Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> Thu, 04 February 2021 18:07 UTC
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References: <160433257633.23038.15047041472414640530@ietfa.amsl.com> <AB11DC08-C6ED-4045-A8F5-872AD263035D@mit.edu> <FR2P281MB01063C2EA739E892B549611D8D110@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <CAM8feuQcCdQFGUKy-ou7H3Ta38yyN1LR+0XJd9WophRMRdPDEA@mail.gmail.com> <FR2P281MB0106C83420ED3F8DF2723BFD8DE30@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <5b8ac79b-0c0e-18e9-9f80-b5d79e9ae59b@free.fr> <CAM8feuQ346w9EL=-qpJRmMOO_YUp_14gShxcro+pVxnfXTvkzw@mail.gmail.com> <5E214281-2974-4632-AB74-4E068B7EE66B@mit.edu> <CAK2Cwb5ACMxjiph796Lq1U3FZ6Tm_2TCmsKTJZn8Fgc0rzEgZQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD9ie-vDS9-Cc=cVRc_SDg7z6KxMqySdcfv3ZPSjAzHorZP7UQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAK2Cwb66asqy1MCtW7KNHyW5=H23fWATBds2aKC3Xi88V34=Rw@mail.gmail.com> <CAD9ie-sGRFQMj81g4oWAS=CgHOe5ReDrAXeVzqvW9UL0W0P-Qw@mail.gmail.com> <FR2P281MB0106FEBFFB997265C8A9EF878DE10@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <CAM8feuQiBij5Be2p3he0HwWfC+WaDRVQ6HqEKoq+FfqYJVGNXA@mail.gmail.com> <FR2P281MB0106245AD7828040C4BF0F7E8DE10@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <CAM8feuQc8Thohftk_=ohNByTvZtxRukdQ3xCzMP3K7zdZBO6Lg@mail.gmail.com> <CAM8feuRU-MKuta6fejsLsYXRhpWwfKqZ6D8VaVvkFhbo+sH9pw@mail.gmail.com> <CAK2Cwb4MrJoRc-oohQdAag_rNdecC75xEG1W1JDOLp6me8-KCw@mail.gmail.com> <CAM8feuT6EsJ+jAQ59CKbgkQ9akBLY2aEkLR4Ng_SN8rS_JHHqA@mail.gmail.com> <28180624-08AA-4659-BB22-5D86034E6F51@mit.edu> <CAM8feuQyXv8FtQkZkKgLrJZ6s7J6QvbzXEz1tgctUQmKs9NYeQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAK2Cwb4CFaePZjqmF6xmvrKcPiDCkW3Sahchiy0MP33zTYZOpg@mail.gmail.com>
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From: Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2021 19:07:14 +0100
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To: Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de>, GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>, Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
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Subject: Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
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Ok, to be enablers of change, we'd need to specify how this would work in detail. Again I find the objective attractive, it's just there a few technical hurdles along the way. HTTP has never been designed for this use case. On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 7:03 PM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> wrote: > Justin's analysis of use of the front channel is misleading. > It could equally be argued that what i have done is installed an AS on the > phone and the communications with it & the PR is back channel. > Basically the point is that the old OIDC paradigms are no longer valid. > Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom > > > On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 7:47 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Yes, issue (#168) message based interaction / DIDComm is a tentative >> alternative mecanism for the interaction part. Not sure how that would work >> in details though, prototyping will probably help here. >> Token delivery through continuation seems fine to me. The client will >> probably have to wait for the next polling before it receives a token >> issued as the result of an asynchronous interaction, but that's not a big >> issue. >> >> But the AS on the phone seems like a harder nut to crack, at least at >> first sight. I think that would be awesome, but it gives me headaches, so I >> think I'll work on easier stuff right now ;-) >> >> Fabien >> >> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 4:30 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >> >>> One of the biggest drawbacks of the current app-centric approaches in >>> OIDC (self-issued OP, or SIOP) is that they depend on using the front >>> channel and browser redirects to pass everything, which is something that >>> GNAP is deliberately getting away from by starting in the back channel. >>> >>> That said, once a request is kicked off in GNAP, the interaction and >>> fulfillment can happen through any number of means. Part of the work that’s >>> being done with the “interaction” section is going to help facilitate this, >>> and I think that there are some other potential branches here. >>> >>> Token delivery is where things get extra weird though — we are >>> explicitly not delivering tokens in the front channel in the core of GNAP, >>> we’re using the response from the continuation API. One idea (that isn’t >>> particularly well thought out and hasn’t been implemented at all) is to >>> have an extension declare an alternative response from the “continue” >>> section that’s defined today, which points to the GNPA continuation API. If >>> an extension defines some alternative way to deliver tokens, that could >>> live alongside a continuation API and the client could indicate support for >>> it in its initial request. >>> >>> In any event, alternative interaction and delivery methods are >>> important, and even if we aren’t going to support every last one of them >>> directly, the protocol design should at least be aware of them. >>> >>> — Justin >>> >>> On Feb 4, 2021, at 8:35 AM, Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Tom, >>> >>> Sure, any experience on that would be greatly appreciated, we're calling >>> for help here (the point being that I suspect what they're doing is not >>> trivial). >>> >>> Fabien >>> >>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 2:21 PM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I've had such an app working for over a year. There are issues which >>>> are being addressed by the browser Interaction team of oidc. >>>> >>>> thx ..Tom (mobile) >>>> >>>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021, 3:12 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Francis, >>>>> >>>>> I've tried a few things with regards to using the AS on a phone, but >>>>> it's really quite complex. >>>>> >>>>> Making that run on a phone comes with quite a bit of trouble. The most >>>>> difficult part if that we'd need to use a secure element, but just >>>>> installing and hosting a http server securely is not a standard setup at >>>>> all. I suggest interested people step in to work on this, as we already >>>>> have a lot of work for the (more usual) server case and already handle a >>>>> privacy preserving scheme. >>>>> >>>>> Please let us know what you think. >>>>> >>>>> Cheers, >>>>> Fabien >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 5:55 AM Fabien Imbault < >>>>> fabien.imbault@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Francis, >>>>>> >>>>>> I've thought a bit more to what you said. I think I'll give it a try >>>>>> as a separate experiment (in code, not in theory). Not that I would expect >>>>>> it to be included in GNAP, but I kind of like the idea :-) >>>>>> >>>>>> The direct impact for GNAP would be to think about multiple ASs. >>>>>> >>>>>> Will let you know. >>>>>> >>>>>> Fabien >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Le mer. 18 nov. 2020 à 13:06, Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> a >>>>>> écrit : >>>>>> >>>>>>> It would be nice if the protocol was designed at many layers of >>>>>>> abstraction. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - The first layer shall design abstract protocol flows, without >>>>>>> specification of the mode and mechanism of interaction. >>>>>>> - The second layer can instantiate the first layer for dedicated >>>>>>> interaction. Here we can talk http, we can define interactions that presume >>>>>>> server based token generation, we can define interaction that run on user >>>>>>> device based token generation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is also the fundament of the structure I proposed for the spec ( >>>>>>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/30). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> /Francis >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>> *From:* Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> >>>>>>> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 18, 2020 6:35 AM >>>>>>> *To:* Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> >>>>>>> *Cc:* txauth@ietf.org <txauth@ietf.org>; Dick Hardt < >>>>>>> dick.hardt@gmail.com>; Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>; >>>>>>> Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>; Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> >>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Would make sense, but not so easy as we rely heavily on HTTP. Hence >>>>>>> the discussion about deep links and so on. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An alternative might be provided by wasm/wasi (running a local >>>>>>> sandbox on your phone, for your own AS), but it's really early stage. This >>>>>>> also poses another question that Denis has put forward, i.e. how do we >>>>>>> handle the multiple AS scenario (likely to occur then). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Fabien >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 12:16 PM Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> We are drifting away from the original problem space. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - My original mention was about the "POST" request, that >>>>>>> subsumes that the "AS" is a "Server". Designing a new protocol, we cannot >>>>>>> afford this limitation. >>>>>>> - I just mentioned SIOP to show a known and closed example? Let >>>>>>> us not focus on the device local discovery scheme (like openid:) for now. >>>>>>> - As capability of holding private keys on user device evolves, >>>>>>> server-based issuing of token will be fading out giving way to device local >>>>>>> generation of token. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> While designing GNAP, let us assume the AS-Role can be exercised on >>>>>>> a user device and design the protocol to honor that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best regards, >>>>>>> /Francis >>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>> *From:* TXAuth <txauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Dick Hardt < >>>>>>> dick.hardt@gmail.com> >>>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 17, 2020 1:28 PM >>>>>>> *To:* Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> >>>>>>> *Cc:* Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>; Denis < >>>>>>> denis.ietf@free.fr>; GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>; Justin >>>>>>> Richer <jricher@mit.edu> >>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Got it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So web apps invoke a openid: deep link and hope there is an app to >>>>>>> handle the openid: scheme? ... and that it is the user's wallet rather than >>>>>>> some malware that has registered openid: on the mobile device? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A native app can attempt to open a deep link associated with an app, >>>>>>> and will fail if the app is not there. If the app is there, it will be >>>>>>> opened, so this can't be used to silently test if an app is present, but it >>>>>>> does allow a native app to provide an alternative experience if an app is >>>>>>> not present. I don't think this works with custom schemes ... and I don't >>>>>>> know how it could work from a web app on the phone with the current Safari >>>>>>> APIs. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Apple warns against using custom schemes [1] ... but perhaps they >>>>>>> can be convinced to make openid: a managed scheme similar to mailto:, >>>>>>> tel:, sms:, facetime: ? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [1] >>>>>>> https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/allowing_apps_and_websites_to_link_to_your_content/defining_a_custom_url_scheme_for_your_app >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ᐧ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 10:06 AM Tom Jones < >>>>>>> thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You are - that is not standard which is opeind:// >>>>>>> This is the one step that still needs to be optimized for SIOP to >>>>>>> have good UX. >>>>>>> Peace ..tom >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:59 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Tom >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I watched your video (I watched at 2X speed) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Looks like the employment website app that is using localhost:8765 >>>>>>> to communicate with the wallet. Am I correct? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> /Dick >>>>>>> ᐧ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:46 AM Tom Jones < >>>>>>> thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Well, here's a demo. Note that in this case the AS is not online all >>>>>>> of the time, so it is really implicit flow and the OIDC id-token comes from >>>>>>> the siop device directly. >>>>>>> (whether this is front-channel or back channel is no longer an >>>>>>> interesting question.) >>>>>>> Now if an always-on AS is required, that is possible, but probably >>>>>>> beyond the scope of this effort and would require something like an >>>>>>> agent-in-the-sky (with diamonds). >>>>>>> here is the link to the 9 min video https://youtu.be/Tq4hw7X5SW0 >>>>>>> <https://urldefense.us/v2/url?u=https-3A__youtu.be_Tq4hw7X5SW0&d=DwMFaQ&c=2plI3hXH8ww3j2g8pV19QHIf4SmK_I-Eol_p9P0CttE&r=D5lnfoa2MVZWELqVbbz71ooelbP7rVGCjGDSBNvUpYQ&m=ixsudGSr_dhG-SLiatb4Sz9FWslmywnYyZAOLgZxhl8&s=jdLLy0G1JTQCAOBZ6PeUgI0kiCtVJXrru0VToYWlNZ8&e=> >>>>>>> Peace ..tom >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:20 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ultimately, in most situations like these in the real world, the >>>>>>> hurdle isn’t technical compatibility so much as it is trust compatibility. >>>>>>> The RP (client) needs to have some incentive to trust the assertions and >>>>>>> identity information that’s coming from the AS. The same is true for an RS >>>>>>> trusting tokens from the AS. The hard question is less “how” to do that >>>>>>> (which SSI answers), but more “why” to do that (which SSI doesn’t answer >>>>>>> very well, because it’s a hard question). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Still: it’s definitely a question about how to support this “AS on >>>>>>> device” element. We’ve got the start of it more than OAuth2/OIDC have by >>>>>>> allowing the bootstrap of the process from a starting call: the interaction >>>>>>> and continuation URIs handed back by the AS don’t need to be the same URIs >>>>>>> that the client starts with, so just like SIOP the process can start in >>>>>>> HTTP and potentially move to other communication channels. A major >>>>>>> difference is that we aren’t dependent on the assumption that the user will >>>>>>> always be in a browser at some stage, and so the whole raft of >>>>>>> front-channel messages that SIOP relies on doesn’t fly. That said, we’ve >>>>>>> got an opportunity to more explicitly open up alternative communication >>>>>>> channels here, and that’s something I’d like to see engineered, even if >>>>>>> it’s an extension. I’d love to see a concrete proposal as to how that would >>>>>>> work over specific protocols, starting with what we’ve got today. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> — Justin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Nov 17, 2020, at 12:03 PM, Fabien Imbault < >>>>>>> fabien.imbault@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Denis, hi Francis, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> At some point integration with SSI (on the authentication side) will >>>>>>> probably occur, including amongst other possibilities SIOP (since they work >>>>>>> with OpenID a part of the work will probably be made easier). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That being said, Denis is right. It's not an AS. Technically it's >>>>>>> entirely possible to rely on a decentralized wallet (for instance on your >>>>>>> phone) and a centralized AS. I know of a few studies on how to decentralize >>>>>>> the AS itself (for instance >>>>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardjono-oauth-decentralized-02). >>>>>>> Maybe it exists, but I'm still looking for real scenarios (or even >>>>>>> architectures) where an AS is deployed directly on a phone, and under the >>>>>>> sole authority of the RO, while being compatible with the rest of the >>>>>>> world. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Cheers, >>>>>>> Fabien >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 5:45 PM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hello Francis, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> See two comments in line. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> B) Current Document >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Roles description shall not hold any assumption on the physical >>>>>>> structure of the party fulfilling the roles. >>>>>>> [FI] not sure what you mean >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [FP] for example, we assume the AS is a server! In most SSI based >>>>>>> use cases, the AS will be running on the user device. See SIOP ( >>>>>>> https://identity.foundation/did-siop/). