Re: [v6ops] [EXTERNAL] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-6man-grand-01 - additional security concerns

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Tue, 04 August 2020 00:09 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: "Templin \(US\)\, Fred L" <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com>, v6ops list <v6ops@ietf.org>, 6man <ipv6@ietf.org>
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Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2020 20:08:21 -0400
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Subject: Re: [v6ops] [EXTERNAL] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-6man-grand-01 - additional security concerns
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SEND is/was too expensive to deploy because 15 years ago, hosts did not have
identities that other hosts or routers could easily validate.
We did not come up with a reasonable TOFU mechanism either.

I believe that there are probably now environments (such as yours Fred) where
the cost/benefit of deploying those identities now has become positive.
This because the cost of deploying identities is much lower than it used to
be (both the administrative cost of doing it, as well as the CPU/network cost
of doing the signing), while the benefit of mitigating the risks is higher.

But, this has gone beyond GRAND.
GRAND is useful without SEND, but would be enhanced by SEND.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-