Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architecture?

[Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>]

The purpose of either handling policies locally or delegating them to the
RO agent.

Le jeu. 25 mars 2021 à 08:04, Adrian Gropper <[e-mail]> a
écrit :

> What purpose would be served by GNAP splitting the AS into two components?
>
> Adrian
>
> On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 2:59 AM Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
>> Isn't the AS-RO a component of the AS? Same idea as the interact
>> component, it functionnally belongs to the AS role but could be deployed
>> either as a monolith or as a separate component?
>>
>> Fabien
>>
>> Le jeu. 25 mars 2021 à 04:26, Adrian Gropper <[e-mail]> a
>> écrit :
>>
>>> Yes, but I would say it’s not the RO that wants the access token. It’s
>>> the RO that wants the client making the request to get an access token.
>>>
>>> Adrian
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 11:22 PM Alan Karp <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Adrian Gropper <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In this design, the AS is the AS-RS and the agent is the AS-RO. By my
>>>>> definition, this model has two ASs since both are processing requests into
>>>>> tokens. The problem with this is complexity and privacy. The RO may not
>>>>> want to share the request information with the AS-RS.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> More precisely, RO has no choice but to present the required
>>>> information to AS-RS if RO wants an access token.  However, RO does not
>>>> want AS-RS to know the policy by which RO delegates tokens.  That's why RO
>>>> uses AS-RO for those delegations.
>>>>
>>>> --------------
>>>> Alan Karp
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 7:41 PM Adrian Gropper <[e-mail]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Thank you for creating the issue. My definition of AS is independent
>>>>> of AS-RO or AS-RS.
>>>>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/223#issuecomment-806280421
>>>>> I also agree with Alan's definition based on delegation. An AS-RS would be
>>>>> a delegate of the RS.
>>>>>
>>>>> Based on that, I see it as obvious that the policy has to be
>>>>> accessible (defined locally?) in order for it to be run as the code that
>>>>> turns a request into an access token.
>>>>>
>>>>> The only other possibility is that the request is packaged by the AS
>>>>> and sent elsewhere (an agent) for evaluation against policy and a
>>>>> proto-token returned. In that case the AS is acting as a proxy and the PDP
>>>>> is elsewhere. I can imagine that an AS-RS would behave this way so that the
>>>>> proto-token could be turned into an access token by the AS-RS. Isn't this
>>>>> what Justin is proposing? In this design, the AS is the AS-RS and the agent
>>>>> is the AS-RO. By my definition, this model has two ASs since both are
>>>>> processing requests into tokens. The problem with this is complexity and
>>>>> privacy. The RO may not want to share the request information with the
>>>>> AS-RS.
>>>>>
>>>>> Adrian
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 5:21 PM Fabien Imbault <
>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Isn't that what the AS is supposed to be, only with the caveat that
>>>>>> the policy is defined locally?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fabien
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Le mer. 24 mars 2021 à 20:17, Alan Karp <[e-mail]> a
>>>>>> écrit :
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> AS-RO is an AS that RO trusts to delegate RO's access tokens
>>>>>>> according to RO's policies.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>> Alan Karp
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 9:36 AM Fabien Imbault <
>>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Alan and Adrian,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I've created issue AS-RO policy delegation (
>>>>>>>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/223) to
>>>>>>>> capture your input.
