Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00

+1
The interim meeting planned on Wednesday will be a good opportunity to
discuss interactions !

Fabien

On Mon, Feb 8, 2021 at 2:22 PM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Justin +1
>
> thx ..Tom (mobile)
>
> On Mon, Feb 8, 2021, 5:19 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>
>> I agree that the focus of this group does need to be on an HTTP-based AS
>> — this particular use case is the one that we have to solve for, and that’s
>> why those details are called out in the charter. We aren’t here to try to
>> build a transport-independent security language, with abstractions and
>> bindings and things of that sort. But that said, the “on-device AS” use
>> case is being brought up a lot, and solutions have been hacked together in
>> the OAuth 2 world in several different ways. As such, we as a WG should be
>> paying attention to them, and if there are things we can do in our design
>> to allow for that kind of deployment then we need to consider them. That
>> doesn’t mean we have to have that fully specified in the core protocol, but
>> if there’s a way to design this so that it can be extended in that
>> direction without the kind of hacks that the OAuth 2 solutions have to rely
>> on, then it’ll be better for everyone. This can’t distract us from solving
>> the core use cases, or drive us to making the core so complex that it
>> becomes irrelevant, but we shouldn’t be blind to these other possibilities.
>>
>> In my opinion as a contributor, the best opportunities we have for that
>> kind of extension in the way the protocol’s built right now are in the
>> interaction and continuation pieces of GNAP. Interaction we’ve always known
>> was going to allow for a move off-browser, and less dependence on
>> user-in-a-browser is baked into the charter as well. But we need more
>> experience and more details about :how: that works, and that’s a lot of
>> what this current conversation is going to be about. You are completely
>> right that there are another set of challenges, but in my mind it’s that
>> the trust model is simply different. What do I trust more, a device in my
>> pocket or a web server in someone else’s data center? There isn’t an easy
>> or universal answer to that question, as it turns out.
>>
>>  — Justin
>>
>> On Feb 7, 2021, at 5:51 PM, Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> wrote:
>>
>> Hello Fabian,
>>
>> I am sorry for the delayed reply, but very busy working on those
>> decentralized use cases where tokens a produced on the user device.
>>
>>
>> Like we can see in this thread, it is not obvious to have those use cases
>> considered in GNAP (as the GNAP charter mentions reliance on HTTP based AS).
>>
>> If the role of an AS is to produce an authorization, a user device hosted
>> AS can be build, but the negotiation process will be different from the one
>> defined by GNAP. Means interaction protocol will need more than just HTTP.
>>
>> The biggest challenge we are facing on user device produced auth tokens
>> is on how to preserve those crypto keys held on user device from malware,
>> loss of device...
>>
>> For the moment keeping focus of GNAP on (http) server-based production of
>> token looks like a good decision.
>>
>> I will review the draft sometime as soon as possible and provide my
>> feedback.
>>
>> Best regards,
>>
>> /Francis
>>
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* TXAuth <txauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Fabien Imbault <
>> fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> *Sent:* Friday, February 5, 2021 3:41 PM
>> *To:* Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>
>> *Cc:* Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>; txauth gnap <
>> txauth@ietf.org>; Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
>> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
>>
>> Hi Adrian,
>>
>> We would be glad to get your expertise on that. Not sure DIDComm is
>> essential yet, so far I see it personally as something to look into,
>> especially for use cases when we want to reach out to a RO. I agree with
>> the potential issues.
>>
>> I have a few ideas on how to implement privacy, but it's quite involved
>> in terms of crypto (again using Ristretto groups :-)).
>>
>> Of course there will be a question of priority in the features we plan to
>> implement. I guess we should aim for a first publication without the parts
>> which are blurry, and take the time to prototype the rest.
