Re: [v6ops] SLAAC renum: Problem Statement & Operational workarounds

[Fernando Gont <[e-mail]>]

Hello, Ted,


On 27/10/19 09:02, Ted Lemon wrote:
> Indeed, this would also not actually solve the problem.   At present,
> the ISPs are doing something that is out of spec and causes problems.
> If we “fix” this by accommodating what they do, does that help, or
> does it just encourage them to continue doing it?

Did happy eyeballs encourage broken IPv6 connectivity, or did it
actually help IPv6 deployment?




> What should be happening on the host with a prefix that’s deprecated
> is that TCP connections should be timing out.   This doesn’t take
> very long.  

~9 minutes, IIRC.


> And if there is a new prefix being advertised on the
> link, that address should have a valid lifetime newer than the old
> prefix, meaning that the next TCP connection should come from that
> new prefix, not the old one.

That's not correct. Neither the Valid Lifetime nor the Preferred
Lifetime affect address selection.




> I think Fernando’s plan to shorten some timers makes sense, but
> shortening the minimum really doesn’t—it just opens up an opportunity
> for an easy DoS, since I can now just send out death packets to the
> local network and break everything all at once.

The reality with ND attacks are (modulo sanity checks on the packets):
you enforce FHS, or you don't.




> If you Really Really want to be able to have the routers send out RAs
> that deprecate the default route, and, as Mark is saying here, to
> upgrade millions or perhaps billions of hosts, why not ask for
> something that’s a real improvement?

Every piece helps.



> First of all, fix CPEs so that they definitely support clean
> deprecation of prefixes using PD.

But robustness cannot rely on any of these specific bits.


>  Second, fix RA so that it’s
> non-repudiable by a device that doesn’t have the secret key.
> 
> SEND does this, sort of.  Nobody uses SEND because it tries to solve
> a too-big problem and does it using obsolete technology.   But the
> basic idea is good: include a public key in every RA that can be used
> to validate that the RA was signed with the corresponding private
> key.

What's the practical difference between that, an a network that supports
RA-Guard?



> When another RA arrives, see if it was signed with the same key.   If
> so, it came from the same router, and can be trusted to update
> whatever information that router sent, including flash-deprecating a
> prefix.   If not, ignore it.

In the non-SEND trust model, you do trust the local router. Why did you
trust the local router to configure your network, but not for
deprecating the prefix?

Thanks,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: [e-mail]
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