[websec] new rev: draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-04

=JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com> Sat, 28 January 2012 00:56 UTC

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Subject: [websec] new rev: draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-04
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New rev:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-04.txt

With this rev, all issue tickets are now nominally addressed. Full change log 
below, and full -04 announcement message at end.

Changes from -01 to -02 address: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

Changes from -02 to -03 address: 14, 26, 27

Changes from -03 to -04 address: 13, 14, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,
                                  35, 36


full issue ticket list for strict-transport-sec:
<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/query?status=assigned&status=closed&status=new&status=reopened&component=strict-transport-sec&order=id>

Diff from previous version:
http://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-04


In a separate message I'll propose a workflow for managing websec issue tickets.

=JeffH

==============================================================

Appendix D.  Change Log

D.1.  For draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec

       Changes from -03 to -04:

       1.   Clarified that max-age=0 will cause UA to forget a known HSTS
            host, and more generally clarified that the "freshest" info
            from the HSTS host is cached, and thus HSTS hosts are able to
            alter the cached max-age in UAs.  This addresses issue ticket
            #13. <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/13>

       2.   Updated section on "Constructing an Effective Request URI" to
            remove remaining reference to RFC3986 and reference RFC2616
            instead.  Further addresses issue ticket #14.
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/14>

       3.   Addresses further ABNF issues noted in comment:1 of issue
            ticket #27.  <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/
            ticket/27#comment:1>

       4.   Reworked the introduction to clarify the denotation of "HSTS
            policy" and added the new Appendix B summarizing the primary
            characteristics of HSTS Policy and Same-Origin Policy, and
            identifying their differences.  Added ref to [RFC4732].  This
            addresses issue ticket #28.
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/28>

       5.   Reworked language in Section 2.3.1.3. wrt "mixed content",
            more clearly explain such vulnerability, disambiguate "mixed
            content" in web security context from its usage in markup
            language context.  This addresses issue ticket #29.
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/29>

       6.   Expanded Denial of Service discussion in Security
            Considerations.  Added refs to [RFC4732] and [CWE-113].  This
            addresses issue ticket #30.
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/30>

       7.   Mentioned in prose the case-insensitivity of directive names.
            This addresses issue ticket #31.
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/31>

       8.   Added Section 10.3 "Implications of includeSubDomains".  This
            addresses issue ticket #32.
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/32>

       9.   Further refines text and ABNF definitions of STS header field
            directives.  Retains use of quoted-string in directive
            grammar.  This addresses issue ticket #33.
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/33>

       10.  Added Section 14.7 "Creative Manipulation of HSTS Policy
            Store", including reference to [WebTracking].  This addresses
            issue ticket #34.
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/34>

       11.  Added Section 14.1 "Ramifications of HSTS Policy
            Establishment only over Error-free Secure Transport" and made
            some accompanying editorial fixes in some other sections.
            This addresses issue ticket #35.
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/35>

       12.  Refined references.  Cleaned out un-used ones, updated to
            latest RFCs for others, consigned many to Informational.
            This addresses issue ticket #36.
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/36>


       13.  Fixed-up some inaccuracies in the "Changes from -02 to -03"
            section.


       Changes from -02 to -03:

       1.  Updated section on "Constructing an Effective Request URI" to
           remove references to RFC3986.  Addresses issue ticket #14.
           <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/14>

       2.  Reference RFC5890 for IDNA, retaining subordinate refs to
           RFC3490.  Updated IDNA-specific language, e.g. domain name
           canonicalization and IDNA dependencies.  Addresses issue
           ticket #26
           <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/26>.

       3.  Completely re-wrote the STS header ABNF to be fully based on
           RFC2616, rather than a hybrid of RFC2616 and httpbis.
           Addresses issue ticket #27
           <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/27>.


