[Webpush] Eric Rescorla's No Objection on draft-ietf-webpush-encryption-08: (with COMMENT)

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 16 August 2017 00:22 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: [Webpush] Eric Rescorla's No Objection on draft-ietf-webpush-encryption-08: (with COMMENT)
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Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-webpush-encryption-08: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Moving to No Objection because my DISCUSS is fixed in:
https://github.com/webpush-wg/webpush-encryption/commit/645a04b3b86ffe10322134e27a3d3c5eb5a8b06b

Note, I think technically only the UA needs to do point verification if the app
generates a fresh key as implied by S 2. It would also be nice to have a cite
to how to do the point verification. This text can be stolen from TLS 1.3.

S 1.
   This document describes how messages sent using this protocol can be
   secured against inspection, modification and falsification by a Push
   Service.

"forgery" is more customary than falsification.

S 3.3.

   key_info = "WebPush: info" || 0x00 || ua_public || as_public

You should make clear that the string is not null-terminated. Ugh, I know.

S 3.4.
You should clearly separate which pieces are defined in this document
and which are defined in the HTTP encryption document.