[Unbearable] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-tokbind-protocol-17: (with COMMENT)

Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> Wed, 09 May 2018 19:55 UTC

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Date: Wed, 09 May 2018 12:55:11 -0700
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Subject: [Unbearable] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-tokbind-protocol-17: (with COMMENT)
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Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tokbind-protocol-17: Yes

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Thanks for this document. I am balloting "yes", but I have a few minor comments:

Minor Comments:

§1.1: Please consider using the boilerplate from 8174 across this cluster.
There are a few instances of lower case keywords across the set.

§3.1: This section does not seem to sufficiently define the difference between
provided_token_binding and referred_token_binding, other than as a mention of
the use case from the HTTPS doc. It would be nice if other application protocol
bindings did not have to refer to the HTTPS doc to fully understand the basic
protocol. (Or is it assumed that only HTTPS will use referred_token_binding)?

§3.2, last paragraph: Why is this a SHOULD? Do you envision scenarios where it
would make sense to behave differently? For example, if an application made
Token Binding IDs available as structured data, what would be the consequences?

§3.3, last bullet: Is the EKM from the TLS connection at the time the binding
is established (rather than when it might later be used)?

§4.1, 2nd paragraph: Why only a SHOULD? It seems like intentionally storing
keys in an insecure manner makes the entire protocol pointless.

§6.1 (and others): I'm not sure what it means for the expert to be "advised to
encourage". Is there something more concrete that could be said? Does this give
the advisor grounds to reject a registration?

Editorial Comments:

§1: Please expand TPM on first mention.