Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> Thu, 04 February 2021 11:12 UTC
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References: <160433257633.23038.15047041472414640530@ietfa.amsl.com> <AB11DC08-C6ED-4045-A8F5-872AD263035D@mit.edu> <FR2P281MB01063C2EA739E892B549611D8D110@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <CAM8feuQcCdQFGUKy-ou7H3Ta38yyN1LR+0XJd9WophRMRdPDEA@mail.gmail.com> <FR2P281MB0106C83420ED3F8DF2723BFD8DE30@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <5b8ac79b-0c0e-18e9-9f80-b5d79e9ae59b@free.fr> <CAM8feuQ346w9EL=-qpJRmMOO_YUp_14gShxcro+pVxnfXTvkzw@mail.gmail.com> <5E214281-2974-4632-AB74-4E068B7EE66B@mit.edu> <CAK2Cwb5ACMxjiph796Lq1U3FZ6Tm_2TCmsKTJZn8Fgc0rzEgZQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD9ie-vDS9-Cc=cVRc_SDg7z6KxMqySdcfv3ZPSjAzHorZP7UQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAK2Cwb66asqy1MCtW7KNHyW5=H23fWATBds2aKC3Xi88V34=Rw@mail.gmail.com> <CAD9ie-sGRFQMj81g4oWAS=CgHOe5ReDrAXeVzqvW9UL0W0P-Qw@mail.gmail.com> <FR2P281MB0106FEBFFB997265C8A9EF878DE10@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <CAM8feuQiBij5Be2p3he0HwWfC+WaDRVQ6HqEKoq+FfqYJVGNXA@mail.gmail.com> <FR2P281MB0106245AD7828040C4BF0F7E8DE10@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <CAM8feuQc8Thohftk_=ohNByTvZtxRukdQ3xCzMP3K7zdZBO6Lg@mail.gmail.com>
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From: Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2021 12:12:27 +0100
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To: Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de>
Cc: GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>, Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>, Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
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Hi Francis, I've tried a few things with regards to using the AS on a phone, but it's really quite complex. Making that run on a phone comes with quite a bit of trouble. The most difficult part if that we'd need to use a secure element, but just installing and hosting a http server securely is not a standard setup at all. I suggest interested people step in to work on this, as we already have a lot of work for the (more usual) server case and already handle a privacy preserving scheme. Please let us know what you think. Cheers, Fabien On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 5:55 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Francis, > > I've thought a bit more to what you said. I think I'll give it a try as a > separate experiment (in code, not in theory). Not that I would expect it to > be included in GNAP, but I kind of like the idea :-) > > The direct impact for GNAP would be to think about multiple ASs. > > Will let you know. > > Fabien > > > Le mer. 18 nov. 2020 à 13:06, Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> a écrit : > >> It would be nice if the protocol was designed at many layers of >> abstraction. >> >> >> - The first layer shall design abstract protocol flows, without >> specification of the mode and mechanism of interaction. >> - The second layer can instantiate the first layer for dedicated >> interaction. Here we can talk http, we can define interactions that presume >> server based token generation, we can define interaction that run on user >> device based token generation. >> >> This is also the fundament of the structure I proposed for the spec ( >> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/30). >> >> /Francis >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> >> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 18, 2020 6:35 AM >> *To:* Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> >> *Cc:* txauth@ietf.org <txauth@ietf.org>; Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>; >> Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>; Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>; >> Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> >> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00 >> >> Would make sense, but not so easy as we rely heavily on HTTP. Hence the >> discussion about deep links and so on. >> >> An alternative might be provided by wasm/wasi (running a local sandbox on >> your phone, for your own AS), but it's really early stage. This also poses >> another question that Denis has put forward, i.e. how do we handle the >> multiple AS scenario (likely to occur then). >> >> Fabien >> >> On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 12:16 PM Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> wrote: >> >> We are drifting away from the original problem space. >> >> - My original mention was about the "POST" request, that subsumes >> that the "AS" is a "Server". Designing a new protocol, we cannot afford >> this limitation. >> - I just mentioned SIOP to show a known and closed example? Let us >> not focus on the device local discovery scheme (like openid:) for now. >> - As capability of holding private keys on user device evolves, >> server-based issuing of token will be fading out giving way to device local >> generation of token. >> >> While designing GNAP, let us assume the AS-Role can be exercised on a >> user device and design the protocol to honor