Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> Tue, 17 November 2020 17:46 UTC
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From: Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 09:46:06 -0800
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To: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
Cc: Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>, Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>, GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
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Well, here's a demo. Note that in this case the AS is not online all of the time, so it is really implicit flow and the OIDC id-token comes from the siop device directly. (whether this is front-channel or back channel is no longer an interesting question.) Now if an always-on AS is required, that is possible, but probably beyond the scope of this effort and would require something like an agent-in-the-sky (with diamonds). here is the link to the 9 min video https://youtu.be/Tq4hw7X5SW0 <https://urldefense.us/v2/url?u=https-3A__youtu.be_Tq4hw7X5SW0&d=DwMFaQ&c=2plI3hXH8ww3j2g8pV19QHIf4SmK_I-Eol_p9P0CttE&r=D5lnfoa2MVZWELqVbbz71ooelbP7rVGCjGDSBNvUpYQ&m=ixsudGSr_dhG-SLiatb4Sz9FWslmywnYyZAOLgZxhl8&s=jdLLy0G1JTQCAOBZ6PeUgI0kiCtVJXrru0VToYWlNZ8&e=> Peace ..tom On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:20 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: > Ultimately, in most situations like these in the real world, the hurdle > isn’t technical compatibility so much as it is trust compatibility. The RP > (client) needs to have some incentive to trust the assertions and identity > information that’s coming from the AS. The same is true for an RS trusting > tokens from the AS. The hard question is less “how” to do that (which SSI > answers), but more “why” to do that (which SSI doesn’t answer very well, > because it’s a hard question). > > Still: it’s definitely a question about how to support this “AS on device” > element. We’ve got the start of it more than OAuth2/OIDC have by allowing > the bootstrap of the process from a starting call: the interaction and > continuation URIs handed back by the AS don’t need to be the same URIs that > the client starts with, so just like SIOP the process can start in HTTP and > potentially move to other communication channels. A major difference is > that we aren’t dependent on the assumption that the user will always be in > a browser at some stage, and so the whole raft of front-channel messages > that SIOP relies on doesn’t fly. That said, we’ve got an opportunity to > more explicitly open up alternative communication channels here, and that’s > something I’d like to see engineered, even if it’s an extension. I’d love > to see a concrete proposal as to how that would work over specific > protocols, starting with what we’ve got today. > > — Justin > > On Nov 17, 2020, at 12:03 PM, Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Hi Denis, hi Francis, > > At some point integration with SSI (on the authentication side) will > probably occur, including amongst other possibilities SIOP (since they work > with OpenID a part of the work will probably be made easier). > > That being said, Denis is right. It's not an AS. Technically it's entirely > possible to rely on a decentralized wallet (for instance on your phone) and > a centralized AS. I know of a few studies on how to decentralize the AS > itself (for instance > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardjono-oauth-decentralized-02). > Maybe it exists, but I'm still looking for real scenarios (or even > architectures) where an AS is deployed directly on a phone, and under the > sole authority of the RO, while being compatible with the rest of the > world. > > Cheers, > Fabien > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 5:45 PM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote: > >> Hello Francis, >> >> See two comments in line. >> >> >> B) Current Document >> >> Roles description shall not hold any assumption on the physical structure >> of the party fulfilling the roles. >> [FI] not sure what you mean >> >> [FP] for example, we assume the AS is a server! In most SSI based use >> cases, the AS will be running on the user device. See SIOP ( >> https://identity.foundation/did-siop/). >> >> I browsed through the two drafts, i.e. : >> >> - Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0 Core architecture, data >> model, and representations W3C Working Draft 08 November 2020 >> - Self-Issued OpenID Connect Provider DID Profile v0.1. DIF Working >> Group Draft >> >> At no place within these two documents, it is possible to imagine that >> "the AS will be running on the user device". >> >> From section 3 of the DIF Working Group Draft: >> >> "Unlike the OIDC Authorization Code Flow as per [OIDC.Core], the >> SIOP will not return an access token to the RP". >> >> An Identity Wallet is not an AS. >> >> >> Roles: >> -> grant endpoint of the AS: Why is this a post request? This eliminates >> the chance of having user device hosted AS (no server). >> [FI] what would you propose instead? >> Would also be interested to understand better the deployment model when >> there is no server. That's something that was discussed several times but >> I'm still missing the underlying architecture and use case. >> >> [FP] See above (SIOP). There will be a lot of identity wallets operated >> on end user device. >> >> See the above comment. Please, do not confuse an Identity Wallet with an >> Authentication Server (AS). >> >> Denis >> >> >> -> Resource Owner (RO) : Authorizes the request? Does it authorize the >> request or the access to a resource? >> [FI] yes, we should make the wording clearer >> >> Missing Section Interactions: >> --> This section shall introduce the notion of interaction before we >> start listing interaction types. >> [FI] yes >> >> Interaction Types: >> --> I prefer a classification with Redirect, Decoupled and Embedded is. >> In the draft, we have one redirect and 2 decouple interactions and nothing >> else. >> [FI] this should be handled as a specific discussion item. As a reminder, >> how would you define embedded? >> >> In practice there's at least these modes: >> - redirect and redirect back >> - redirect to different browser or device >> - user code >> - CIBA >> >> [FP] This classification is limited. >> >> - Redirect: same device, same or different user agents (browser, >> mobile app, desktop app, ...) >> - Decoupled: different devices >> - Embedded : RC carries RO authorization to AS >> >> >> >> Resource Access Request vs. Resource Request >> --> Both are mixed up. No clarification of the context of each section. >> [FI] could you clarify what you'd expect. Btw on this topic, there's a >> more general discussion on whether we should make a distinction or not. >> >> [FP]: Here: >> >> - Resource Access Request: Requesting Access to a resource. Response >> is an access token (or any type of grant) >> - Resource Request: Request the resource. Response is the resource >> (or a corresponding execution) >> >> >> Token Content Negotiation >> --> Not expressed as such. This is central to GNAP and not represented >> enough in the document. >> [FI] right. This should be a specific discussion item. >> >> Requesting "User" Information >> we identify two types of users: RQ and RO. It will be better not to refer >> to a user in this draft, but either to a RQ or an RO. >> [FI] yes that would avoid potential misunderstandings. Although in the >> end, people will translate RQ into user or end-user most of the time. Cf in >> definition, currently we have Requesting Party (RQ, aka "user") >> >> >> Interaction Again >> -> For each interaction type, we will have to describe the protocol flow >> and the nature and behavior of involved Roles (Parties), Elements, Requests. >> [FI] yes >> >> >> [FP] Will these and into tickets? >> >> Best regards. >> /Francis >> >> >> >> -- >> TXAuth mailing list >> TXAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >> > -- > TXAuth mailing list > TXAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth > > > -- > TXAuth mailing list > TXAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >
- [GNAP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-… internet-drafts
- Re: [GNAP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-gnap-core-proto… Justin Richer
- [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00 Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault