Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases with several ASs built along "Privacy by Design" (PbD)
Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> Tue, 11 August 2020 22:43 UTC
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From: Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 15:42:47 -0700
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To: Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de>
Cc: Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>, Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>,
GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases with several ASs
built along "Privacy by Design" (PbD)
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I guess I need to ask the group as a whole then. Will GNAP support self-issued Identifiers? If so then the AS is on the user's device. I need to understand that SII are in-scope. Peace ..tom On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 3:40 PM Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> wrote: > On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 6:27 PM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> "The token request must not mention any reference of the RS." >> this cannot be an absolute rule. I have cases were the client needs to >> tell the user which they are coming back for additional grants. >> The reason is typically because a request by the client for data/access >> from the rs was rejected. The reason for the rejection is important for the >> client to make the case to the user for additional permissions. >> Peace ..tom >> > - If you want privacy, *don't* expose RS identity to AS. > - If you want transparency, expose RS identity to AS. > You can't have both.... > /Francis > >> >> >> >> On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 2:27 PM Francis Pouatcha <fpo= >> 40adorsys.de@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: >> >>> Hello Fabian, >>> >>> On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 2:17 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Francis, >>>> >>>> I think Denis points to the fact that, in the current situation, the AS >>>> receives the resource request from the Client and therefore knows what >>>> tokens are asked. >>>> >>> The token request must not mention any reference of the RS. >>> >>> >>>> Then it also implements the consent interface (and possibly the login >>>> too) and so it also knows who validates and what is accepted or not. >>>> >>> Decoupling this does not change the privacy context, as the AS issues >>> the Token. AS needs to add a reference to the RC in the token. SO AS can >>> correlate on StudentId anyway. >>> >>> >>>> I don't think the abstract flow deals with those privacy concerns. >>>> >>> To solve the privacy problem addressed in this thread, we need to go the >>> (SSI/DiD/VC) way. Then UNIV-0 (in his role of RS) will have to issue a VC >>> (Verifiable Credential) to the Student (in his role of RC). The Student >>> will then present this claim to UNIV-1 during his registration. In this >>> case we need no Grant negotiation and no AS. >>> >>> Best regards. >>> /Francis >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> Then I agree with you on the audience field of the token, if left empty >>>> it simplifies part of the problem, although it removes a big part of the >>>> control you may want from directed tokens. That's why I'm willing to better >>>> develop the RS hiding idea. >>>> >>>> Fabien >>>> >>>> Le mar. 11 août 2020 à 05:58, Francis Pouatcha <fpo= >>>> 40adorsys.de@dmarc.ietf.org> a écrit : >>>> >>>>> Hello Denis, >>>>> >>>>> what you describe in the use case seems to be the default behavior of >>>>> the protocol. Let me map it with this abstract protocol flow: >>>>> >>>>> +-----------+ +--------------+ +-----------+ +----+ >>>>> +---------------------+ >>>>> | Requestor | | Orchestrator | | RS | | GS | | Resource >>>>> Controller | >>>>> | is UNIV-1 | | is UNIV-1 | | is UNIV-0 | | or | | >>>>> is | >>>>> | Staff | | Registr. App | | Server | | AS | | >>>>> Student | >>>>> +-----------+ +--------------+ +-----------+ +----+ >>>>> +---------------------+ >>>>> |(1) RegisterStudent | | | >>>>> | >>>>> |---------------------->| | | >>>>> | >>>>> | |(2) >>>>> RequestRecordIntent(RecordType,StudentId, >>>>> | | >>>>> OrchestratorId):AuthRequest[RecordType,StudentId] >>>>> | |<-------------->| | >>>>> | >>>>> | | | | >>>>> | >>>>> | |(3) >>>>> AuthZRequest(RecordType,StudentId,OrchestratorId) >>>>> | |--------------------------->| >>>>> | >>>>> | | | |(4) >>>>> ConsentRequest(RecordType, >>>>> | | | | >>>>> OrchestratorId):Consent >>>>> | | | >>>>> |<-------------->| >>>>> | >>>>> |(5) AuthZ[RecordType,StudentId,OrchestratorId] >>>>> | |<---------------------------| >>>>> | >>>>> | | | | >>>>> | >>>>> | |(2) >>>>> RequestRecord(RecordType,StudentId,OrchestratorId) >>>>> | | :RecordOf[StudentId] | >>>>> | >>>>> | |<-------------->| | >>>>> | >>>>> |(7) Registered | | | >>>>> | >>>>> |<----------------------| | | >>>>> | >>>>> + + + + >>>>> + >>>>> >>>>> we assume the authz request sent by "Client" to "AS" describes the >>>>> protected resource without referring to the authz server. An AS can issue >>>>> the authz to release the graduation record of a student >>>>> ((5) AuthZ[RecordType,StudentId,OrchestratorId]), without any reference to >>>>> the target university. >>>>> >>>>> What matters for this authz object is: >>>>> - StudentId: a reference to the student as known to the resource >>>>> server. >>>>> - RecordType: a reference to a resource of type graduation record as >>>>> understandable by the resource server. >>>>> - OrchestratorId: reference to the Orchestrator. Can be used to bind >>>>> authz to Orchestrator.. >>>>> >>>>> But: >>>>> - RS must trust AS issued token. >>>>> - StudentId must be known to RS, AS and Orchestrator. >>>>> >>>>> Therefore, the AS does not need to know the RS. Keep the audience >>>>> field empty. >>>>> >>>>> Same principle applies for the second use case. >>>>> >>>>> What privacy problem do you see here? >>>>> >>>>> Best regards. >>>>> /Francis >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Aug 4, 2020 at 5:08 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I tried my best twice to download three use cases in the Use cases >>>>>> directory, but I failed. >>>>>> >>>>>> Rather than failing a third time, here is the direct link of the >>>>>> second try: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/general/wiki/Three-Client-Server-use-cases-with-several-ASs-built-along-%22Privacy-by-Design%22-(PbD) >>>>>> >>>>>> Denis >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Txauth mailing list >>>>>> Txauth@ietf.org >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Francis Pouatcha >>>>> Co-Founder and Technical Lead >>>>> adorsys GmbH & Co. KG >>>>> https://adorsys-platform.de/solutions/ >>>>> -- >>>>> TXAuth mailing list >>>>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Francis Pouatcha >>> Co-Founder and Technical Lead >>> adorsys GmbH & Co. KG >>> https://adorsys-platform.de/solutions/ >>> -- >>> TXAuth mailing list >>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>> >> > > -- > Francis Pouatcha > Co-Founder and Technical Lead > adorsys GmbH & Co. KG > https://adorsys-platform.de/solutions/ >
- [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases with sever… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha