[Webpush] Suggestion regarding curve validation in draft-ietf-webpush-encryption
Peter Beverloo <beverloo@google.com> Thu, 11 May 2017 19:03 UTC
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From: Peter Beverloo <beverloo@google.com>
Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 19:57:21 +0100
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To: "webpush@ietf.org" <webpush@ietf.org>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Cc: Quan Nguyen <quannguyen@google.com>
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Subject: [Webpush] Suggestion regarding curve validation in draft-ietf-webpush-encryption
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Relaying for Quan Nguyen (cc'd):
I would suggest adding a section about verifying peer's public key
is on the private key's curve in ECDH protocol. Without this check,
for the curve that they use P-256, it would allow attacker to
extract the private key.
Thanks,
Peter
- [Webpush] Suggestion regarding curve validation i… Peter Beverloo
- Re: [Webpush] Suggestion regarding curve validati… Martin Thomson