>>>>>>>> A first question that arises: can we give a definition to AS-RO?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thanks
>>>>>>>> Fabien
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 23, 2021 at 4:15 PM Alan Karp <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Alan,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes, but in that flow, the token relationship between AS-RS and
>>>>>>>>>> AS-RO is only secure if the tokens issued by AS-RS are cryptographically
>>>>>>>>>> attenuable in the first place.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Attenuated delegation is a requirement, but that doesn't have to
>>>>>>>>> be done cryptographically.  Token exchange works just fine.  SPKI and
>>>>>>>>> zcap-ld are examples of the crypto approach, and we used token exchange in
>>>>>>>>> the system for HP.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>>>> Alan Karp
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 23, 2021 at 4:12 AM Fabien Imbault <
>>>>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Alan,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes, but in that flow, the token relationship between AS-RS and
>>>>>>>>>> AS-RO is only secure if the tokens issued by AS-RS are cryptographically
>>>>>>>>>> attenuable in the first place.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Fabien
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 9:26 PM Alan Karp <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> But with all that in mind, I think the key here is going to be
>>>>>>>>>>>> looking at what the inputs to the AS are, and how those can be defined in
>>>>>>>>>>>> an interoperable way for AS’s that can accept them. I think there’s a lot
>>>>>>>>>>>> of room for innovation and flexibility here that doesn’t break the trust
>>>>>>>>>>>> model or core use cases. If I have an AS-RS set that won’t accept my
>>>>>>>>>>>> favorite flavor of policy engine inputs, then I can decide not to use that
>>>>>>>>>>>> one. But this is a very different question than saying the RS itself needs
>>>>>>>>>>>> to accept my own AS — and we can’t keep conflating these two models.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree.  The point of having an AS-RO is to allow RO to
>>>>>>>>>>> specify a policy for which of RO's access tokens should be delegated under
>>>>>>>>>>> what conditions.  AS-RS should not need to understand those policies.  The
>>>>>>>>>>> flow would be
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>    - RO contacts AS-RS and gets one or more access tokens.
>>>>>>>>>>>    - RO delegates one or more of those tokens, potentially
>>>>>>>>>>>    sub-scoped, to AS-RO.
>>>>>>>>>>>    - A different user contacts AS-RO to get a potentially
>>>>>>>>>>>    sub-scoped access token from AS-RO.
>>>>>>>>>>>    - That user presents the access token delegated by AS-RO
>>>>>>>>>>>    when invoking the resource.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> AS-RS only needs to verify that the delegation chain is
>>>>>>>>>>> legitimate, e.g., no increase in scope, and that it grants permission for
>>>>>>>>>>> the request being made.  AS-RS does not need to understand the policy
>>>>>>>>>>> behind granting the delegation by AS-RO.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>>>>>> Alan Karp
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 11:40 AM Justin Richer <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Adrian,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I think this shows the problem with the terminology as it’s
>>>>>>>>>>>> been applied in this conversation, which I’ve tried to shine light on
>>>>>>>>>>>> before. What you and others are calling the “RS” is really the “AS and RS
>>>>>>>>>>>> working together” — everything to the right of the line. When Denis had
>>>>>>>>>>>> brought up “eliminating the AS” in another thread, what he’d really done is
>>>>>>>>>>>> labeled everything to the right of the line as the “RS”. Of course, the
>>>>>>>>>>>> irony here is that everything to the right of the line used all be called
>>>>>>>>>>>> the “AS” or simply “server” in the OAuth 1 days. As you say below, I don’t
>>>>>>>>>>>> want the client to have visibility on what happens on that side.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Note well: The Google+ logo labeled “IdP” in the diagram is not
>>>>>>>>>>>> the AS, as far as GNAP is concerned. It does not issue an access token that
>>>>>>>>>>>> the RS will accept. The elements to the left of the line could be a lot of
>>>>>>>>>>>> things, but they are NOT the AS — by definition. The client lives over on
>>>>>>>>>>>> the left, but so do any external inputs to the AS. These could be policy
>>>>>>>>>>>> inputs on behalf of the RO, they could be presentation artifacts, they
>>>>>>>>>>>> could be federated logins, they could be the output of policy decisions.
>>>>>>>>>>>> How the AS comes to trust those things is up to the AS’s implementation.
