[websec] #53: Clarify status of pin validation when used with private trust anchors

"websec issue tracker" <trac+websec@trac.tools.ietf.org> Mon, 15 October 2012 23:09 UTC

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Subject: [websec] #53: Clarify status of pin validation when used with private trust anchors
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#53: Clarify status of pin validation when used with private trust anchors

 Clarify in the I-D whether and how, when a the server's certificate chain
 chains up to a private trust anchor (as opposed to a publicly-trusted one
 such as in Mozilla's or Microsoft's root CA programs), the UA should
 perform pin validation. Options:

 * If anchor is private, do not perform pin validation

 * Always perform pin validation, presumably always failing when trust
 anchor is private

 * If anchor is private, validate against a database of private pins;
 ** If there is no DB of private pins, do not perform pin validation
 ** If there is no DB of private pins, perform pin validation anyway
 (presumably always failing)

 * Other options?

 Currently, Google Chrome opts to not perform pin validation when the trust
 anchor is private.

-- 
-------------------------+----------------------
 Reporter:  palmer@…     |      Owner:  palmer@…
     Type:  defect       |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |  Milestone:
Component:  key-pinning  |    Version:
 Severity:  -            |   Keywords:
-------------------------+----------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/trac/ticket/53>
websec <http://tools.ietf.org/websec/>