>>
>> Cheers
>> Fabien
>>
>> Le ven. 5 févr. 2021 à 21:19, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> a
>> écrit :
>>
>> There are privacy implications as well as the cost of processing spam. A
>> service endpoint associated with a DID can be presumed to be a public
>> broadcast. Any party can attempt to send a message or an authorization
>> request to that service endpoint. The operator of that service, typically
>> the DID controller, will bear the cost and risk of processing the message.
>> They may request a bond be posted by the party responding to the
>> "broadcast" in order to mitigate spam and phishing. They may also require
>> that the party seeking to communicate offer credentials, which poses a
>> privacy risk to that party in the form of phishing "broadcasts" via DIDs
>> and lures that lead to DIDs.
>>
>> In my role as invited expert on privacy to some W3C WGs and, to some
>> extent, DIF WGs, I have not managed to understand the privacy engineering
>> and implications in DIDcomm. I will try harder if DIDcomm has an essential
>> role with GNAP and I can understand it in the self-sovereign or fiduciary
>> authorization server context. Does it?
>>
>> Adrian
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 5, 2021 at 1:08 PM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Probably (and to be honest even for industrial users I find it complex),
>> but alternatives are not ready for prime time either.
>> Maybe some day DIDComm could be useful as a basic block, what we suggest
>> is to first use that as a potential interaction (and there's already a lot
>> of questions that arise just from that).
>>
>> Fabien
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 5, 2021 at 6:55 PM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> No, you didn't misunderstand me. It's just that the ux for that is not
>> acceptable to retail users. As long as gnap sticks to industrial users you
>> should do fine.
>>
>> thx ..Tom (mobile)
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 5, 2021, 7:56 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Targeting existing browsers and types of applications (web, pwa, mobile,
>> etc.) seems like a reasonable option for an industrial standard. Improving
>> security, privacy, ease of use and interoperability (including
>> decentralized identity as well) should be good enough objectives.
>> Plus from our previous discussions, I was under the impression you were
>> fine with the approach of deploying the AS on the phone as a loopback, for
>> mobile apps. Did I miss something?
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Fabien
>>
>> Le ven. 5 févr. 2021 à 16:33, Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> a
>> écrit :
>>
>> If you mean can GNAP work on old fashioned apps running with existing
>> browsers and existing identity providers, then yes, i guess you are ok.
>>
>> If you want to work on apps where the user is in control of authn and
>> authz, then no, GNAP cannot work. It is not alone in that OIDC wont work
>> there either.
>>
>> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 5, 2021 at 3:19 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Tom,
>>
>> Thanks, your responses made it clearer for me what you expect from an AS
>> deployed on a mobile.
>>
>> I think we're on the right path to meet the rest of your concerns. There
>> are already a few items on these:
>> - privacy preserving techniques have been discussed and are likely to be
>> included (I think). It's been recognized as a core concern
>> - not exactly sure the meaning you give to discovery here (it's already
>> been used in the WG but with a different meaning I believe). The request or
>> the continuation api provide entry points to pay attention to.
>>
>> Is that enough for your use case ? Do you need something else ? (like
>> SSE?)
>>
>> Cheers
>> Fabien
>>
>> Le jeu. 4 févr. 2021 à 22:10, Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> a
>> écrit :
>>
>> discovery is the prime problem.  What causes the wallet/AS to wake up and
>> pay attention. How does the RP know what to ask for without violating user
>> privacy rights?
>>
>> CHAPI would be ok i guess, but that requires cred man to be fixed. Not
>> sure if it fixes discovery or privacy even then.
>>
>> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 12:45 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>
>> Tom, what additional functionality do you see that a browser would need
>> to support in order for GNAP to be adopted? For the elements of the core
>> protocol today, nothing is needed to change within the browsers —
>> everything is built on existing functions. GNAP uses browsers as a tool,
>> and I would argue depends on them even less so than OAuth 2 does.
>> Extensions could use browser functionality, like using CHAPI to pass
>> interaction elements, but the core protocol functions on vanilla browsers
>> today.
>>
>>  — Justin
>>
>> On Feb 4, 2021, at 3:20 PM, Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> i assumed that the wallet (aka AS) needed to be a native app, not a PWA
>> (which can come from a traditional web server).
>> There are folks, lke Kim C, who are working on a PWA, but i agree the
>> blocks there seem to be large.
>> THe blocks on a native app are simple, easy to describe, and easy to ask
>> the browser guys to fix. Not sure if they care tho.
>> I have trouble seeing a path to GNAP adoption for retail customers w/o
>> some browser support.
>> That's why i am mostly silent here.
>>
>> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 11:43 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Fair enough. But loopback limits a lot what you can do... Just for debug
>> it's a pain.
>> But as soon as you try more, it's a bit crazy. Fun to test ipv6 (luckily
>> supported by my ISP) and ddns. But it feels really hacky.
>> Also deployment is a pain, compared to a traditional webserver.
>>
>> Le jeu. 4 févr. 2021 à 20:20, Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> a
>> écrit :
>>
>> doesn't work very well on windows uwp. works fine on smartphones
>> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 11:18 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>
>> OK, thanks — in that case, there are no changes at all to GNAP, which is
>> already HTTP driven. The harder parts tend to be where you can’t (or don’t
>> want to) use something like that.
>>
>>  — Justin
>>
>> On Feb 4, 2021, at 2:16 PM, Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> yes, loopback
>>
>> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 11:01 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>
>> Tom, can you expand on how exactly the back-channel  communication works
>> between on-device components? Do you use HTTP locally?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>  — Justin
>>
>> On Feb 4, 2021, at 1:03 PM, Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Justin's analysis of use of the front channel is misleading.
>> It could equally be argued that what i have done is installed an AS on
>> the phone and the communications with it & the PR is back channel.
>> Basically the point is that the old OIDC paradigms are no longer valid.
>> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 7:47 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Yes, issue (#168) message based interaction / DIDComm is a tentative
>> alternative mecanism for the interaction part. Not sure how that would work
>> in details though, prototyping will probably help here.
>> Token delivery through continuation seems fine to me. The client will
>> probably have to wait for the next polling before it receives a token
>> issued as the result of an asynchronous interaction, but that's not a big
>> issue.
>>
>> But the AS on the phone seems like a harder nut to crack, at least at
>> first sight. I think that would be awesome, but it gives me headaches, so I
>> think I'll work on easier stuff right now ;-)
>>
>> Fabien
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 4:30 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>
>> One of the biggest drawbacks of the current app-centric approaches in
>> OIDC (self-issued OP, or SIOP) is that they depend on using the front
>> channel and browser redirects to pass everything, which is something that
>> GNAP is deliberately getting away from by starting in the back channel.
>>
>> That said, once a request is kicked off in GNAP, the interaction and
>> fulfillment can happen through any number of means. Part of the work that’s
>> being done with the “interaction” section is going to help facilitate this,
>> and I think that there are some other potential branches here.
>>
>> Token delivery is where things get extra weird though — we are explicitly
>> not delivering tokens in the front channel in the core of GNAP, we’re using
>> the response from the continuation API. One idea (that isn’t particularly
>> well thought out and hasn’t been implemented at all) is to have an
>> extension declare an alternative response from the “continue” section
>> that’s defined today, which points to the GNPA continuation API. If an
>> extension defines some alternative way to deliver tokens, that could live
>> alongside a continuation API and the client could indicate support for it
>> in its initial request.
>>
>> In any event, alternative interaction and delivery methods are important,
>> and even if we aren’t going to support every last one of them directly, the
>> protocol design should at least be aware of them.
>>
>>  — Justin
>>
>> On Feb 4, 2021, at 8:35 AM, Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Tom,
>>
>> Sure, any experience on that would be greatly appreciated, we're calling
>> for help here (the point being that I suspect what they're doing is not
>> trivial).
