Re: [webfinger] [apps-discuss] Mail client configuration via WebFinger

Marten Gajda <marten@dmfs.org> Wed, 13 July 2016 22:32 UTC

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Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 00:32:01 +0200
From: Marten Gajda <marten@dmfs.org>
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Subject: Re: [webfinger] [apps-discuss] Mail client configuration via WebFinger
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Hi Paul,

the "current draft" is still the one at
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-daboo-aggregated-service-discovery-03
and the issues at GitHub are discussion items for the upcoming draft.
I wanted to clarify a few points before I start to work on the draft. If
you have anything to add to these points or if you have any other
concerns, please let me know, so we can address them.
Unless there is some more interest in the certificate stuff, I'm not
going to add this to the draft. We still can add that later on if it
turns out to be useful.

Cheers,

Marten


Am 11.07.2016 um 23:31 schrieb Paul E. Jones:
> Marten,
>
> Sorry to just be coming back to this after a whole month passed.
>
> What current draft?  Did you write one that I missed?  Or are these
> requirements for the draft you would like to see?
>
> Paul
>
> ------ Original Message ------
> From: "Marten Gajda" <marten@dmfs.org <mailto:marten@dmfs.org>>
> To: "webfinger@ietf.org"; <webfinger@ietf.org <mailto:webfinger@ietf.org>>
> Sent: 6/8/2016 3:35:05 PM
> Subject: Re: [webfinger] [apps-discuss] Mail client configuration via
> WebFinger
>
>> All,
>>
>> I've created a GitHub repository to track open issues with the
>> current draft, see https://github.com/CalConnect/AUTODISCOVERY/issues
>> You're welcome to contribute to the discussion, either by creating a
>> new issue or by commenting on an existing one.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Marten
>>
>> Am 05.06.2016 um 23:00 schrieb Marten Gajda:
>>> I think OpenID Connect already covers the discovery of everything
>>> you need to do OAuth2. That involves Webfinger, but there is no need
>>> to protect this request, because it doesn't contain personal
>>> information.
>>> So we don't need to reinvent the OAuth2 bootstrapping sequence.
>>> The only minor issue I see is that you may have to ask the user
>>> twice to grant access. Once to authorize the client to access the
>>> configuration document and another time to authorize the client to
>>> access the individual services. The second step is necessary,
>>> because the scope tokens of these services are not known when the
>>> first authorization request is presented to the user. The problem
>>> with that is, there doesn't seem to be a mechanism to broaden scope,
>>> without allowing the user to switch to a different account. To get
>>> access to the individual services, the client needs to start another
>>> authorization code grant. But the user is always free to log out and
>>> log in with a different account before granting access.
>>>
>>> Marten
>>>
>>> Am 03.06.2016 um 20:13 schrieb George Fletcher:
>>>> Did a quick scan of the draft document. Given that more and more
>>>> systems are trying to remove the need for passwords, it seems like
>>>> the final solution needs to support 2FA and biometric mechanisms
>>>> for "HTTP authentication". I definitely would not want the
>>>> webfinger instance releasing my config data without my
>>>> "authentication". I suppose OAuth2 could be used to protect the
>>>> webfinger APIs though there is a bit of a chicken-and-egg here:)
>>>>
>>>> I kind of like the suggestion around returning a 401 with data in
>>>> the WWW-Authenticate header on where to get a token to use with the
>>>> API. This would allow the client to start and OAuth2 flow with the
>>>> Authorization Server specified and that would give the user a clear
>>>> indication of what password/credentials are being requested. Once
>>>> the client gets the token, it uses it with the webfinger call and
>>>> now the service-configuration data is returned because the token is
>>>> the authorization for the specified id.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> George
>>>>
>>>> On 6/3/16 10:44 AM, Marten Gajda wrote:
>>>>> Note that the idea behind
>>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-daboo-aggregated-service-discovery-03
>>>>> is to put the service configuration for all services of a provider
>>>>> into a single document.
>>>>>
>>>>> So you would receive something like this:
>>>>>
>>>>> {
>>>>>     "rel " :  "service-configuration",
>>>>>     "href " : "https://example.com/service-configuration"
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> If a user uses the same account identifier at another provider the
>>>>> Webfinger request could return their configuration too (given
>>>>> there is some mechanism to add it and the provider actually
>>>>> supports that).
>>>>>
>>>>> {
>>>>>     "rel " :  "service-configuration",
>>>>>     "href " : "https://example.com/service-configuration"
>>>>> },
>>>>> {
>>>>>     "rel " :  "service-configuration",
>>>>>     "href " : "https://acme-calendar.com/service-configuration"
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> Without that it would be more difficult to setup your account at
>>>>> acme-calendar.com with your login "user@example.com";.
>>>>> acme-calendar.com would have to issue some kind of user-identifier
>>>>> like user@acme-calendar.com for auto-configuration purposes, even
>>>>> though you don't use it for authentication (because you use
