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Re: [Unbearable] (late, sorry) WGLC question on establishing the binding or not

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Tue, 20 December 2016 22:02 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2016 15:01:40 -0700
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To: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
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Cc: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, IETF Tokbind WG <unbearable@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Unbearable] (late, sorry) WGLC question on establishing the binding or not
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> Since in this case (client and server sent exact same TB version in nego)
> a server knows that the client supports TB, so if the client doesn't send a
> TB message, either some sort of weird attack is happening (which we
> definitely don't want), or the client is buggy and negotiated TB when it
> shouldn't have. I would suggest that when servers can detect buggy clients,
> they be as strict as possible, which would mean TB should say that a server
> SHOULD reject the TB message (and maybe close the connection) in this case.
>

There's no TB message in that case so it'd have to be reject the
application message (I guess a 400 for HTTP). But that's basically the same
train of thought that I had. I don't feel all that strongly about it but
that does align with my thoughts.

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