Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architecture?

Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> Sat, 20 March 2021 20:58 UTC

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From: Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2021 21:58:11 +0100
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To: Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>
Cc: Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com>, GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>, Mark Miller <erights@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architecture?
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OK fine then.

I just remembered that you suggested a choice between several AS-RSs by the
RO. If that's not the case, there's no problem.

Fabien

Le sam. 20 mars 2021 à 21:20, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> a
écrit :

> To be clear, I'm suggesting that GNAP standardize two separate flows if
> necessary and give the RS the option of supporting one or both of them.
> - Option 1 is capabilities and exactly as Alan just outlined where the RO
> does not need to inform the RS that it is using an AS.
> - Option 2 is an RO-controlled AS as might be linked to a DID service
> endpoint.
>
> Adrian
>
> On Sat, Mar 20, 2021 at 1:58 PM Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> You are close on the flow.  The only change is that the RO does not need
>> to inform the RS that the RO is using an AS.
>>
>> The flow is described in our Zebra Copy tech report,
>> https://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2007/HPL-2007-105.pdf, which, by the
>> way, uses non-opaque tokens.  (Don't worry about the length.  The last 60
>> pages are a walkthrough of the reference implementation.)  I believe that
>> example is closer to the GNAP use cases than the one in the talk Adrian
>> mentioned.  Also, I hope the different terminology isn't too confusing.
>>
>>    1. The owner of RS delegates a set of rights to the administrator of
>>    the service, AS-RS.
>>    2. RO contacts AS-RS and gets back a capability authorizing a
>>    specific set of methods at RS.
>>    3. RO can use that capability to invoke RS with any of the authorized
>>    permissions.
>>    4. RO can delegate a subset of those rights to a client, who can then
>>    invoke the RS with any of the authorized permissions.
>>    5. RO can delegate a subset of those rights to an AS-RO.
>>    6. AS-RO can delegate a subset of those rights to a client based on a
>>    policy specified by RO.
>>    7. That client can invoke RO with any of the authorized permissions.
>>
>> Note that AS-RS doesn't need to know anything about the various
>> delegatees.  It just needs to verify that the delegations are valid.
>>
>> Responsibility tracking follows those steps.  AS-RS will hold RO
>> responsible for all uses of any token delegated from the one AS-RS gave
>> RO.  Each delegator is responsible for knowing who to hold responsible for
>> each of its delegations.  Say there's a $100 penalty for misuse, and the
>> client in step 6 does something bad.  AS-RS will collect $100 from RO.
>> It's up to RO to collect $100 from AS-RO and up to AS-RO to collect from
>> the client.
>>
>> This approach is the only thing that makes sense.  What would RS or AS-RS
>> do with the information that RO delegated to AS-RO?  AS-RS has no way of
>> collecting from AS-RO; only RO does.
>>
>> --------------
>> Alan Karp
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 20, 2021 at 3:52 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks for the description.
>>>
>>> Trying to summarize what a capability  flow would look like following
>>> those ideas:
>>>
>>> 1) RS issues a capability for the RO. For instance "view and download
>>> photo".
>>>
>>> 2) RO can delegate that capability (or an attenuated version) to the AS.
>>> Say "view photo", possibly with some ambient conditions.
>>> If the RO further wants to choose between a list of possible ASs, the RO
>>> would have to signal its choice to the RS, which would then have to signal
>>> it to the client (what we had called RS preflight in some discussions). So
>>> the AS-RS relationship would be mediated via the RO (or more precisely its
>>> agent).
>>>
>>> 3) a core GNAP negociation takes place with the AS (traditional photo
>>> example).
>>>
>>> Is that correct? Do not hesitate to correct me if I didn't accurately
>>> capture what you said.
>>> (I volontarily put DID aside for now)
>>>
>>> Steps occurring before 3 are optional (for reasons discussed before and
>>> also because we can't assume all RSs would be able to support that).
>>>
>>> Fabien
>>>
>>> Le sam. 20 mars 2021 à 10:49, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> a
>>> écrit :
>>>
>>>> Hi Fabien,
>>>>
>>>> Yes, it’s optional and adding meaningful options is one way to consider
>>>> the ethical imperative http://www.cybsoc.org/heinz.htm
