Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases with several ASs built along "Privacy by Design" (PbD)
Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> Tue, 11 August 2020 21:27 UTC
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From: Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 17:27:03 -0400
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To: Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
Cc: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>, GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases with several ASs built along "Privacy by Design" (PbD)
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Hello Fabian, On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 2:17 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Francis, > > I think Denis points to the fact that, in the current situation, the AS > receives the resource request from the Client and therefore knows what > tokens are asked. > The token request must not mention any reference of the RS. > Then it also implements the consent interface (and possibly the login too) > and so it also knows who validates and what is accepted or not. > Decoupling this does not change the privacy context, as the AS issues the Token. AS needs to add a reference to the RC in the token. SO AS can correlate on StudentId anyway. > I don't think the abstract flow deals with those privacy concerns. > To solve the privacy problem addressed in this thread, we need to go the (SSI/DiD/VC) way. Then UNIV-0 (in his role of RS) will have to issue a VC (Verifiable Credential) to the Student (in his role of RC). The Student will then present this claim to UNIV-1 during his registration. In this case we need no Grant negotiation and no AS. Best regards. /Francis > > > Then I agree with you on the audience field of the token, if left empty it > simplifies part of the problem, although it removes a big part of the > control you may want from directed tokens. That's why I'm willing to better > develop the RS hiding idea. > > Fabien > > Le mar. 11 août 2020 à 05:58, Francis Pouatcha <fpo= > 40adorsys.de@dmarc.ietf.org> a écrit : > >> Hello Denis, >> >> what you describe in the use case seems to be the default behavior of the >> protocol. Let me map it with this abstract protocol flow: >> >> +-----------+ +--------------+ +-----------+ +----+ >> +---------------------+ >> | Requestor | | Orchestrator | | RS | | GS | | Resource >> Controller | >> | is UNIV-1 | | is UNIV-1 | | is UNIV-0 | | or | | is >> | >> | Staff | | Registr. App | | Server | | AS | | >> Student | >> +-----------+ +--------------+ +-----------+ +----+ >> +---------------------+ >> |(1) RegisterStudent | | | | >> |---------------------->| | | | >> | |(2) RequestRecordIntent(RecordType,StudentId, >> | | >> OrchestratorId):AuthRequest[RecordType,StudentId] >> | |<-------------->| | | >> | | | | | >> | |(3) >> AuthZRequest(RecordType,StudentId,OrchestratorId) >> | |--------------------------->| | >> | | | |(4) >> ConsentRequest(RecordType, >> | | | | >> OrchestratorId):Consent >> | | | |<-------------->| >> | |(5) AuthZ[RecordType,StudentId,OrchestratorId] >> | |<---------------------------| | >> | | | | | >> | |(2) >> RequestRecord(RecordType,StudentId,OrchestratorId) >> | | :RecordOf[StudentId] | | >> | |<-------------->| | | >> |(7) Registered | | | | >> |<----------------------| | | | >> + + + + + >> >> we assume the authz request sent by "Client" to "AS" describes the >> protected resource without referring to the authz server. An AS can issue >> the authz to release the graduation record of a student >> ((5) AuthZ[RecordType,StudentId,OrchestratorId]), without any reference to >> the target university. >> >> What matters for this authz object is: >> - StudentId: a reference to the student as known to the resource server. >> - RecordType: a reference to a resource of type graduation record as >> understandable by the resource server. >> - OrchestratorId: reference to the Orchestrator. Can be used to bind >> authz to Orchestrator. >> >> But: >> - RS must trust AS issued token. >> - StudentId must be known to RS, AS and Orchestrator. >> >> Therefore, the AS does not need to know the RS. Keep the audience field >> empty. >> >> Same principle applies for the second use case. >> >> What privacy problem do you see here? >> >> Best regards. >> /Francis >> >> On Tue, Aug 4, 2020 at 5:08 AM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote: >> >>> I tried my best twice to download three use cases in the Use cases >>> directory, but I failed. >>> >>> Rather than failing a third time, here is the direct link of the second >>> try: >>> >>> >>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/general/wiki/Three-Client-Server-use-cases-with-several-ASs-built-along-%22Privacy-by-Design%22-(PbD) >>> >>> Denis >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Txauth mailing list >>> Txauth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>> >> >> >> -- >> Francis Pouatcha >> Co-Founder and Technical Lead >> adorsys GmbH & Co. KG >> https://adorsys-platform.de/solutions/ >> -- >> TXAuth mailing list >> TXAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >> > -- Francis Pouatcha Co-Founder and Technical Lead adorsys GmbH & Co. KG https://adorsys-platform.de/solutions/
- [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases with sever… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] [Txauth] Three Client-Server use cases… Francis Pouatcha