>>>>> user@exampe.com for authentication). I think that's the idea
>>>>> behind the `acct:` URI scheme, but I don't think that you can
>>>>> explain to users why they need another user identifier and when to
>>>>> use one or the other.
>>>>> But that also raises the privacy concerns I mentioned earlier. If
>>>>> the request is not authenticated, everyone could see that you have
>>>>> an account at acme-calendar.com.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regarding SSO: There is an RFC that extends SASL based
>>>>> authentication to support the token authentication mechanisms as
>>>>> used by OAuth1 and OAuth2, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7628
>>>>> So SSO already works with IMAP, POP3 and SMTP.
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers
>>>>>
>>>>> Marten
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Am 03.06.2016 um 15:40 schrieb Paul E. Jones:
>>>>>> Marten,
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>> So how would the UI work?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1) User enters user identifier, most likely an email address,
>>>>>>> like mailto:user@example.com and hits "next"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2) Client sends a Webfinger request to
>>>>>>> https://exampe.com/.well-known/webfinger?... to see if there is
>>>>>>> a configuration document
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>   -> response 404 Not Found
>>>>>>>    a) Client falls back to "manual setup" or another
>>>>>>> auto-configuration mechanism
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>   -> response 401 Unauthorized
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> One should not get 401 querying the WebFinger information for the
>>>>>> user.  What should happen is that the server should return a JSON
>>>>>> object that contains a link relation that might look like this:
>>>>>> {
>>>>>>     "rel " :  "mail-config",
>>>>>>     "href " :
>>>>>> "https://mailserver.example.com/config?user=paulej%40packetizer.com"
>>>>>> }
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Or something like that.  The mail client should query that URI it
>>>>>> is that one that should result in a potential 401.  The JSON
>>>>>> format that would come back here would need to be something we
>>>>>> define.  It could be based on JRD, but would not have to be.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Otherwise, I think the flow looks right.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>    b) Client asks for password at "example.com" and goes back to
>>>>>>> step 2 (this time with authentication)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>   -> response 200 Ok
>>>>>>>    c) client moves on to next step
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 3) (optional) Client presents found services to the user to let
>>>>>>> him select the services to set up
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 4) Client runs the setup handler for each selected service
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think in general that could work but it raises two questions:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1) How to make sure the user really understands that he's
>>>>>>> authenticating at example.com in step 2b? If the user tries to
>>>>>>> configure calendar sync with "acme-calendar.com" where his login
>>>>>>> happens to be mailto:user@example.com he might not be prepared
>>>>>>> to being asked for his example.com password. Maybe I'm just
>>>>>>> paranoid or overcautious, but I think that it might easily
>>>>>>> happen that the users sends his acme-calendar.com password to
>>>>>>> example.com in that case (since Basic authentication is still
>>>>>>> the most common mechanism, the client basically sends the
>>>>>>> password in plain text).
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Yeah, that's a valid concern.  The only thing I can suggest is
>>>>>> that the Subject CN from the certificate is presented to the
>>>>>> user.  Alternatively, there could be two passwords: one that is
>>>>>> the "configuration password" and one that is the email password. 
>>>>>> However, I don't think two passwords will help us.  If I want to
>>>>>> hack somebody and can gain access to their WF config, I can
>>>>>> auto-config their email client to point to my own IMAP server and
>>>>>> just retrieve the password that way.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> So, I think we have to rely on the certificate presented to the
>>>>>> mail client and the user will have to know to trust it.  The mail
>>>>>> provider can tell the user "when configuring email, ensure that
>>>>>> the configuration server is mailconfig.example.com and do not
>>>>>> provide a password if that is not the name of the configuration
>>>>>> server indicated."
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> If the mail config information is not protected with a password,
>>>>>> we probably would want the customer to verify that the SMTP
>>>>>> server information is correct before the password is provided. 
>>>>>> These would be the steps users would take if performing manual
>>>>>> configuration, but the software presents that information to the
>>>>>> user without the user having to enter it.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2) How does the client know which credentials to use to set up
>>>>>>> the individual services in step 4? Should the client ask the
>>>>>>> user for the credentials for each service or can it assume that
>>>>>>> some of them share the same credentials? Is that something an