>>
>> Fabien
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 2:21 PM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> I've had such an app working for over a year. There are issues which are
>> being addressed by the browser Interaction team of oidc.
>>
>> thx ..Tom (mobile)
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021, 3:12 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Francis,
>>
>> I've tried a few things with regards to using the AS on a phone, but it's
>> really quite complex.
>>
>> Making that run on a phone comes with quite a bit of trouble. The most
>> difficult part if that we'd need to use a secure element, but just
>> installing and hosting a http server securely is not a standard setup at
>> all. I suggest interested people step in to work on this, as we already
>> have a lot of work for the (more usual) server case and already handle a
>> privacy preserving scheme.
>>
>> Please let us know what you think.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Fabien
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 5:55 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Francis,
>>
>> I've thought a bit more to what you said. I think I'll give it a try as a
>> separate experiment (in code, not in theory). Not that I would expect it to
>> be included in GNAP, but I kind of like the idea :-)
>>
>> The direct impact for GNAP would be to think about multiple ASs.
>>
>> Will let you know.
>>
>> Fabien
>>
>>
>> Le mer. 18 nov. 2020 à 13:06, Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> a écrit :
>>
>> It would be nice if the protocol was designed at many layers of
>> abstraction.
>>
>>
>>    - The first layer shall design abstract protocol flows, without
>>    specification of the mode and mechanism of interaction.
>>    - The second layer can instantiate the first layer for dedicated
>>    interaction. Here we can talk http, we can define interactions that presume
>>    server based token generation, we can define interaction that run on user
>>    device based token generation.
>>
>> This is also the fundament of the structure I proposed for the spec (
>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/30).
>>
>> /Francis
>>
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 18, 2020 6:35 AM
>> *To:* Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de>
>> *Cc:* txauth@ietf.org <txauth@ietf.org>; Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>;
>> Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>; Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>;
>> Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
>> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
>>
>> Would make sense, but not so easy as we rely heavily on HTTP. Hence the
>> discussion about deep links and so on.
>>
>> An alternative might be provided by wasm/wasi (running a local sandbox on
>> your phone, for your own AS), but it's really early stage. This also poses
>> another question that Denis has put forward, i.e. how do we handle the
>> multiple AS scenario (likely to occur then).
>>
>> Fabien
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 12:16 PM Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> wrote:
>>
>> We are drifting away from the original problem space.
>>
>>    - My original mention was about the "POST" request, that subsumes
>>    that the "AS" is a "Server". Designing a new protocol, we cannot afford
>>    this limitation.
>>    - I just mentioned SIOP to show a known and closed example? Let us
>>    not focus on the device local discovery scheme (like openid:) for now.
>>    - As capability of holding private keys on user device evolves,
>>    server-based issuing of token will be fading out giving way to device local
>>    generation of token.
>>
>> While designing GNAP, let us assume the AS-Role can be exercised on a
>> user device and design the protocol to honor that.
>>
>> Best regards,
>> /Francis
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* TXAuth <txauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Dick Hardt <
>> dick.hardt@gmail.com>
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 17, 2020 1:28 PM
>> *To:* Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
>> *Cc:* Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>; Denis <
>> denis.ietf@free.fr>; GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>; Justin Richer <
>> jricher@mit.edu>
>> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
>>
>> Got it.
>>
>> So web apps invoke a openid: deep link and hope there is an app to handle
>> the openid: scheme? ... and that it is the user's wallet rather than some
>> malware that has registered openid: on the mobile device?
>>
>> A native app can attempt to open a deep link associated with an app, and
>> will fail if the app is not there. If the app is there, it will be opened,
>> so this can't be used to silently test if an app is present, but it does
>> allow a native app to provide an alternative experience if an app is not
>> present. I don't think this works with custom schemes ... and I don't know
>> how it could work from a web app on the phone with the current Safari APIs.
>>
>> Apple warns against using custom schemes [1] ... but perhaps they can be
>> convinced to make openid: a managed scheme similar to mailto:, tel:,
>> sms:, facetime: ?