       Changes from -01 to -02:

       1.   Updated Section 8.2 "URI Loading and Port Mapping" fairly
            thoroughly in terms of refining the presentation of the
            steps, and to ensure the various aspects of port mapping are
            clear.  Nominally fixes issue ticket #1
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/1>

       2.   Removed dependencies on
            [I-D.draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-15].  Thus updated STS
            ABNF in Section 6.1 "Strict-Transport-Security HTTP Response
            Header Field" by lifting some productions entirely from
            [I-D.draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-15] and leveraging
            [RFC2616].  Addresses issue ticket #2
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/2>.

       3.   Updated Effective Request URI section and definition to use
            language from [I-D.draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-15] and
            ABNF from [RFC2616].  Fixes issue ticket #3
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/3>.

       4.   Added explicit mention that the HSTS policy applies to all
            TCP ports of a host advertising the HSTS policy.  Nominally
            fixes issue ticket #4
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/4>

       5.   Clarified the need for the "includeSubDomains" directive,
            e.g. to protect Secure-flagged domain cookies.  In
            Section 14.2 "The Need for includeSubDomains".  Nominally
            fixes issue ticket #5
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/5>

       6.   Cited Firesheep as real-live threat in Section 2.3.1.1
            "Passive Network Attackers".  Nominally fixes issue ticket #6
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/6>.

       7.   Added text to Section 11 "User Agent Implementation Advice"
            justifying connection termination due to tls warnings/errors.
            Nominally fixes issue ticket #7
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/7>.

       8.   Added new subsection Section 8.5 "Interstitially Missing
            Strict-Transport-Security Response Header Field".  Nominally
            fixes issue ticket #8
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/8>.

       9.   Added text to Section 8.3 "Errors in Secure Transport
            Establishment" explicitly note revocation check failures as
            errors causing connection termination.  Added references to
            [RFC5280] and [RFC2560].  Nominally fixes issue ticket #9
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/9>.

       10.  Added a sentence, noting that distributing specific end-
            entity certificates to browsers will also work for self-
            signed/private-CA cases, to Section 10 "Server Implementation
            and Deployment Advice" Nominally fixes issue ticket #10
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/10>.

       11.  Moved "with no user recourse" language from Section 8.3
            "Errors in Secure Transport Establishment" to Section 11
            "User Agent Implementation Advice".  This nominally fixes
            issue ticket #11
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/11>.

       12.  Removed any and all dependencies on
            [I-D.draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-15], instead depending
            on [RFC2616] only.  Fixes issue ticket #12
            <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/12>.

       13.  Removed the inline "XXX1" issue because no one had commented
            on it and it seems reasonable to suggest as a SHOULD that web
            apps should redirect incoming insecure connections to secure
            connections.

       14.  Removed the inline "XXX2" issue because it was simply for
            raising consciousness about having some means for
            distributing secure web application metadata.

       15.  Removed "TODO1" because description prose for "max-age" in
            the Note following the ABNF in Section 6 seems to be fine.

       16.  Decided for "TODO2" that "the first STS header field wins".
            TODO2 had read: "Decide UA behavior in face of encountering
            multiple HSTS headers in a message.  Use first header?
            Last?".  Removed TODO2.

       17.  Added Section 1.1 "Organization of this specification" for
            readers' convenience.

       18.  Moved design decision notes to be a proper appendix
            Appendix A.


========================================================================
Subject: I-D Action: draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-04.txt
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2012 16:31:54 -0800
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: websec@ietf.org

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. 
This draft is a work item of the Web Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
	Author(s)       : Jeff Hodges
                           Collin Jackson
                           Adam Barth
	Filename        : draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-04.txt
	Pages           : 43
	Date            : 2012-01-27

    This specification defines a mechanism enabling Web sites to declare
    themselves accessible only via secure connections, and/or for users
    to be able to direct their user agent(s) to interact with given sites
    only over secure connections.  This overall policy is referred to as
    HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS).  The policy is declared by Web
    sites via the Strict-Transport-Security HTTP response header field,
    and/or by other means, such as user agent configuration, for example.


A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-04.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-04.txt

---
end