Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentication agility
Keith Moore <moore@network-heretics.com> Tue, 25 March 2014 20:24 UTC
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Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 16:24:17 -0400
From: Keith Moore <moore@network-heretics.com>
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To: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <CAGZ8ZG0rBxiE2dGZXhpvhKiyJOu=6Bn8sQ2seJ9_KvgPjmaaRg@mail.gmail.com> <532CFAB0.4070301@network-heretics.com> <10492.1395613933@sandelman.ca> <533042FF.7060603@network-heretics.com> <53305B5D.8030708@fifthhorseman.net> <53305EFD.9030003@network-heretics.com> <53306294.4070205@fifthhorseman.net> <CAGZ8ZG2GYTYfrSDGxEMS3eRsg2g_LaWP_pyHt9vmz4NV2cGAEw@mail.gmail.com>
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Cc: "uta@ietf.org" <uta@ietf.org>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Subject: Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentication agility
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On 03/25/2014 04:09 PM, Trevor Perrin wrote: > On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 9:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor > <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote: >> On 03/24/2014 12:36 PM, Keith Moore wrote: >> >>> So, what's the incentive for either clients or servers to support OE if >>> clients just silently accept it without any indication to the user? >>> Just for the good of mankind? >> I'd say "to increase the cost of pervasive monitoring" and "to resist >> surveillance by passive attackers" > I'd go further - OE for HTTP could have strong auth added to it in the > future, such as pinning or DANE, which *could* be indicated to the > user. Why wait? Even if pinning, DANE, or whatever (as appropriate for that particular protocol) weren't required immediately, we might as well specify it now. Maybe we could even recommend a transition schedule - e.g. clients could ignore the lack of AE for X years after adoption, after which they'd start providing some sort of warning indication if recommended form of AE were not present. After Y years, they'd refuse to connect without AE. Obviously the details and the assumed transition dates would have to vary according to the deployment considerations for that particular protocol, and they should perhaps even be implementation-configurable, but we might as well start encouraging implementation and testing now. Site developers could set the transition dates to sooner in order to test features in advance of users' clients actually complaining. The point is: if you're going to install stepping stones, don't stop after placing the first stone and assume that the others will be placed eventually. We have a rare opportunity in which there is considerable public interest in improving communications privacy. We should not squander it by specifying only that which is easiest to do. Also: it is unlikely that we'll improve privacy in practice without also raising user expectations. Keith
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentication… Trevor Perrin
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Trevor Perrin
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Michael Richardson
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Eliot Lear
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Michael Richardson
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Eliot Lear
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Michael Richardson
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Michael Richardson
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Eliot Lear
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Trevor Perrin
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… William Chan (陈智昌)
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Trevor Perrin
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Trevor Perrin
- Re: [Uta] Opportunistic encryption and authentica… Keith Moore