[Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence
Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Mon, 11 April 2016 20:45 UTC
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence
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Hiya, With no hats, I'd like to argue that the WG should pursue the "webby" STS proposal, but should also ensure that we do not damage progress made by those who are deploying the DANE/DNSSEC approach to securing MTA-MTA connections. I think we can do that by requiring that outbound MTAs that implement the "webby" approach MUST/SHOULD first test for, and process, TLSA records for the next MX in the path. In other words the "webby" approach is tried 2nd. In more detail, my reasoning is as follows: - The DANE/DNSSEC approach works and when deployed does move MTA-MTA use of TLS beyond opportunistic security. And indeed some folks have deployed that and gotten the benefits. - Deploying DANE/DNSSEC requires DNSSEC (fairly obviously;-) and the fact is that DNSSEC deployment is not something that everyone who wants to move beyond opportunistic security is currently willing to do. - We can, and probably will, define a "webby" to achieve the same desired effect of getting beyond opportunistic security. Daniel and co's STS aprooach (as outlined for the next revision in B-A) is one such, and seems like it's one that can work. - Any such webby approach will inherently involve us in re-inventing a lot of what we get from DANE/DNSSEC. That's a bit of a pain, but inevitable and not a reason to not do STS. (The goal here is not perfection but to enable folks to do better than opportunistic security after all.) - My guess is that the webby approach will end up being a bit less secure/safe compared to the DANE/DNSSEC way of doing things, mostly due to it having to depend on some kind of TOFU step that gets repeated whenever DNS without DNSSEC is used (i.e. when something cached expires). - We therefore end up with two ways to do one thing. One ("webby") likely to be deployed by some bigger mail processors who don't currently do DNSSEC, and another DANE/DNSSEC that will likely be better and that's where we'd (as in the IETF) really prefer us all to end up when/if possible. - I think that saying one MUST first try DANE/DNSSEC is correct, but there may be cases where e.g. DNSSEC is just never going to visibly work for an MTA so it may be correct to say one SHOULD first try DANE/DNSSEC with the exception being cases where one knows at coding time that you'll never see an RRSIG or similar. Anyway with two ways, I really hope the WG conclude that we want both to be deployable without one damaging the other. There are of course other ways to try ensure we can sensibly live with both DANE/DNSSEC and webby STS and yet help folks move beyond opportunistic security, but I think the way outlined above is likely best if the folks who develop MTAs can accept it. Cheers, S. PS: Yes, this is entirely jumping the gun, and is only something the WG would need to decide a bit down the road. But since we had a good discussion of the topic in B-A, I wanted to send this before I forget it all, as I'm quite likely to do;-)
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Jim Fenton
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Viktor Dukhovni
- [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Mark Risher
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Neil Cook
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Daniel Margolis
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Daniel Margolis
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Neil Cook
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Daniel Margolis
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Neil Cook
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Daniel Margolis
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Neil Cook
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Chris Newman
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Binu Ramakrishnan
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Daniel Margolis
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Jim Fenton
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Jim Fenton
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Chris Newman
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Jim Fenton
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Chris Newman
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence =JeffH
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Uta] "webby" STS and DANE/DNSSEC co-existence Leif Johansson