Re: [v6ops] Last Call: <draft-ietf-v6ops-v6-aaaa-whitelisting-implications-08.txt> (Considerations for Transitioning Content to IPv6) to Informational RFC

Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> Mon, 20 February 2012 20:49 UTC

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To: Havard Eidnes <he@uninett.no>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <20120201150911.25955.80172.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <017501ccefdc$68025a50$38070ef0$@lampo@eurid.eu> <13205C286662DE4387D9AF3AC30EF456D7671A210C@EMBX01-WF.jnpr.net> <20120220.170216.446120856.he@uninett.no>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 20 Feb 2012 17:02:16 BST." <20120220.170216.446120856.he@uninett.no>
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2012 07:48:42 +1100
Message-Id: <20120220204842.556861DA0095@drugs.dv.isc.org>
Cc: marc.lampo@eurid.eu, v6ops@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [v6ops] Last Call: <draft-ietf-v6ops-v6-aaaa-whitelisting-implications-08.txt> (Considerations for Transitioning Content to IPv6) to Informational RFC
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One can whitelist with DNSSEC at the source.  It just requires
having two nsec/nsec3 chains if the zone is signed.  One with AAAA
records in the bit map field and one without.  There are a number
of ways to implement this.  It's just a matter of returning consistent
answers.

In named this can be done with views.

	view "aaaa" {
		match-clients {
			key aaaa; !key noaaaa;
			whitelist;
		};
		zone "example.com" {
			type master;
			file "aaaa/example.com.signed";
		};
	};

	view "noaaaa" {
		match-clients {
			key noaaaa; !key aaaa;
			!whitelist; any;
		};
		zone "example.com" {
			type master;
			file "noaaaa/example.com.signed";
		};
	};

If you want to whitelist in the resolver, then DO=1 + signed AAAA
disables whitelisting.  There is no point when the client can detect
that it is happening.  This is what we did for filter-aaaa in named.

In message <20120220.170216.446120856.he@uninett.no>, Havard Eidnes writes:
> > The IESG has already approved this drat for publication.  However, I
> > think that your comment is significant if you can make a case that
> > the DNS information returned to the user is less trustworthy than it
> > would have been had the authoritative DNS not been practicing
> > whitelisiting.  Can you make this case?
> 
> "Less trustworthy" would be an imprecise euphemistic term to use in
> this case.  Instead, the returned data would fail cryptographic
> validation as performed by DNSSEC, and would therefore be discarded as
> invalid ("incorrect") by a DNSSEC-validating resolver.
> 
> Therefore, it would seem to me that you can either do AAAA
> whitelisting or DNSSEC, but not successfully do both.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> - H=E5vard
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> v6ops mailing list
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-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org