>>>>>>> auto-configuration document can help with?
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> It would be nice if there is a config indicator that says "SMTP
>>>>>> server and IMAP server passwords are the same", so the client
>>>>>> does not have to ask.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> If we use a "config password" then we could even have the server
>>>>>> tell the client the password for services, which would
>>>>>> transparently allow those to be different.  Alternatively, the
>>>>>> client will have to ask each about each one.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> For calendaring services, then yes: the client would have to ask
>>>>>> the user.  It could ask if it's the same or different than the
>>>>>> email password or the config password.  For some services, the
>>>>>> authentication mechanisms will be entirely different (like Google
>>>>>> Calendar).  The mail client will just have to know how to access
>>>>>> the service.  For that reason, I'm a little hesitant to suggest
>>>>>> including calendaring service config along with the email config
>>>>>> data.  We could have each of those services listed in the users'
>>>>>> WebFinger document.  For example, I might have this entry in my
>>>>>> WF document:
>>>>>> {
>>>>>>     "rel" : "calendar"
>>>>>>     "href" : "urn:whatever:google"
>>>>>> }
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Note I did not provide a URL.  The reason is that this is an
>>>>>> entirely different service that has an entirely different access
>>>>>> method.  Maybe the client can ask the user "is
>>>>>> paulej@packetizer.com our user ID for your Google calendar?"  In
>>>>>> my case, I don't think it is.  Certainly, it's not my gmail ID. 
>>>>>> And, I would not want to advertise that to the world,
>>>>>> necessarily.  Anyway, I think we should limit the scope of what
>>>>>> we try to do to things that are standard OR we define a generic
>>>>>> URN that a client will just have to know how to deal with.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>> Ideally the server supports some kind of SSO mechanism like
>>>>>>> OpenID Connect, so you don't need to enter your password
>>>>>>> multiple times. But a working auto-configuration is really the
>>>>>>> precondition for this, because an OpenID Connect implementations
>>>>>>> needs a way to discover the OAuth2 scope tokens to request from
>>>>>>> the server and auto-configuration is really the way to do that,
>>>>>>> IMO. For this it would be helpful to have some mechanism to
>>>>>>> request a broader scope from the user (without allowing him to
>>>>>>> switch to a different account), but that's a different topic I
>>>>>>> guess.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> I definitely like the idea of SSO.  But, I struggle to see how we
>>>>>> would use this in practice with mail autoconfig since SMTP, IMAP,
>>>>>> and POP servers require a password, anyway.  If we use that as a
>>>>>> means to have those passwords provided behind the scenes (as I
>>>>>> indicated above), that might be a good argument for using OpenID
>>>>>> Connect.  In that way, the ISP can also ensure that passwords are
>>>>>> REALLY complex and unknown even to the user.  Not a bad practice,
>>>>>> in that we can view those passwords as complex tokens.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Would that kind of use of OpenID Connect to retrieve the password
>>>>>> be workable?  (I'll admit I don't have so much experience with
>>>>>> OpenID Connect.  I implemented OpenID 2.0, but that's not ideal
>>>>>> for what we'd want to accomplish here.  I don't have a good feel
>>>>>> for how Connect might make this better.)
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Paul
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> webfinger mailing list
>>>>>> webfinger@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/webfinger
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -- 
>>>>> Marten Gajda
>>>>> CEO
>>>>>
>>>>> dmfs GmbH
>>>>> Schandauer Straße 34
>>>>> 01309 Dresden
>>>>> GERMANY
>>>>>
>>>>> phone: +49 177 4427167
>>>>> email: marten@dmfs.org
>>>>>
>>>>> Managing Director: Marten Gajda
>>>>> Registered address: Dresden
>>>>> Registered No.: AG Dresden HRB 34881
>>>>> VAT Reg. No.: DE303248743
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> webfinger mailing list
>>>>> webfinger@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/webfinger
>>>>
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Marten Gajda
>>> CEO
>>>
>>> dmfs GmbH
>>> Schandauer Straße 34
>>> 01309 Dresden
>>> GERMANY
>>>
>>> phone: +49 177 4427167
>>> email: marten@dmfs.org
>>>
>>> Managing Director: Marten Gajda
>>> Registered address: Dresden
>>> Registered No.: AG Dresden HRB 34881
>>> VAT Reg. No.: DE303248743
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> webfinger mailing list
>>> webfinger@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/webfinger
>>
>> -- 
>> Marten Gajda
>> CEO
>>
>> dmfs GmbH
>> Schandauer Straße 34
>> 01309 Dresden
>> GERMANY
>>
>> phone: +49 177 4427167
>> email: marten@dmfs.org
>>
>> Managing Director: Marten Gajda
>> Registered address: Dresden
>> Registered No.: AG Dresden HRB 34881
>> VAT Reg. No.: DE303248743
>
>
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-- 
Marten Gajda
CEO

dmfs GmbH
Schandauer Straße 34
01309 Dresden
GERMANY

phone: +49 177 4427167
email: marten@dmfs.org

Managing Director: Marten Gajda
Registered address: Dresden
Registered No.: AG Dresden HRB 34881
VAT Reg. No.: DE303248743