>>>>>>>>>>>> It’s something we can talk about, but ultimately GNAP won’t be in any
>>>>>>>>>>>> position to dictate because in practice some AS’s are simply going to
>>>>>>>>>>>> internalize all policies and we will never successfully force those open.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> But with all that in mind, I think the key here is going to be
>>>>>>>>>>>> looking at what the inputs to the AS are, and how those can be defined in
>>>>>>>>>>>> an interoperable way for AS’s that can accept them. I think there’s a lot
>>>>>>>>>>>> of room for innovation and flexibility here that doesn’t break the trust
>>>>>>>>>>>> model or core use cases. If I have an AS-RS set that won’t accept my
>>>>>>>>>>>> favorite flavor of policy engine inputs, then I can decide not to use that
>>>>>>>>>>>> one. But this is a very different question than saying the RS itself needs
>>>>>>>>>>>> to accept my own AS — and we can’t keep conflating these two models.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> So to me, GNAP can support a Zero Trust Architecture by
>>>>>>>>>>>> LEVERAGING the AS, not by subsuming or eliminating it. It is in fact the
>>>>>>>>>>>> AS, not the client and not the RS, that will request and consume the
>>>>>>>>>>>> results of a privacy-preserving zero-trust policy query thing. Anything
>>>>>>>>>>>> that happens downstream from that is of little concern to the zero-trust
>>>>>>>>>>>> components because, as you point out, it’s on the “other side” of the line.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I think we got this basic component model pretty right in
>>>>>>>>>>>> OAuth: the AS and RS and client working together. Where OAuth misses the
>>>>>>>>>>>> mark is the assumption that the user has to log in to the AS through a
>>>>>>>>>>>> webpage and interact directly, thereby proving they’re the RO. It’s this
>>>>>>>>>>>> latter space where I think we can both push innovation and also address the
>>>>>>>>>>>> important and compelling use cases like the ones you’re bringing.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>  — Justin
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mar 22, 2021, at 2:14 PM, Adrian Gropper <
>>>>>>>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm sorry, Justin. As a Resource Owner, I look at the RS trust
>>>>>>>>>>>> boundary (the dotted line in the diagram) as being the RS. I don't expect
>>>>>>>>>>>> any visibility into what's going on on the right.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> My problem with the framing you propose is that requests are
>>>>>>>>>>>> going to the RS (or the AS-RS) and I don't want to share my policies with
>>>>>>>>>>>> the AS-RS. I want to keep the RS and AS-RS as ignorant as possible.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Adrian
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 1:48 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Adrian,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> What you’re discussing below, in terms of logging in to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> site, is not approaching the RS. You are in fact approaching the client,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and identifying both the AS and RS to the client. The client is a client *of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> your identity* in this model, and the RS is part of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity provider. It’s really important that we don’t conflate the RS and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> client in this way as it leads to a lot of confusion downstream and a lot
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of broken trust boundaries.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> With that model in mind, approaching the “RS" and providing it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> your identity is really just a case of the “federated login to AS” pattern
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that we discussed on the WG call. The user here approaches an RS, which has
>>>>>>>>>>>>> its own AS. To share things from this RS, the RO has to authenticate to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> RS’s AS. This particular AS allows the RO to do so using an external
>>>>>>>>>>>>> identity — in which case, the AS is now a “client” of a separate,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> disconnected (but layered) delegation. The ultimate client that eventually
>>>>>>>>>>>>> calls the RS down the way may or may not know about these layers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <PastedGraphic-1.png>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This same AS, which is closely tied to the RS and trusted by
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the RS, might also take in FIDO credentials, or DIDs, or any number of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> other proof mechanisms. The output of this is an access token the RS
>>>>>>>>>>>>> trusts, but the input is up to the AS. The RS is not what you’re logging in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>  — Justin
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mar 22, 2021, at 1:28 PM, Adrian Gropper <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too am in favor of avoiding consolidation and correlation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Right now, when I approach a service provider (RS) for the first time, I'm
>>>>>>>>>>>>> offered the opportunity to identify my persona as: email, sign-in with
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Google, Facebook, or Apple. I know there are people who try to create
>>>>>>>>>>>>> one-off email addresses but that is mostly a waste of time.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, along come FIDO2 and DID wallets to the rescue. Now, in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory, I have a way to start out my RS relationship pseudonymously.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> When I want my resource to be discovered or shared I will post
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that RS URL including my pseudonym. If I then want to introduce a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediator in front of my AS or messaging service endpoint, I have that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> option. If I want to keep requests away from the mediator, I would publish
>>>>>>>>>>>>> an encryption key along with my pseudonym.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> - Adrian
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 9:55 AM Justin Richer <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mar 21, 2021, at 1:18 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On Sat, Mar 20, 2021 at 01:07:42AM -0400, Adrian Gropper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> @Alan Karp <[e-mail]> shared a talk about the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Principle Of Least
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> Authority (POLA) in a recent comment
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/145#issuecomment-803099693
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I recommend it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> We might expect a protocol with authorization in the title
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to use authority
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> as a core principle. I advocate for a GNAP design that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> maximizes the power
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> of the RO, to be seen as a human rights issue when the RO
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a human. This
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> causes me to ask how to combine better security with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better human rights in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> GNAP.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> Who should have the least authority in the GNAP design?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> The AS derives authority as a delegate of the RO. If we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ask the RO to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> partition limited authority across dozens of different ASs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by domain and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> function, then we are not using technology to empower the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> individual.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> Probably the opposite, as we introduce consent fatigue and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> burden normal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> people to partition their lives into non-overlapping