>>>>
>>>> If I understand Alan’s teachings, the RS has the option to either issue
>>>> one or more capabilities to the RO or to store some identity-related
>>>> information about the RO such as the DID of the RO and, by reference, the
>>>> AS service endpoint controlled by that DID.
>>>>
>>>> Given some capabilities, the RO can either deal with them manually or
>>>> hand them to an AS. Either way, the RS has no idea of the RO’s choice until
>>>> it receives a token from some end user. This seems to be what the Letters
>>>> of Transit in Casablanca were all about.
>>>>
>>>> If, on the other hand, the RO chooses to give 5e RS a DID, a
>>>> self-sovereign identifier, instead of taking some capabilities, then the RS
>>>> has the expectation  to trust tokens signed by that DID.
>>>>
>>>> It’s my hope that GNAP can allow an ethical RS to offer both choices to
>>>> the RO.
>>>>
>>>> Adrian
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Mar 20, 2021 at 4:23 AM Fabien Imbault <
>>>> fabien.imbault@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Adrian,
>>>>>
>>>>> Calling to one AS per persona can only be optional, as we have no way,
>>>>> and no wish, of knowing all the identities used by the RO.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think this relates to the idea of the RO having its own distinct
>>>>> agent, but I still don't understand how that would work (even re-reading
>>>>> the thread in issue 145). Could you elaborate?
>>>>>
>>>>> Thxs
>>>>> Fabien
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Le sam. 20 mars 2021 à 06:08, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>
>>>>> a écrit :
>>>>>
>>>>>> @Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> shared a talk about the Principle
>>>>>> Of Least Authority (POLA) in a recent comment
>>>>>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/145#issuecomment-803099693
>>>>>> I recommend it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We might expect a protocol with authorization in the title to use
>>>>>> authority as a core principle. I advocate for a GNAP design that maximizes
>>>>>> the power of the RO, to be seen as a human rights issue when the RO is a
>>>>>> human. This causes me to ask how to combine better security with better
>>>>>> human rights in GNAP.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Who should have the least authority in the GNAP design?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The AS derives authority as a delegate of the RO. If we ask the RO to
>>>>>> partition limited authority across dozens of different ASs by domain and
>>>>>> function, then we are not using technology to empower the individual.
>>>>>> Probably the opposite, as we introduce consent fatigue and burden normal
>>>>>> people to partition their lives into non-overlapping domains.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My experience says we should aim for one AS per persona because that
>>>>>> maps into the way we manage our public and private identities. POLA would
>>>>>> then teach care in keeping ASs and RSs related to work / public separate
>>>>>> from ASs and RSs related to private life so that a policy vulnerability in
>>>>>> our delegation to an AS would have the least likelihood of harm.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Beyond that fairly obvious principle, we could spread our
>>>>>> interactions among as many services as possible. We already do this when we
>>>>>> spread assets across multiple banks, internet services across redundant
>>>>>> platforms, or we use LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook with limited overlap
>>>>>> in social graphs.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> At the next level down, we want to manage resources at each RS using
>>>>>> least authority in order to make AS policy vulnerabilities easier to spot
>>>>>> and debug. My AS might get multiple capabilities or access to scopes from
>>>>>> an RS, each one carefully labeled with its intended uses so that the policy
>>>>>> engine of my AS could be structured to consider requests relative to only
>>>>>> one capability or scope family at a time. For example, in issuing health
>>>>>> record authorizations, I might separate the behavioral health capabilities
>>>>>> from capabilities to access the physical parts of my record at a given
>>>>>> hospital's GNAP RS API.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Lastly, at the level of attenuation, I would choose a relationship
>>>>>> with RSs that issue to me capabilities that can be attenuated not only by
>>>>>> my AS but also by the requesting parties that receive them as part of an
>>>>>> access token.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Adrian
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> TXAuth mailing list
>>>>>> TXAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth
>>>>>>
>>>>>