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Re: [Uta] Adoption of draft-rsalz-use-san

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Wed, 17 March 2021 16:54 UTC

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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [Uta] Adoption of draft-rsalz-use-san
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> On Mar 15, 2021, at 5:58 AM, Eliot Lear <lear=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> For libraries like OpenSSL I wouldn’t mind throwing in a new flag, for instance, that would be required to validate a cert based on the subject.  That would help these other uses get over the hump over time; perhaps even with a warning of some form emitted.

See X509_check_host(3).  It's behaviour is customisable via the
below flags:

    X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
    X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
    X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS,
    X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS,
    X509_CHECK_FLAG_MULTI_LABEL_WILDCARDS.
    X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS.

So what Rich is proposing amounts to changing the default flag
setting from zero to X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT, and
then applications that want the legacy behaviour can just clear
that flag bit if they so desire.

-- 
	Viktor.

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