Re: [v6ops] Security issues in RFC8754 and related/subsequent drafts?

[[e-mail]]

> > The way I see this playing out is operators quickly moving along the lines of:
> > If I'm expected to filter "RH type 4 (SRH)" on all of my external interfaces in case someone else decides to run SRH, what else should I filter? Clearly 5 and 6 (CRH-16/32)... and 7, 8, ... 255.
> > I need to be ready *before* you enable $insert_new_protocol_here, so the only sensible thing for me to do is filter all RH/43. Oh, and I don't know what sort of new uses there might be for Hop-by-Hop that might affect me, so I should clearly just filter all protocol 0 (perhaps in the future I might allow specific ones... maybe). HIP? I don't use that, but I might in the future, and I certainly don't have time to follow all of the new things being proposed in the IETF/by vendors, so obviously I should filter that everywhere...
> > Actually, why am I bothering to write this long filter list? I'll just allow TCP and UDP, and call it done...
> >
> > (When I started writing the above I thought I would need to add a "Warning: Hyperbole ahead" marker -- but I'm no longer sure that that's the case).
> 
> Proposal for a principle: "If Internet traffic is carried across a limited domain, the technology used in the limited domain must not hinder end to end transparency."
> 
> <no hats/>
> 
> I must admit I'm having a hard time parsing the last part of the sentence. I think it is more:
> "A limited domain must default to fail closed, and require explicit configuration to open it."

It means: an operator's implementation of a limited domain should not impede anyone transitting that network to use the same mechanism.

O.