>>
>> [1]
>> https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/allowing_apps_and_websites_to_link_to_your_content/defining_a_custom_url_scheme_for_your_app
>>
>>
>> ᐧ
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 10:06 AM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> You are - that is not standard which is opeind://
>> This is the one step that still needs to be optimized for SIOP to have
>> good UX.
>> Peace ..tom
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:59 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Tom
>>
>> I watched your video (I watched at 2X speed)
>>
>> Looks like the employment website app that is using localhost:8765 to
>> communicate with the wallet. Am I correct?
>>
>> /Dick
>> ᐧ
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:46 AM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Well, here's a demo. Note that in this case the AS is not online all of
>> the time, so it is really implicit flow and the OIDC id-token comes from
>> the siop device directly.
>> (whether this is front-channel or back channel is no longer an
>> interesting question.)
>> Now if an always-on AS is required, that is possible, but probably beyond
>> the scope of this effort and would require something like an
>> agent-in-the-sky (with diamonds).
>> here is the link to the 9 min video   https://youtu.be/Tq4hw7X5SW0
>> <https://urldefense.us/v2/url?u=https-3A__youtu.be_Tq4hw7X5SW0&d=DwMFaQ&c=2plI3hXH8ww3j2g8pV19QHIf4SmK_I-Eol_p9P0CttE&r=D5lnfoa2MVZWELqVbbz71ooelbP7rVGCjGDSBNvUpYQ&m=ixsudGSr_dhG-SLiatb4Sz9FWslmywnYyZAOLgZxhl8&s=jdLLy0G1JTQCAOBZ6PeUgI0kiCtVJXrru0VToYWlNZ8&e=>
>> Peace ..tom
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:20 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>
>> Ultimately, in most situations like these in the real world, the hurdle
>> isn’t technical compatibility so much as it is trust compatibility. The RP
>> (client) needs to have some incentive to trust the assertions and identity
>> information that’s coming from the AS. The same is true for an RS trusting
>> tokens from the AS. The hard question is less “how” to do that (which SSI
>> answers), but more “why” to do that (which SSI doesn’t answer very well,
>> because it’s a hard question).
>>
>> Still: it’s definitely a question about how to support this “AS on
>> device” element. We’ve got the start of it more than OAuth2/OIDC have by
>> allowing the bootstrap of the process from a starting call: the interaction
>> and continuation URIs handed back by the AS don’t need to be the same URIs
>> that the client starts with, so just like SIOP the process can start in
>> HTTP and potentially move to other communication channels. A major
>> difference is that we aren’t dependent on the assumption that the user will
>> always be in a browser at some stage, and so the whole raft of
>> front-channel messages that SIOP relies on doesn’t fly. That said, we’ve
>> got an opportunity to more explicitly open up alternative communication
>> channels here, and that’s something I’d like to see engineered, even if
>> it’s an extension. I’d love to see a concrete proposal as to how that would
>> work over specific protocols, starting with what we’ve got today.
>>
>>  — Justin
>>
>> On Nov 17, 2020, at 12:03 PM, Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Denis, hi Francis,
>>
>> At some point integration with SSI (on the authentication side) will
>> probably occur, including amongst other possibilities SIOP (since they work
>> with OpenID a part of the work will probably be made easier).
>>
>> That being said, Denis is right. It's not an AS. Technically it's
>> entirely possible to rely on a decentralized wallet (for instance on your
>> phone) and a centralized AS. I know of a few studies on how to decentralize
>> the AS itself (for instance
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardjono-oauth-decentralized-02).
>> Maybe it exists, but I'm still looking for real scenarios (or even
>> architectures) where an AS is deployed directly on a phone, and under the
>> sole authority of the RO, while being compatible with the rest of the
>> world.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Fabien
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 5:45 PM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:
>>
>> Hello  Francis,
>>
>> See two comments in line.
