Re: [websec] cookie injection attack via superdomain of HSTS Host (was: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC6797 (4075)
Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Sat, 09 August 2014 21:46 UTC
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2014 00:46:41 +0300
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References: <53E572EA.3000301@KingsMountain.com> <COL131-DS9E68224E55DB0534D47F5F0EF0@phx.gbl>
To: Eric Lawrence <e_lawrence@hotmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [websec] cookie injection attack via superdomain of HSTS Host (was: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC6797 (4075)
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On Aug 9, 2014, at 8:46 PM, Eric Lawrence <e_lawrence@hotmail.com> wrote: > > The best scenario, of course, is if a site's HSTS policy is pre-deployed to the browser These things tend to work for big sites (Facebook, bank of america, Amazon) and not so well for smaller sites. I wonder if a good modification to HSTS would be to have an “includeParent” directive. Of course we can’t let a subdomain specify a policy for a parent domain, but it could serve as a hint, triggering the UA to probe the parent domain as you suggested. That said, this is yet more evidence that cookies are hopelessly broken. Yoav (not wearing any hats)