Re: [vwrap] [wvrap] Simulation consistency

Dzonatas Sol <dzonatas@gmail.com> Sat, 02 April 2011 18:26 UTC

Return-Path: <dzonatas@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: vwrap@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: vwrap@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D7B93A687D for <vwrap@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 2 Apr 2011 11:26:28 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.556
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.556 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.043, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id eRL5RtQ2d-PW for <vwrap@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 2 Apr 2011 11:26:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-iy0-f172.google.com (mail-iy0-f172.google.com [209.85.210.172]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 24CE53A6873 for <vwrap@ietf.org>; Sat, 2 Apr 2011 11:26:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by iye19 with SMTP id 19so5385640iye.31 for <vwrap@ietf.org>; Sat, 02 Apr 2011 11:28:08 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:message-id:date:from:user-agent:mime-version:to :cc:subject:references:in-reply-to:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=4qmXkUuYgG0unOqGr1UG9IJo5wYbtLTI67qMgm5q4pc=; b=aE4C6Cu95KCpCv3VyhLLd7yjzlMQQ+SCK+ed7RkYt2PWcuFzS791uzuzCcmxvPvsaN 2KJ6bSVrrZb0pkBUYw7l3kQBL51rPNqT1neYlsF+FYQ1dV5su/Hw0TGe3lNgnWwhQWIR ubCXnnmfJsCDnGyE5hVLknVAPMB4+ivl+bstk=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=message-id:date:from:user-agent:mime-version:to:cc:subject :references:in-reply-to:content-type:content-transfer-encoding; b=vsQp1XBGNlX9kyiekzIIwnmNgygU6jWrbSFXneDiXJcmxUn93GvBkACaLQ9a/Yv7HL oOga3k0kDnzw1bMwuVleMUzzUc7aaKxmCKGGTOsskbDQx1c9gB7iSO6Dd3nZ8gLung7E GWfBNdNKsvZxW3sIDoOOtkNDeF6mJHRBySJAY=
Received: by 10.42.153.2 with SMTP id k2mr4050491icw.333.1301768888262; Sat, 02 Apr 2011 11:28:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [192.168.0.50] (adsl-71-137-195-251.dsl.scrm01.pacbell.net [71.137.195.251]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id wu1sm2164361icb.22.2011.04.02.11.28.04 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Sat, 02 Apr 2011 11:28:04 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <4D976AE2.50302@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 02 Apr 2011 11:28:50 -0700
From: Dzonatas Sol <dzonatas@gmail.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla-Thunderbird 2.0.0.24 (X11/20100329)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: vwrap@ietf.org
References: <20110402.101259.14412.0@webmail09.vgs.untd.com> <20110402171923.13176462@hikaru.localdomain> <AANLkTinAFea45Kxhqu4mCqtPVZnmkM96rMWepKeTywmt@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTinAFea45Kxhqu4mCqtPVZnmkM96rMWepKeTywmt@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"; format="flowed"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: Meadhbh Hamrick <ohmeadhbh@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [vwrap] [wvrap] Simulation consistency
X-BeenThere: vwrap@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Virtual World Region Agent Protocol - IETF working group <vwrap.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/vwrap>, <mailto:vwrap-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/vwrap>
List-Post: <mailto:vwrap@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:vwrap-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/vwrap>, <mailto:vwrap-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 02 Apr 2011 18:26:28 -0000

Meadhbh Hamrick wrote:
> yes. there is something missing in the protocol. it's trust. you don't
> put "trust" in a protocol, you put "security" in a protocol. at the
> end of the day, the people using this protocol will need to decide
> whom they trust. this is why there was a security model and the
> ability of the protocol to "securely carry trust."
>   

Well said! +1

> the idea is that the protocol would carry cryptographically
> unforgeable attestations of an endpoint's identity. this identity
> would then be evaluated by protocol participants to see if it is
> "trusted."
>   

Exactly!

Perhaps some assume content is always digital-deliverables for 
evaluation rather than only digital-context and the need to evaluate 
analog-content (separately). I know the issue is that I can write that 
easy and yet the overall task is complex, especially when one tries to 
wrap their head around the concept of analog-content evaluation over 
digital networks.

Maybe kinetics (as now popularized by Microsoft) can help people 
comprehend these steps without the need to know the bounds of math, 
omegas, within the limits, and beyond, as we can more easily assume with 
ray-tracer knowledge. I mention this because know such knowledge would 
help ease the hearts of those in concern of asset security, yet I don't 
always have easier ways to explain things as Meadhbh did above.

Imagine the only way to establish some sign-on is a specific diet and 
motion in front of the MS-Kinetic cam. That is analog data. If you think 
of single captures of the images then that is the digital renders of 
analog samples. The point is analog can only be sampled. The question of 
"trust" becomes how many samples does it take before some other 
participant acknowledges. (Or...,) How many milliseconds go by before 
you even recognize someone and trust your own cognition?

Something to keep in mind while this list assumed digital-security (and 
exploitation) was the only argument possible.


-- 
--- https://twitter.com/Dzonatas_Sol ---
Web Development, Software Engineering, Virtual Reality, Consultant