Re: [Unbearable] WGLC 3 on core documents

Nick Harper <nharper@google.com> Mon, 27 February 2017 19:36 UTC

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From: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2017 11:36:10 -0800
Message-ID: <CACdeXi+8jrQkSi3iXNE1cu0JMSHc5Kyakc5YXABkuogUijywqg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>
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Cc: IETF Tokbind WG <unbearable@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Unbearable] WGLC 3 on core documents
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The client collusion scenario is about one client exporting a bound token
for another client to use. This bound token is a security token, and
reusing the token (whether it is on the same client or another client) is
replaying it. Hence, "Security Token Replay" is a perfectly appropriate
section for those sentences. They don't need their own section.

On Mon, Feb 27, 2017 at 1:19 AM, Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:

> Comments on draft-ietf-tokbind-protocol-13 (The Token Binding Protocol
> Version 1.0)
>
> On page 14 within the Security Considerations section, I appreciate the
> fact that the following sentences have been added:
>
> *   The Token Binding protocol does not prevent cooperating clients from*
> *   sharing a bound token.  A client could intentionally export a bound*
> *   token with the corresponding Token Binding private key, or perform*
> *   signatures using this key on behalf of another client.*
>
>
> However, these sentences have been placed inside section 7.1. which is
> called "Security Token Replay".
>
> This security consideration has nothing to do with "Security Token Replay"
> but with "Client collusion".
>
> Therefore, these sentences should be placed under a new section called:
> "7.2. Client collusion".
>
> ============================================================
> ==========================
>
> Comments on draft-ietf-tokbind-https-08 (Token Binding over HTTP)
>
> On page 14 within the Security Considerations section, the same kind of
> change as the one requested
> for draft-ietf-tokbind-protocol-13 (The Token Binding Protocol Version
> 1.0) should be done, i.e. add a new section
> called: "7.2. Client collusion" with the following text :
>
>
>
>
> *   Token Binding over HTTP does not prevent cooperating clients from
> sharing a bound token.  A client could intentionally export a bound
> token with the corresponding Token Binding private key, or perform
> signatures using this key on behalf of another client.*
>
>
> Denis
>
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