that. >> >> Best regards, >> /Francis >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* TXAuth <txauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Dick Hardt < >> dick.hardt@gmail.com> >> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 17, 2020 1:28 PM >> *To:* Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> >> *Cc:* Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>; Denis < >> denis.ietf@free.fr>; GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>; Justin Richer < >> jricher@mit.edu> >> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00 >> >> Got it. >> >> So web apps invoke a openid: deep link and hope there is an app to handle >> the openid: scheme? ... and that it is the user's wallet rather than some >> malware that has registered openid: on the mobile device? >> >> A native app can attempt to open a deep link associated with an app, and >> will fail if the app is not there. If the app is there, it will be opened, >> so this can't be used to silently test if an app is present, but it does >> allow a native app to provide an alternative experience if an app is not >> present. I don't think this works with custom schemes ... and I don't know >> how it could work from a web app on the phone with the current Safari APIs. >> >> Apple warns against using custom schemes [1] ... but perhaps they can be >> convinced to make openid: a managed scheme similar to mailto:, tel:, >> sms:, facetime: ? >> >> [1] >> https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/allowing_apps_and_websites_to_link_to_your_content/defining_a_custom_url_scheme_for_your_app >> >> >> ᐧ >> >> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 10:06 AM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> You are - that is not standard which is opeind:// >> This is the one step that still needs to be optimized for SIOP to have >> good UX. >> Peace ..tom >> >> >> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:59 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Hi Tom >> >> I watched your video (I watched at 2X speed) >> >> Looks like the employment website app that is using localhost:8765 to >> communicate with the wallet. Am I correct? >> >> /Dick >> ᐧ >> >> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:46 AM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> Well, here's a demo. Note that in this case the AS is not online all of >> the time, so it is really implicit flow and the OIDC id-token comes from >> the siop device directly. >> (whether this is front-channel or back channel is no longer an >> interesting question.) >> Now if an always-on AS is required, that is possible, but probably beyond >> the scope of this effort and would require something like an >> agent-in-the-sky (with diamonds). >> here is the link to the 9 min video https://youtu.be/Tq4hw7X5SW0 >> <https://urldefense.us/v2/url?u=https-3A__youtu.be_Tq4hw7X5SW0&d=DwMFaQ&c=2plI3hXH8ww3j2g8pV19QHIf4SmK_I-Eol_p9P0CttE&r=D5lnfoa2MVZWELqVbbz71ooelbP7rVGCjGDSBNvUpYQ&m=ixsudGSr_dhG-SLiatb4Sz9FWslmywnYyZAOLgZxhl8&s=jdLLy0G1JTQCAOBZ6PeUgI0kiCtVJXrru0VToYWlNZ8&e=> >> Peace ..tom >> >> >> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:20 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >> >> Ultimately, in most situations like these in the real world, the hurdle >> isn’t technical compatibility so much as it is trust compatibility. The RP >> (client) needs to have some incentive to trust the assertions and identity >> information that’s coming from the AS. The same is true for an RS trusting >> tokens from the AS. The hard question is less “how” to do that (which SSI >> answers), but more “why” to do that (which SSI doesn’t answer very well, >> because it’s a hard question). >> >> Still: it’s definitely a question about how to support this “AS on >> device” element. We’ve got the start of it more than OAuth2/OIDC have by >> allowing the bootstrap of the process from a starting call: the interaction >> and continuation URIs handed back by the AS don’t need to be the same URIs >> that the client starts with, so just like SIOP the process can start in >> HTTP and potentially move to other communication channels. A major >> difference is that we aren’t dependent on the assumption that the user will >> always be in a browser at some stage, and so the whole raft of >> front-channel messages that SIOP relies on doesn’t fly. That said, we’ve >> got an opportunity to more explicitly open up alternative communication >> channels here, and that’s something I’d like to see engineered, even if >> it’s an extension. I’d love to see a concrete proposal as to how that would >> work over specific protocols, starting with what we’ve got today. >> >> — Justin >> >> On Nov 17, 2020, at 12:03 PM, Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> Hi Denis, hi Francis, >> >> At some point integration with SSI (on the authentication side) will >> probably occur, including amongst other possibilities SIOP (since they work >> with OpenID a part of the work will probably be made easier). >> >> That being said, Denis is right. It's not an AS. Technically it's >> entirely possible to rely on a decentralized wallet (for instance on your >> phone) and a centralized AS. I know of a