[Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-webpush-protocol-11: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
"Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Thu, 13 October 2016 11:32 UTC
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Subject: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-webpush-protocol-11: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-webpush-protocol-11: Discuss When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-webpush-protocol/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- DISCUSS: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Apologies if some of this is a bit wrong, I had to review this while not at a keyboard so I might make a booboo or two mapping my mental notes to text:-) Apologies also if some of the earlier discussion affects these, I didn't get a chance to check the PRs created as a result of other IESG comments. (1) This might just me being confused (in which case, sorry) but I'm not quite clear on how with works with the SOP. Given you (reasonably) recommend a different port (which is a different origin than 443) are you saying here that the SOP doesn't apply to the client? (Well, actually you don't say, so I'm not sure:-) If the SOP applies, how is the port change handled? If the SOP does not apply, then what does? (Given that I assume some UAs at least will not change their handling of the SOP no matter what we say here.) (2) So-called "capability URLs" (is that a new term here? seems like it could be the topic for a useful informational rfc) are clearly weak, but also clearly as good as we'll get for some things. However, those also become known over time, (in which case they are toast;-) so why don't you need to provide a way for a push service to say "hey, instead of <this-URL> in future you'll need to use <that-URL>"? If that could be done as an extension later, then I'd be ok with that in terms of clearing the discuss, but then I think you'd need to mention it, so that applications and UAs don't build in an assumption that these URLs are fixed for all time (while also needing to be kept "secret" as with other bearer tokens). (3) Why is it not correct to encourage mutual-auth TLS for the application to push-service connections? I'm not arguing to make that mandatory, but it's not that hard in many cases and is very useful, esp since without some client auth just knowing the URL will often enable a sender to send a crap load of updates to possibly many bandwidth/power-challenged UAs. (This is only a discuss because of that potential DoS vector.) (4) Is it really honest to say that the W3C Push API, webpush encryption and vapid are only informative references? The first seems easy to make normative, the second I think really needs to exist before we ought recommend this all get out into the wild and I'm not clear if one could sensibly make a service for this without the 3rd. Yes that might add some delay to the RFC being issued, but that might be the right thing to do. Why is it right to not wait on those two IDs and the w3c rec? This is mainly a discuss in case the answer is "we know nobody's gonna do webpush-encryption ever" in which case I'd like to be convinced that implementing and deploying based on this draft without reading those references defines a good standard. I'm not saying that it does not, I'm saying I'm not yet convinced. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- - Thanks for the MUST use TLS. That's totally necessary here. (Even if maybe not sufficient:-) - I just want to check this is correct: I think it'd be potentially useful to be able to pad the traffic here with NOOP pushed messages. The argument is that the existence of a message may sometimes be the same as knowing the message content and the cost of turning on the radio to even check is no different from checking and getting a NOOP pushed message, so there's no major cost to a reasonably sized NOOP message that's only there for traffic padding. (While padding at other layers can also be done, I think we do not know enough today to say at which layers traffic padding is most useful, and we therefore ought define it where we can.) That said, I think one could later define a new "OnlyKidding" Urgency or Topic (see 9.1) that'd do the job. If that's right, consider this me asking if anyone'd like to do that later? If that's wrong, then consider this me asking: "how can I effectively pad traffic at this layer?" - section 6: (A nit) I think this could be clearer if you better explained how the subscriptions and push messages are correlated. While the current text is fine, since it's clear eventually from the examples, it might be better to not assume so much familiarity with h2.
- [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-… Brian Raymor
- Re: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-… Brian Raymor
- Re: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-… Brian Raymor
- Re: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-… Martin Thomson
- Re: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-… Brian Raymor
- Re: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-… Brian Raymor
- Re: [Webpush] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-… Stephen Farrell