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Re: [v6ops] SLAAC renum: Problem Statement & Operational workarounds

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Thu, 31 October 2019 19:47 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 15:47:18 -0400
In-Reply-To: <5e0d1da1-4933-069c-68f6-9aa360106582@si6networks.com>
Cc: Philip Homburg <pch-v6ops-9@u-1.phicoh.com>, v6ops@ietf.org
To: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
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Subject: Re: [v6ops] SLAAC renum: Problem Statement & Operational workarounds
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On Oct 31, 2019, at 3:41 PM, Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com> wrote:
> As someone that has played a lot with ND-based DoS vectors, I should say
> that you trust RAs, or you don't. If you do, all bets are off. ("sudo
> apt-get install ipv6toolkit;man ra6" and you'll get examples of a bunch
> of other DoS attacks that an attacker can perform).

As an end user, I don’t have this experience.   If someone is spamming my network with RAs, I can find out who and disconnect them.   A DoS attack based on massive quantities of RAs is a lot different than an attack that shuts my network off with one multicast.

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