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I browsed through the two drafts, i.e. : >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0 Core architecture, data >>>>>>> model, and representations W3C Working Draft 08 November 2020 >>>>>>> - Self-Issued OpenID Connect Provider DID Profile v0.1. DIF >>>>>>> Working Group Draft >>>>>>> >>>>>>> At no place within these two documents, it is possible to imagine >>>>>>> that "the AS will be running on the user device". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> From section 3 of the DIF Working Group Draft: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Unlike the OIDC Authorization Code Flow as per [OIDC.Core], >>>>>>> the SIOP will not return an access token to the RP". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An Identity Wallet is not an AS. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Roles: >>>>>>> -> grant endpoint of the AS: Why is this a post request? This >>>>>>> eliminates the chance of having user device hosted AS (no server). >>>>>>> [FI] what would you propose instead? >>>>>>> Would also be interested to understand better the deployment model >>>>>>> when there is no server. That's something that was discussed several times >>>>>>> but I'm still missing the underlying architecture and use case. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [FP] See above (SIOP). There will be a lot of identity wallets >>>>>>> operated on end user device. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> See the above comment. Please, do not confuse an Identity Wallet >>>>>>> with an Authentication Server (AS). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Denis >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -> Resource Owner (RO) : Authorizes the request? Does it authorize >>>>>>> the request or the access to a resource? >>>>>>> [FI] yes, we should make the wording clearer >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Missing Section Interactions: >>>>>>> --> This section shall introduce the notion of interaction before we >>>>>>> start listing interaction types. >>>>>>> [FI] yes >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Interaction Types: >>>>>>> --> I prefer a classification with Redirect, Decoupled and Embedded >>>>>>> is. In the draft, we have one redirect and 2 decouple interactions and >>>>>>> nothing else. >>>>>>> [FI] this should be handled as a specific discussion item. As a >>>>>>> reminder, how would you define embedded? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In practice there's at least these modes: >>>>>>> - redirect and redirect back >>>>>>> - redirect to different browser or device >>>>>>> - user code >>>>>>> - CIBA >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [FP] This classification is limited. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Redirect: same device, same or different user agents (browser, >>>>>>> mobile app, desktop app, ...) >>>>>>> - Decoupled: different devices >>>>>>> - Embedded : RC carries RO authorization to AS >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Resource Access Request vs. Resource Request >>>>>>> --> Both are mixed up. No clarification of the context of each >>>>>>> section. >>>>>>> [FI] could you clarify what you'd expect. Btw on this topic, >>>>>>> there's a more general discussion on whether we should make a distinction >>>>>>> or not. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [FP]: Here: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Resource Access Request: Requesting Access to a resource. >>>>>>> Response is an access token (or any type of grant) >>>>>>> - Resource Request: Request the resource. Response is the >>>>>>> resource (or a corresponding execution) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Token Content Negotiation >>>>>>> --> Not expressed as such. This is central to GNAP and not >>>>>>> represented enough in the document. >>>>>>> [FI] right. This should be a specific discussion item. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Requesting "User" Information >>>>>>> we identify two types of users: RQ and RO. It will be better not to >>>>>>> refer to a user in this draft, but either to a RQ or an RO. >>>>>>> [FI] yes that would avoid potential misunderstandings. Although in >>>>>>> the end, people will translate RQ into user or end-user most of the time. >>>>>>> Cf in definition, currently we have Requesting Party (RQ, aka >>>>>>> "user") >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Interaction Again >>>>>>> -> For each interaction type, we will have to describe the protocol >>>>>>> flow and the nature and behavior of involved Roles (Parties), Elements, >>>>>>> Requests. >>>>>>> [FI] yes >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [FP] Will these and into tickets? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best regards. >>>>>>> /Francis >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> TXAuth mailing list >>>>>>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> TXAuth mailing list >>>>>>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> TXAuth mailing list >>>>>>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> TXAuth mailing list >>>>>>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>
- [GNAP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-… internet-drafts
- Re: [GNAP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-gnap-core-proto… Justin Richer
- [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00 Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault