Re: [VoT] vot Digest, Vol 14, Issue 5
Peter Alterman <palterman@safe-biopharma.org> Fri, 13 May 2016 11:07 UTC
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Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 07:07:17 -0400
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From: Peter Alterman <palterman@safe-biopharma.org>
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Subject: Re: [VoT] vot Digest, Vol 14, Issue 5
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That raises the issue of what kind of machine readable metadata should represent the trustmark? Peter On May 13, 2016 5:48 AM, <vot-request@ietf.org> wrote: > Send vot mailing list submissions to > vot@ietf.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/vot > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > vot-request@ietf.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > vot-owner@ietf.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of vot digest..." > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Security Problem with Primary Credential Usage (Julian White) > 2. Re: Security Problem with Primary Credential Usage (Chris) > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Julian White <jwhite@nu-d.com> > To: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> > Cc: Chris <cnd@geek.net.au>, vot@ietf.org > Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 08:52:55 +0100 > Subject: Re: [VoT] Security Problem with Primary Credential Usage > Justin, > > For my own clarity, can the RP pass a request for a specific trustmark, or > list of trustmarks that it will accept? The text seems to imply that they > will get whatever trustmark the IdP sends and have to make a decision based > on that each time. In reality, since the evaluation of the trustmark is a > cumbersome manual process I suspect RP's will whitelist trustmarks that > they will accept so then it seems inefficient for and IdP to return a > response under a trustmark the RP won't accept. > > Thanks, > > Julian. > > On 12 May 2016 at 19:49, Julian White <jwhite@nu-d.com> wrote: > >> That makes sense, tho that didn't come across in the description of the >> trustmark. >> >> Julian >> On 12 May 2016 19:45, "Justin Richer" <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >> >>> We explicitly left those kinds of things out of the vector as they’d >>> really be related to the IdP itself and not the authentication transaction >>> to which the VoT refers. In other words, the security of the IdP is related >>> to the trust framework and assessment of the IdP and it can be published as >>> part of the IdP’s discovery documents and associated trust marks. This is >>> information that is going to remain the same regardless of the transaction. >>> >>> This is also part of why you need to have a trustmark context to >>> interpret the VoT in. >>> >>> — Justin >>> >>> On May 12, 2016, at 11:11 AM, Julian White <jwhite@nu-d.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I have a number of comments and questions (see attached), many of which >>> are related to the issues raised by Chris, some maybe my misunderstanding >>> coming in half way through the drafting tho. >>> >>> I, like Chris, also think there needs to be something more explicit >>> around the "security" of the IdP authentication which includes the measures >>> to try and detect 'odd' things (like MITM). I would also go one step >>> further in that I also want to know about the maturity of the IdP's >>> "security", its of no use to me if they have really good credentials but >>> store all the data in the clear on their website or have a load of >>> administrative back-doors that could let anyone generate a valid >>> authentication response. >>> >>> It feels like we need to do more work in this area. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Julian. >>> >>> On 8 May 2016 at 13:24, Chris <cnd@geek.net.au> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi All, >>>> >>>> I think there is a critical flaw in section 3.2 of >>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-richer-vectors-of-trust-02 (Primary >>>> Credential Usage) >>>> >>>> Mutual-authentication is missing. When no provision is made to prevent >>>> man-in-the-middle, credential harvesting, spoof, phishing, malware, or >>>> other common threats, this renders all possible vectors C0, Ca, Cb, Cd, Ce, >>>> Cf, and others *equally* untrustworthy. >>>> >>>> We should consider inclusion either for the overall strength of the >>>> authentication process, or some breakdown of either all the techniques used >>>> or the strength of protection employed to thwart at least common attack >>>> scenarios. >>>> >>>> This problem gets tricky quite fast: >>>> >>>> Do we identify the authentication technology vendor? (if yes - who >>>> works out their resistance strength to common attacks? what about >>>> different modes?) >>>> Do we broadly identify the techniques (whos opinions count as to >>>> whether or not the technique is effective and against what threats?) >>>> Do we identify or classify the threats and indicate which ones were >>>> mitigated (who should be trusted to decide if these really were mitigated?) >>>> >>>> For example - tamper-proof hardware digital certificate devices with >>>> biometrics unlocks are totally useless, if the user paid no attention to a >>>> broken SSL warning, or has malware. They're also equally useless in most >>>> corporate environments that use deep-packet inspection firewalls - and >>>> "unexpected certificates" (eg. from DPI or malicious) carry their own >>>> privacy problems (eg: passwords are not as "protected" as you think). Much >>>> more common authentication "protection" of course, are two-step or sms one >>>> time codes - which are equally useless when an end user can be tricked into >>>> revealing them to spoof sites. >>>> >>>> 91% of successful break-ins start from phishing. Right now, every >>>> vector is pointing one way - we need at least one "Vector of Trust" to >>>> point *back* the other way! >>>> >>>> How about a 5th vector - "S" for "Security", which somehow allows an RP >>>> a level of confidence in the protection afforded to the user's actual >>>> authentication process, in terms of (or at least considering) a wide range >>>> of (and all common) modern threats. >>>> >>>> Chris. >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> vot mailing list >>>> vot@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/vot >>>> >>>> >>> <draft-richer-vectors-of-trust-02.docx> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> vot mailing list >>> vot@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/vot >>> >>> >>> > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Chris <cnd@geek.net.au> > To: Julian White <jwhite@nu-d.com> > Cc: vot@ietf.org, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> > Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 19:48:21 +1000 > Subject: Re: [VoT] Security Problem with Primary Credential Usage > Hi Julian, > > It is like I said at the start. The entirety of the trustmark idea > evaluates to one single strength - everything is equally untrustworthy, > because it's all only unidirectional. > > You can't solve trust without fixing BOTH ends. It is a *two-way *street. > For as long as a user and proxy are indistinguishable, C0 == Ca == Cb == Cd > == Ce == Cf. > > I know it sounds like a little problem, but so was the debris on that last > Concorde's runway. This is the show stopper. > > Chris. > > > Friday, May 13, 2016, 5:52:55 PM, you wrote: > > > Justin, > > For my own clarity, can the RP pass a request for a specific trustmark, or > list of trustmarks that it will accept? The text seems to imply that they > will get whatever trustmark the IdP sends and have to make a decision based > on that each time. In reality, since the evaluation of the trustmark is a > cumbersome manual process I suspect RP's will whitelist trustmarks that > they will accept so then it seems inefficient for and IdP to return a > response under a trustmark the RP won't accept. > > Thanks, > > Julian. > > On 12 May 2016 at 19:49, Julian White <jwhite@nu-d.com> wrote: > That makes sense, tho that didn't come across in the description of the > trustmark. > Julian > On 12 May 2016 19:45, "Justin Richer" <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: > We explicitly left those kinds of things out of the vector as they’d > really be related to the IdP itself and not the authentication transaction > to which the VoT refers. In other words, the security of the IdP is related > to the trust framework and assessment of the IdP and it can be published as > part of the IdP’s discovery documents and associated trust marks. This is > information that is going to remain the same regardless of the transaction. > > This is also part of why you need to have a trustmark context to interpret > the VoT in. > > — Justin > > On May 12, 2016, at 11:11 AM, Julian White <jwhite@nu-d.com> wrote: > > Hi, > > I have a number of comments and questions (see attached), many of which > are related to the issues raised by Chris, some maybe my misunderstanding > coming in half way through the drafting tho. > > I, like Chris, also think there needs to be something more explicit around > the "security" of the IdP authentication which includes the measures to try > and detect 'odd' things (like MITM). I would also go one step further in > that I also want to know about the maturity of the IdP's "security", its of > no use to me if they have really good credentials but store all the data in > the clear on their website or have a load of administrative back-doors that > could let anyone generate a valid authentication response. > > It feels like we need to do more work in this area. > > Regards, > > Julian. > > On 8 May 2016 at 13:24, Chris <cnd@geek.net.au> wrote: > Hi All, > > I think there is a critical flaw in section 3.2 of > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-richer-vectors-of-trust-02 (Primary > Credential Usage) > > Mutual-authentication is missing. When no provision is made to prevent > man-in-the-middle, credential harvesting, spoof, phishing, malware, or > other common threats, this renders all possible vectors C0, Ca, Cb, Cd, Ce, > Cf, and others *equally* untrustworthy. > > We should consider inclusion either for the overall strength of the > authentication process, or some breakdown of either all the techniques used > or the strength of protection employed to thwart at least common attack > scenarios. > > This problem gets tricky quite fast: > > Do we identify the authentication technology vendor? (if yes - who works > out their resistance strength to common attacks? what about different > modes?) > Do we broadly identify the techniques (whos opinions count as to whether > or not the technique is effective and against what threats?) > Do we identify or classify the threats and indicate which ones were > mitigated (who should be trusted to decide if these really were mitigated?) > > For example - tamper-proof hardware digital certificate devices with > biometrics unlocks are totally useless, if the user paid no attention to a > broken SSL warning, or has malware. They're also equally useless in most > corporate environments that use deep-packet inspection firewalls - and > "unexpected certificates" (eg. from DPI or malicious) carry their own > privacy problems (eg: passwords are not as "protected" as you think). Much > more common authentication "protection" of course, are two-step or sms one > time codes - which are equally useless when an end user can be tricked into > revealing them to spoof sites. > > 91% of successful break-ins start from phishing. Right now, every vector > is pointing one way - we need at least one "Vector of Trust" to point > *back* the other way! > > How about a 5th vector - "S" for "Security", which somehow allows an RP a > level of confidence in the protection afforded to the user's actual > authentication process, in terms of (or at least considering) a wide range > of (and all common) modern threats. > > Chris. > > _______________________________________________ > vot mailing list > vot@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/vot > > > <draft-richer-vectors-of-trust-02.docx>_______________________________________________ > vot mailing list > vot@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/vot > > > > _______________________________________________ > vot mailing list > vot@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/vot > >
- Re: [VoT] vot Digest, Vol 14, Issue 5 Peter Alterman