Re: [Uta] Comments on draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-03

Daniel Margolis <dmargolis@google.com> Tue, 28 March 2017 16:25 UTC

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From: Daniel Margolis <dmargolis@google.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 18:25:36 +0200
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To: Federico Santandrea <federico.santandrea@diennea.com>
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Subject: Re: [Uta] Comments on draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-03
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Yes, I think we have discussed the possibility of that before. You could
also do this with a new EKU value, I think. Ultimately the value of adding
this constraint is unclear to me; for example, dyndns.org would not be
saved by that (since a user who has "foo.dyndns.org" can easily get a cert
for that name); conversely, it could make it harder for some people to
adopt (I guess). So I Don't know.

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 12:18 PM, Federico Santandrea <
federico.santandrea@diennea.com> wrote:

> From Security Considerations section of draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-03:
>
>    "Similarly, we consider the possibilty of domains that deliberately
>    allow untrusted users to serve untrusted content on user-specified
>    subdomains.  In some cases (e.g. the service Tumblr.com) this takes
>    the form of providing HTTPS hosting of user-registered subdomains
>     [...] In these cases, there is a risk that untrusted users would be
>    able to serve custom content at the "mta-sts" host, including
>    serving an illegitimate SMTP STS policy."
>
> It's likely that such domains serve wildcard certificates for
> user-specified subdomains. I think a further mitigation of this could
> be to require the HTTPS connection's certificate to be valid precisely
> for the mta-sts.example.com host, ignoring wildcard matches.
>
> --
> Federico
>
>
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