>>
>>
>> B) Current Document
>>
>> Roles description shall not hold any assumption on the physical structure
>> of the party fulfilling the roles.
>> [FI] not sure what you mean
>>
>>  [FP] for example, we assume the AS is a server! In most SSI based use
>> cases, the AS will be running on the user device. See SIOP (
>> https://identity.foundation/did-siop/).
>>
>> I browsed through the two drafts, i.e. :
>>
>>    - Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0 Core architecture, data
>>    model, and representations W3C Working Draft 08 November 2020
>>    - Self-Issued OpenID Connect Provider DID Profile v0.1. DIF Working
>>    Group Draft
>>
>> At no place within these two documents, it is possible to imagine that
>> "the AS will be running on the user device".
>> From section 3 of the DIF Working Group Draft:
>>       "Unlike the OIDC Authorization Code Flow as per [OIDC.Core], the
>> SIOP will not return an access token to the RP".
>> An Identity Wallet is not an AS.
>>
>>
>> Roles:
>> -> grant endpoint of the AS: Why is this a post request? This eliminates
>> the chance of having user device hosted AS (no server).
>> [FI] what would you propose instead?
>> Would also be interested to understand better the deployment model when
>> there is no server. That's something that was discussed several times but
>> I'm still missing the underlying architecture and use case.
>>
>>  [FP] See above (SIOP). There will be a lot of identity wallets operated
>> on end user device.
>>
>> See the above comment. Please, do not confuse an Identity Wallet with an
>> Authentication Server (AS).
>> Denis
>>
>>
>> -> Resource Owner (RO) : Authorizes the request? Does it authorize the
>> request or the access to a resource?
>> [FI] yes, we should make the wording clearer
>>
>> Missing Section Interactions:
>> --> This section shall introduce the notion of interaction before we
>> start listing interaction types.
>> [FI] yes
>>
>> Interaction Types:
>> --> I prefer a classification with Redirect, Decoupled and Embedded is.
>> In the draft, we have one redirect and 2 decouple interactions and nothing
>> else.
>> [FI] this should be handled as a specific discussion item. As a reminder,
>> how would you define embedded?
>>
>> In practice there's at least these modes:
>> - redirect and redirect back
>> - redirect to different browser or device
>> - user code
>> - CIBA
>>
>> [FP] This classification is limited.
>>
>>    - Redirect: same device, same or different user agents (browser,
>>    mobile app, desktop app, ...)
>>    - Decoupled: different devices
>>    - Embedded : RC carries RO authorization to AS
>>
>>
>>
>> Resource Access Request vs. Resource Request
>> --> Both are mixed up. No clarification of the context of each section.
>> [FI] could you clarify what you'd expect.  Btw on this topic, there's a
>> more general discussion on whether we should make a distinction or not.
>>
>> [FP]: Here:
>>
>>    - Resource Access Request: Requesting Access to a resource. Response
>>    is an access token (or any type of grant)
>>    - Resource Request: Request the resource. Response is the resource
>>    (or a corresponding execution)
>>
>>
>> Token Content Negotiation
>> --> Not expressed as such. This is central to GNAP and not represented
>> enough  in the document.
>> [FI] right. This should be a specific discussion item.
>>
>> Requesting "User" Information
>> we identify two types of users: RQ and RO. It will be better not to refer
>> to a user in this draft, but either to a RQ or an RO.
>> [FI] yes that would avoid potential misunderstandings. Although in the
>> end, people will translate RQ into user or end-user most of the time. Cf in
>> definition, currently we have Requesting Party (RQ, aka "user")
>>
>>
>> Interaction Again
>> -> For each interaction type, we will have to describe the protocol flow
>> and the nature and behavior of involved Roles (Parties), Elements, Requests.
>> [FI] yes
>>
>>
>> [FP] Will these and into tickets?
>>
>> Best regards.
>> /Francis
>>
>>
>>
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