Re: [websec] #53: Clarify status of pin validation when used with private trust anchors

Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> Tue, 28 May 2013 22:33 UTC

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References: <058.27d97f66ed18f6f7f41e08788db76253@trac.tools.ietf.org> <073.7596c49c42f63bc38fe20a2ed8c59450@trac.tools.ietf.org> <51A49695.9080200@gondrom.org> <9E7A30FE-E598-4A73-96DA-CC865E4A8C8D@checkpoint.com>
Date: Tue, 28 May 2013 15:33:56 -0700
Message-ID: <CAOuvq21uPQdUHEN3noEYKBr01HToTdOSBTTnmRirSuqrXhACMQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Cc: "<websec@ietf.org>" <websec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [websec] #53: Clarify status of pin validation when used with private trust anchors
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Thanks everyone. Closing it out.


On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 5:11 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:

> I agree. I think that this non-strict behavior is something that UAs will
> implement anyway, because otherwise the UA doesn't work in any place that
> has a "next generation firewall" (which is pretty much any firewall these
> days)
>
> And if they did stick to only strict behavior, pretty much none of the
> potential servers would use HPKP.
>
> I agree that this text represents a middle ground that allows both UAs and
> servers to deploy the protocol.
>
> so, +1.
>
> Yoav
> (with no hats, except maybe a next-generation firewall vendor hat)
>
> On May 28, 2013, at 2:35 PM, Tobias Gondrom <tobias.gondrom@gondrom.org>
> wrote:
>
> > Hi Chris,
> >
> > I think so. (but am not 100% sure.)
> > Any other comments on this issue before we close it?
> >
> > Thanks, Tobias
> >
> >
> > On 25/05/13 02:41, websec issue tracker wrote:
> >> #53: Clarify status of pin validation when used with private trust
> anchors
> >>
> >>
> >> Comment (by palmer@google.com)
> >>
> >> The current draft has this text:
> >>
> >>  578 <t>If the connection has no errors, then the UA will determine
> >> whether to
> >>  579 apply a new, additional correctness check: Pin Validation. A UA
> >> SHOULD
> >>  580 perform Pin Validation whenever connecting to a Known Pinned Host,
> >> but MAY
> >>  581 allow Pin Validation to be disabled for Hosts according to local
> >> policy. For
> >>  582 example, a UA may disable Pin Validation for Pinned Hosts whose
> >> validated
> >>  583 certificate chain terminates at a user-defined trust anchor, rather
> >> than a
> >>  584 trust anchor built-in to the UA. However, if the Pinned Host
> Metadata
> >>  585 indicates that the Pinned Host is operating in "strict mode" (see
> >>  586 <xref target="strict"/>), then the UA MUST perform Pin
> >> Validation.</t>
> >>
> >> I believe this is the result of previous consensus. Is that correct, and
> >> can I therefore close this issue?
> >>
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/websec
>
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