expect any person to “manage keys” — I’ve been on the internet for >>>>> decades and I can barely keep tabs on my GPG keys, and only use them when I >>>>> am forced to. This is exactly the kind of “market pressure” that I think >>>>> Ben mentions above, people will just want to outsource that to someone >>>>> else, and the reality will be a few popular providers. >>>>> >>>>> In which case, we could end up doing a ton of work to allow an RS >>>>> choice only to end up with a world where the RS ends up making a limited >>>>> choice anyway. We see how that plays out with OpenID Connect — RP’s could >>>>> allow arbitrary IdPs but they choose Google because it works and that’s >>>>> where the users are. (And that’s not to say anything of the proprietary >>>>> OIDC-like protocols, but that’s another discussion). >>>>> >>>>> For further reading on these topics, I recommend both “Why Johnny >>>>> Can’t Encrypt” and “Why CSCW Systems Fail”. >>>>> >>>>> So what does this have to do with GNAP? I think we can be clear-eyed >>>>> on what kinds of expectations we have for the participants. If we expect >>>>> users (RO’s) to have to set up the AS-RS relationship, or expect them to >>>>> carry their AS, or manage their personal keys — I think we’ve lost the >>>>> battle for relevance. >>>>> >>>>> — Justin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >> TXAuth mailing list >> TXAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >> >
- [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architecture? Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication and Au… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Adrian Gropper
- [GNAP] Alice a J&J COVID vaccine Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Alice a J&J COVID vaccine Adrian Gropper