Re: [Unbearable] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tokbind-https-10.txt

Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> Fri, 21 July 2017 09:21 UTC

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From: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
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Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2017 11:21:19 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Unbearable] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tokbind-https-10.txt
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This ID is still lacking to indicate that  this mechanism will be 
ineffective in case of a collusion between clients.

This should be clearly indicated in the Security Considerations section.

Denis

> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Token Binding WG of the IETF.
>
>          Title           : Token Binding over HTTP
>          Authors         : Andrei Popov
>                            Magnus Nyström
>                            Dirk Balfanz
>                            Adam Langley
>                            Nick Harper
>                            Jeff Hodges
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-tokbind-https-10.txt
> 	Pages           : 22
> 	Date            : 2017-07-21
>
> Abstract:
>     This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow HTTP
>     servers to cryptographically bind security tokens (such as cookies
>     and OAuth tokens) to TLS connections.
>
>     We describe both first-party and federated scenarios.  In a first-
>     party scenario, an HTTP server is able to cryptographically bind the
>     security tokens it issues to a client, and which the client
>     subsequently returns to the server, to the TLS connection between the
>     client and server.  Such bound security tokens are protected from
>     misuse since the server can generally detect if they are replayed
>     inappropriately, e.g., over other TLS connections.
>
>     Federated token bindings, on the other hand, allow servers to
>     cryptographically bind security tokens to a TLS connection that the
>     client has with a different server than the one issuing the token.
>
>     This Internet-Draft is a companion document to The Token Binding
>     Protocol.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tokbind-https/
>
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tokbind-https-10
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tokbind-https-10
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tokbind-https-10
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
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