Re: [v6ops] SLAAC renum: Problem Statement & Operational workarounds

[Fernando Gont <[e-mail]>]

On 1/11/19 07:11, Ted Lemon wrote:
> On Nov 1, 2019, at 5:45 AM, Fernando Gont <[e-mail]
> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>> So why aren’t they doing that?   What’s the obstacle?
>>
>> Are you referring to the CPE case, or to the rest?
> 
> I’m specifically referring to the ISP case, although I think referring
> to it as “the CPE case” is limiting your options! :)

At least one ISP reported issues with their provisioning system. I will
ask another, and come back to you.


> 
>> If you assume all routers employ the same values for the valid/preferred
>> lifetimes, then what you propose is the equivalent to "prefer the last
>> advertised prefix". In which case, in the presence of multiple RAs the
>> src address of new sessions will deterministically flap. That doesn't
>> seem nice from a troubleshooting perspective.
> 
> No, I’m saying that if you have two prefixes, one with a preferred
> lifetime of zero, and another with a preferred lifetime that is not
> zero, you should choose the second one.   Can you explain in a little
> more detail when this would cause a “deterministic flap”?

I misunderstoof you. What I was assuming that you were describing is this:

* CPE no longer advertises OLDPREFIX

* CPE now advertises NEWPREFIX

* If hosts always prefer the prefix with the larger Preferred Lifetime
(or the latest advertised Prefix), then you have "solved the problem"


However, in a scenario where you have two routers, Router_A that
advertises PREFIX_A, and Router_B that Advertises Prefix_B, then, upon
receipt of an RA from Router_A, Prefix_A would become preferred. But
then, when an RA from Router_B is received, Prefix_B will become
preferred. Then, upon receipt of an RA from Router_A, Prefix_A will
become preferred again.


In the case you discribe, all is fine. However, the key is: what caused
the Preferred Lifetime to become 0? (and RA from the CPE trying to
deprecate a previous prefix?)



>>> As for previous comments about source address selection, I think that if
>>> you have two prefixes that are otherwise equivalent (a tie), and one has
>>> a preferred lifetime of zero, while the other has a preferred lifetime
>>> of not-zero, it would be dysfunctional to choose the one with the
>>> preferred lifetime of zero.  What on earth is the purpose of preferred
>>> and valid lifetimes if SAS isn’t taking them into account?
>>
>> The timers are only supposed to be of use if they go off. Given the
>> default values the use (one month, and one week), they never go off.
>>
>> The valid lifetime would trigger garbage collection for stale prefixes.
>> The preferred lifetime would keep a fresh and working address as the
>> preferred address for new flows. -- if only they went of in a timelier
>> manner.
>>
>> So, I'd rather ask the question: what on earth is the purpose of setting
>> a timer that will never go off in a meaningful situation and period of
>> time?
> 
> Possibly we are talking past each other.   A prefix with a preferred
> lifetime of zero always has a preferred lifetime of zero.   There’s no
> timer to go off.   How the preferred lifetime /got/ to be zero is of
> course an important question, and there I think that what you are
> getting at is important: a 30 day expiry time is way too long.

Yep, then we were talking past each other :-)


> 
> What if the user does want to release the prefix, e.g. for privacy reasons?
> 
>> Not that I oppose to that. But I just note that there's no reason for ot
>> trusting a router that advertises PIO,VL=0, because your trust model is
>> that you do trust the router (if not your whole local network).
>>
>>> If I get an RA that’s not signed by the same key as a route in my
>>> routing table that’s working, I don’t let it override what is currently
>>> in my routing table and working.
>>
>> But that's not the current deployed reality. IN current deployments, RAs
>> are not signed. So why wuld you be skeptical to PIO, VL=0?
> 
> Right, we have a problem there.   SEND didn’t solve it.   I don’t think
> RA Guard solves it for the home case.   So, there is work to do… :)

Improvements in this area would certainly be nice. However, my point is
that it should be quite acceptable for one to update RFC4861 such that
PIO, VL=0 be honored, since the trust model is that you do trust
routers... and, in terms of DoS, there are already pletny of other
vectors for an attacker to exploint.


Thanks,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: [e-mail]
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