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> My experience says we should aim for one AS per persona
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because that maps
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> into the way we manage our public and private identities.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> POLA would then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> teach care in keeping ASs and RSs related to work / public
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> separate from
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> ASs and RSs related to private life so that a policy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> vulnerability in our
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> delegation to an AS would have the least likelihood of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> harm.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Thinking about how least authority/least privilege would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> apply to GNAP
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > seems like a useful exercise.  I do want to point out some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> potential
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > pitfalls with one-AS-per-persona that we can also be aware
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of.  If
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > one-AS-per-persona becomes one-persona-per-AS as well, then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the AS's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > identity in effect also serves as a persona identity and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are privacy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > considerations to that.  If, on the other hand, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > multiple-personas-per-AS (presumably corresponding to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> multiple humans)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > route is taken, we should consider whether that would lead
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to various
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > (e.g., market) forces driving consolidation to just a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> handful of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > super-popular AS services.  That topic is a current matter
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of concern to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > some IETF participants.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Ben, big +1 to this. This is something that we discussed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ages ago in the UMA working group, and it’s one of the biggest problems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with the personal AS (and personal data store) model. This kind of thing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> makes RS-first trust models really difficult in practice.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As a strawman, let’s say that I’ve got software that wants to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> access my medical information. It calls an RS and requests access, but it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hasn’t been granted anything yet. Now I as the RO have set up the RS so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it talks to my personal AS, that only I use. In addition to the RS
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> having to be able to figure out which medical records are being requested
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from the context of the unauthenticated request (which means it needs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identifiers in the URL or something similar for the RS to be able to tell,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assuming that it protects data for more than one person). So this client
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> software doesn’t know who I am and doesn’t know my medical record
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> information, makes a completely unauthorized request to the RS, and the RS
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> says “Go to Justin’s personal AS to get a token”. The client can now make a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> direct correlation between the data that’s being protected at the RS and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the person running the AS that protects it. Importantly, this client makes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this call with no prior relationship to the RS and no really auditable way
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to track it down after the fact. This is a design feature in the good case,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and terrifying in the bad case.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If the RS instead says “welcome to Medicine Doctor RS, please
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> talk to the Medicine Doctor AS to get access”, we haven’t exposed anything
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at all. And from the perspective of both the patient and the RS, this is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more privacy-preserving, and it’s really the least surprising option. Once
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the client gets to the AS, it can start a negotiation of figuring out who
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the RO is for the information being accessed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On top of this, the usability expectations of people managing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own AS, or set of AS’s for multiple personas to keep things separate,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a huge burden. Even in the tech community, I know people who can’t
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reliably manage more than one email address for different purposes. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wouldn’t expect my partner to do that — they have trouble enough balancing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all the logins and sessions required for different kids remote schooling, I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> couldn’t imagine them having to understand all the requirements for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> managing multiple authorization servers and associated policies. I also
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don’t expect any person to “manage keys” — I’ve been on the internet for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> decades and I can barely keep tabs on my GPG keys, and only use them when I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am forced to. This is exactly the kind of “market pressure” that I think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ben mentions above, people will just want to outsource that to someone
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else, and the reality will be a few popular providers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In which case, we could end up doing a ton of work to allow
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an RS choice only to end up with a world where the RS ends up making a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> limited choice anyway. We see how that plays out with OpenID Connect — RP’s
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> could allow arbitrary IdPs but they choose Google because it works and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that’s where the users are. (And that’s not to say anything of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proprietary OIDC-like protocols, but that’s another discussion).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For further reading on these topics, I recommend both “Why
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Johnny Can’t Encrypt” and “Why CSCW Systems Fail”.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So what does this have to do with GNAP? I think we can be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clear-eyed on what kinds of expectations we have for the participants. If
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we expect users (RO’s) to have to set up the AS-RS relationship, or expect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them to carry their AS, or manage their personal keys — I think we’ve lost
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the battle for relevance.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  — Justin
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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