few studies on how to decentralize >> the AS itself (for instance >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardjono-oauth-decentralized-02). >> Maybe it exists, but I'm still looking for real scenarios (or even >> architectures) where an AS is deployed directly on a phone, and under the >> sole authority of the RO, while being compatible with the rest of the >> world. >> >> Cheers, >> Fabien >> >> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 5:45 PM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote: >> >> Hello Francis, >> >> See two comments in line. >> >> >> B) Current Document >> >> Roles description shall not hold any assumption on the physical structure >> of the party fulfilling the roles. >> [FI] not sure what you mean >> >> [FP] for example, we assume the AS is a server! In most SSI based use >> cases, the AS will be running on the user device. See SIOP ( >> https://identity.foundation/did-siop/). >> >> I browsed through the two drafts, i.e. : >> >> - Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0 Core architecture, data >> model, and representations W3C Working Draft 08 November 2020 >> - Self-Issued OpenID Connect Provider DID Profile v0.1. DIF Working >> Group Draft >> >> At no place within these two documents, it is possible to imagine that >> "the AS will be running on the user device". >> >> From section 3 of the DIF Working Group Draft: >> >> "Unlike the OIDC Authorization Code Flow as per [OIDC.Core], the >> SIOP will not return an access token to the RP". >> >> An Identity Wallet is not an AS. >> >> >> Roles: >> -> grant endpoint of the AS: Why is this a post request? This eliminates >> the chance of having user device hosted AS (no server). >> [FI] what would you propose instead? >> Would also be interested to understand better the deployment model when >> there is no server. That's something that was discussed several times but >> I'm still missing the underlying architecture and use case. >> >> [FP] See above (SIOP). There will be a lot of identity wallets operated >> on end user device. >> >> See the above comment. Please, do not confuse an Identity Wallet with an >> Authentication Server (AS). >> >> Denis >> >> >> -> Resource Owner (RO) : Authorizes the request? Does it authorize the >> request or the access to a resource? >> [FI] yes, we should make the wording clearer >> >> Missing Section Interactions: >> --> This section shall introduce the notion of interaction before we >> start listing interaction types. >> [FI] yes >> >> Interaction Types: >> --> I prefer a classification with Redirect, Decoupled and Embedded is. >> In the draft, we have one redirect and 2 decouple interactions and nothing >> else. >> [FI] this should be handled as a specific discussion item. As a reminder, >> how would you define embedded? >> >> In practice there's at least these modes: >> - redirect and redirect back >> - redirect to different browser or device >> - user code >> - CIBA >> >> [FP] This classification is limited. >> >> - Redirect: same device, same or different user agents (browser, >> mobile app, desktop app, ...) >> - Decoupled: different devices >> - Embedded : RC carries RO authorization to AS >> >> >> >> Resource Access Request vs. Resource Request >> --> Both are mixed up. No clarification of the context of each section. >> [FI] could you clarify what you'd expect. Btw on this topic, there's a >> more general discussion on whether we should make a distinction or not. >> >> [FP]: Here: >> >> - Resource Access Request: Requesting Access to a resource. Response >> is an access token (or any type of grant) >> - Resource Request: Request the resource. Response is the resource >> (or a corresponding execution) >> >> >> Token Content Negotiation >> --> Not expressed as such. This is central to GNAP and not represented >> enough in the document. >> [FI] right. This should be a specific discussion item. >> >> Requesting "User" Information >> we identify two types of users: RQ and RO. It will be better not to refer >> to a user in this draft, but either to a RQ or an RO. >> [FI] yes that would avoid potential misunderstandings. Although in the >> end, people will translate RQ into user or end-user most of the time. Cf in >> definition, currently we have Requesting Party (RQ, aka "user") >> >> >> Interaction Again >> -> For each interaction type, we will have to describe the protocol flow >> and the nature and behavior of involved Roles (Parties), Elements, Requests. >> [FI] yes >> >> >> [FP] Will these and into tickets? >> >> Best regards. >> /Francis >> >> >> >> -- >> TXAuth mailing list >> TXAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >> >> -- >> TXAuth mailing list >> TXAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >> >> >> -- >> TXAuth mailing list >> TXAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >> >> -- >> TXAuth mailing list >> TXAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >> >>
- [GNAP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-… internet-drafts
- Re: [GNAP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-gnap-core-proto… Justin Richer
- [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00 Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault