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Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 18:36:23 +0100 (CET)
From: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
To: John Levine <johnl@taugh.com>, uta@ietf.org
Cc: dkg@fifthhorseman.net
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References: <87k1jfi2dd.fsf@fifthhorseman.net>
 <20190108172630.84DA9200C72467@ary.local>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/uta/Bx6c9VpMnIg40Q15MtP9YHjnFtQ>
Subject: Re: [Uta] SMTP Over TLS on Port 26 - Implicit TLS Proposal
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> Il 8 gennaio 2019 alle 18.26 John Levine <johnl@taugh.com> ha scritto:
> 
> 
> In article <87k1jfi2dd.fsf@fifthhorseman.net> you write:
> >I think the community would welcome that, but figuring out what specific
> >timeline is plausible; getting affirmative buy-in; setting up adequate
> >testing and notice; etc, is the real work involved.  It won't happen
> >just by wishing it.
> 
> MTA-STS does a great deal of this.  It has a way for a domain to say
> "all my inbound mail uses TLS" (RFC 8461) and for other systems to
> report back and say whether they're actually seeing that (RFC 8460.)
> 
> I don't understand why people are trying to reinvent the wheel when we
> just defined a fairly round one a few months ago.

DANE and MTA-STS provide an evolutionary and backwards compatible path for the transition to fully encrypted and authenticated email flows for those that care, but cannot force anyone to care and deploy them. What we are discussing is whether we could collectively exert gentle pressure (i.e. encrypt your email by this date or you won't be allowed to communicate any more) so that even those that don't care start to care.

Regards,
-- 

Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy & Innovation, Open-Xchange
vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com
Office @ Via Treviso 12, 10144 Torino, Italy

