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Re: [websec] handling STS header field extendability

Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> Sat, 11 August 2012 14:42 UTC

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From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Sat, 11 Aug 2012 10:42:30 -0400
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To: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
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Cc: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>, IETF WebSec WG <websec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [websec] handling STS header field extendability
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On 10 August 2012 17:52, Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> wrote:
> Please forgive my ignorance, but do LockCA and/or LockEV offer any
> functionality that you can't already get with public key pinning as
> currently specified? You can pin to a given CA's public key(s), and
> you can pin to any given EV issuers' public keys.

I can't think of one for Lock CA; but LockEV could be useful for sites
that want to deploy some additional measure, but can't/don't want to
a) commit to a CA or b) enumerate all possible EV authorities.  It
should be ('should be', not 'is') more difficult to get a fraudulent
EV certificate through trickery or treachery than a DV certificate.

I don't think browsers differentiate between OV and DV in any
meaningful way, but I could be wrong.

-tom

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