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Re: [v4tov6transition] Ways to break IPv6

Tim Chown <tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk> Wed, 13 October 2010 09:45 UTC

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From: Tim Chown <tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk>
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Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2010 10:45:39 +0100
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Subject: Re: [v4tov6transition] Ways to break IPv6
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On 13 Oct 2010, at 07:49, Joel Jaeggli wrote:

> I love how we talk about what they will do in the future tense. They do this today. my corporate laptops have had v6 broken in various sundry ways by bad policy and retarded security products across three employers since 2007. As long as v6 has been enabled in systems  people have been disabling it deliberately, or worse, breaking it in ways that make you wonder how these companies keep v4 working, in point of fact sometimes they don't. 

Disabling IPv6 administratively is probably quite wise, until you're ready to do a managed deployment.     Even in supposed IPv4-only networks issues like rogue RAs can cause problems for hosts with IPv6 enabled.    We surveyed a local reasonable size wireless network for example and 50% of the time a host somewhere on it was issuing rogue RAs; that was over 6 months of data.

Tim

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